Brokering Truces Between Gangs in Latin America: New Evidence on the Effects on Communities
HOSTING ORGANIZATIONS:
When it comes to combating crime and homicide in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) —home to 41 of the 50 most dangerous cities in the world—policymakers have few tested tools at their disposal. Although evidence is scarce, recent efforts to produce rigorous research is helping to broaden our understanding of what works in reducing violence and crime in the region.
The Becker Friedman Institute (BFI) at the University of Chicago, Princeton University, and Innovations for Poverty Action are pleased to announce the launch of a new series focusing on violence and crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. This monthly series aims to shed light on novel innovative research on violence and crime in the LAC region and its policy implications.
This webinar will be held in both English and Spanish. Translation from English to Spanish and vice versa will be provided.
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Gangs like Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, are known for having complete territorial control over urban neighborhoods, with violence and extortion as their main activities. In countries with low state capacity, these activities can limit socio-economic development in those areas.
A particularly common and controversial policy, which governments have used in an attempt to limit the negative consequences of gang violence, is to broker a truce between gangs in order to reduce competition. In El Salvador, for example, cooperation between gangs appears to have reduced violence, but little is known about the effect on extortion, the main revenue source for gangs, and the impact on households.
In this webinar, Eduardo Montero (University of Michigan) and Mica Sviatschi (Princeton University) discussed their research on how gangs affect the economic conditions in the areas where they rule, and the role of truces.