

# Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection

Discussion: Matthew Gentzkow

# Motivation

- Economist's (usual) world: Set of products given, key variable is **price**
- Real world: Choice of *which* products to offer often as or more important
  
- Product characteristics are both
  - An instrument of policy
  - Endogenous to policy

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  - Endogenous to policy
  
- E.g., cars...
  - Regulation of gas mileage, emissions, etc.
  - Changes in product mix after bailout (Wollmann 2015)
  
- E.g., insurance...
  - Mandates, minimum coverage requirements, etc.
  - Endogenous plan offerings on ACA & MA exchanges, employer coverage decisions

# State of play

- Theory and empirics with endogenous product characteristics is hard
  - Structural IO models: simple settings, small space of possible goods
  - Selection markets: all these problems plus issues of existence, etc.
- *“Allowing the contract space to be determined endogenously in a selection markets raises challenges on both the theoretical and empirical front”* (Einav & Finkelstein 2011)
- Frontier: Handel et al. (2015) = 2 potential products

# This Paper

- Theory: New definition of competitive equilibrium
  - Exists
  - Gets rid of pathological equilibria
  - Robust to perturbations
  - Differentiated-Bertrand foundation
  
- Application: Einav et al. (2013)
  - Equilibrium inefficiency is large
  - Mandates increase efficiency but have unintended consequences
  - Characterize social-planner's price schedule

- Questions I'll leave to real theorists...
  - Is introduction of behavioral types an “appealing” refinement?
  - How large is the conceptual contribution relative to past literature (esp. Handel et al. 2015, Dubey & Geanakoplos 2002)?
- *Is this a useful applied tool that allows us to do things we couldn't do before?*
  - Their answer: **Yes!!!** Arbitrarily rich product spaces! Ten-dimensional heterogeneity! Behavioral consumers! Complex regulations!
  - My answer: **Yes!** (Though the authors could do (even) more to sharpen marginal contribution, and show their model not only nests these cases, but lets us learn something novel and interesting about them.)

## Birds-Eye View


# Which Products?

- Fact: Tiny subset of potential products are sold in equilibrium
- Possible explanations
  - 1 Fixed costs
  - 2 Unraveling (Akerlof, Hendren)




# Which Products?

- Fact: Tiny subset of potential products are sold in equilibrium
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  - 2 Unraveling (Akerlof, Hendren)
- This paper: How far can we get with (2) alone?
- Key Predictions
  - If  $x$  is sold,  $p^*(x) = AC(x)$
  - If  $x$  is not sold, set of types that would value it most includes somebody with  $AC(x) \geq WTP(x)$




# Not Sold



# Note: Local Concept

- Highest WTP types could have  $AC(x) \geq WTP(x)$ , and yet there could be some price at which  $p^* > AC(x)$
- E.g., if marginal costs decrease rapidly
- Also, can have multiple equilibria in lemons model when other equilibrium concepts select one



## Questions / Suggestions

# Useful Tool for Applied (Pen & Paper) Theory?

- “Correct” prediction in canonical models (like many previous papers)
- No other analytical results
- Could be hard...
  - Directly checking equilibrium conditions not promising
  - Prop 1 provides necessary, but not sufficient conditions
  - Can prove there is exactly one  $p^*$  that satisfies necessary conditions; but will this work outside simplest models?
- Give us sufficient conditions, at least for special cases; or explain more clearly where the gap lies

# Useful Tool for Numerical Theory?

- Current application makes a pretty convincing case
- Practical Issues:
  - Multiplicity
  - Computation
- Is iterative algorithm guaranteed to find equilibrium? Under some conditions?
- How far can we push the product space and still compute equilibrium?
- Compare ease of computation to other equilibrium notions (e.g., Handel et al.)

# Useful Tool for Empirical Work?

- Can we fit real data with *only* unraveling?
- The truth is in many markets, including many insurance markets, fixed costs are important
- In application, model predicts full set of possible products will be offered – not a good prediction
- I suspect most/all empirical applications will require strong exogenous restrictions on  $X$
- Can you give examples of markets where you think this is not the case, and zero fixed costs is a good approximation?
- Are there examples where predictions are *robust* to the choice of  $X$ ?
- Can we reconcile the importance of fixed costs with perfect competition?



# Final Thought

- Novelty of theory is equilibrium product selection (I don't think you get credit for  $P = AC$ )
- But this plays little / no role in the application
  - All (almost all?) products  $X$  are offered in equilibrium
  - Not relevant to social planner problem
- Can you show us more about what your model predicts about *product selection*?