With the advent of the internet economy, there has been a remarkable convergence of lines of inquiry between the fields of economic theory and computer science. The emergence of new markets mediated by information technology has spurred new research on how strategic agents interact with complex institutions. These new markets have also focused attention on how best to design institutions in the face of limited information and limited computational resources. The disciplines of game theory and complexity theory provide complementary approaches to understanding these issues.
This conference brought together leading researchers from these fields to share and discuss exciting new developments. Starting from economists’ familiar ground of game theory, auctions, and market design, presenters pointed that when designing real-world auctions and markets, it’s critical to include a level of detail and complexity that economists usually must minimize to solve their models. They showed how bringing in heuristics used for optimization problems in computing science can enrich models and solve such problems with far less computing time and power.
The broader goal of the conference was to facilitate a dialogue on how best to advance the common objective of understanding strategic behavior and institutional design in complex environments.
Friday, August 12, 2016
Auctions and Pricing in Markets with Complex Constraints
Paul Milgrom, Shirley R. and Leonard W. Ely Jr. Professor of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University School of Business
Discussant: Tim Roughgarden
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
Michal Feldman, Blavatnik School of Computer Science at Tel-Aviv University
Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection
Eduardo Azevedo, University of Pennsylvania
Benjamin Golub, Assistant Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Games of Incomplete Information Played By Statisticians
Annie Liang, Microsoft Research
Discussant: Vasilis Syrgkanis
Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second Degree Price Discrimination
Nima Haghpanah, Pennsylvania State University
Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population
Eva Tardos, Cornell University
Saturday, August 13, 2016
Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
Constantinos Daskalakis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
, David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Global Conflict Studies, Harris Public Policy
Nicholas S. Lambert, Stanford University
Game Abstractions for Counterfactual Predictions in Online Market
Eric Sodomka, Facebook, Inc.
Scott Kominers, Associate Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School
Stephen Morris, Professor of Economics, Princeton University
Affirmative Action in Assignment Mechanisms
Parag Pathak, Associate Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology