Becker Friedman Institute
for Research in Economics
The University of Chicago

Research. Insights. Impact. Advancing the Legacy of Chicago Economics.

G22: Insurance; Insurance Companies

Sharing R&D Risk in Healthcare via FDA Hedges

Adam Jørring, Andrew W. Lo, Tomas Philipson, Manita Singh, Richard Thakor

The high cost of capital for firms conducting medical research and development (R&D) has been partly attributed to the government risk facing investors in medical innovation. This risk slows down medical innovation because investors must be compensated for it. We propose new and simple financial instruments, Food and Drug Administration (FDA) hedges, to allow medical R&D investors to better share the pipeline risk associated with FDA approval with broader capital markets.

Self-fulfilling Runs: Evidence from the U.S. Life Insurance Industry

Nathan Foley-Fisher, Borghan Narajabad, Stéphane Verani

Is shadow banking vulnerable to self-fulfilling runs? Investors typically decide to withdraw simultaneously, making it challenging to identify self-fulfilling runs. In this paper, we exploit the contractual structure of funding agreement-backed securities offered by U.S. life insurers to institutional investors. The contracts allow us to obtain variation in investors' expectations about other investors' actions that is plausibly orthogonal to changes in fundamentals. We find that a run on U.S. life insurers during the summer of 2007 was partly due to self-fulfilling expectations.

Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Stephen P. Ryan, Paul Schrimpf, Mark R. Cullen

In this paper we explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral response to the insurance contract. Such "selection on moral hazard" can have important implications for attempts to combat either selection or moral hazard. We explore these issues using individual-level panel data from a single firm, which contain information about health insurance options, choices, and subsequent claims.

Adverse Selection and Switching Costs in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts

Benjamin Handel

This paper investigates consumer switching costs in the context of health insurance markets, where adverse selection is a potential concern. Switching costs contribute to poor choices when the market environment changes and consumers do not adjust appropriately. Though previous work has studied the problems of adverse selection and consumer choice inadequacy in isolation, these phenomena interact in a way that directly impacts market outcomes.