Rosenfield Program: Chicago Experiments

Nicholas Epley

UChicago Booth School

Nicholas Epley is the John Templeton Keller Professor of Behavior Science at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. He studies social cognition—how thinking people think about other thinking people—to understand why smart people so routinely misunderstand each other. His research has appeared in more than two dozen empirical journals, been featured by The New York TimesWall Street Journal, CNN, Wired, and National Public Radio, among many others, and has been funded by the National Science Foundation and the Templeton Foundation.

Advances with Field Experiments 2016

Recent years have seen an enormous increase and interest in academic research using experimental methods in the field to address questions across a broad range of topics in economics. Moreover, businesses and governments across many countries around the world are starting to appreciate the power that field experiments can have on the design of products, services, and policies.

A New Approach to an Age-Old Problem: Solving Externalities by Incenting Workers Directly

Greer K. Gosnell, John List, Robert D. Metcalfe

Understanding motivations in the workplace remains of utmost import as economies around the world rely on increases in labor productivity to foster sustainable economic growth. This study makes use of a unique opportunity to “look under the hood” of an organization that critically relies on worker effort and performance. By partnering with Virgin Atlantic Airways on a field experiment that includes over 40,000 unique lights covering an eight-month period, we explore how information and incentives affect captains’ performance.

Affirmative Action And Human Capital Investment: Theory And Evidence From A Randomized Field Experiment

Brent Hickman, Christopher Cotton, Joseph Price

High-School human capital investment occurs within a competitive environment, and Affirmative Action (AA) shapes the relative competition between blacks and whites for admission to high-quality colleges. We present a theory of AA in university admissions and conduct a field experiment to mimic aspects of competition for college. We offer relative incentives to study math and track students’ time on a mathematics website.