Criminal organizations are pervasive. In many cities globally, gangs serve critical functions by enforcing social order and property rights, often despite the presence of strong governments. Such conditions present a puzzle to researchers and policymakers who expect gang activity to diminish in the presence of greater state power. This paper aims to resolve this paradox, investigating how these so-called “duopolies” function, and what policies may be effective at curbing gang activity.
The authors use Medellín, Colombia, as a case study in their analysis. Medellín is a large city that features an advanced economy and strong government at the local-, state-, and national-level. Nonetheless, virtually every low- and middle-income neighborhood in Medellín is also occupied by one of more than 350 small gangs, or combos, who typically engage in at least some governance activities, including prohibiting and punishing property crime, settling disputes between neighbors, enforcing rules, and, exchange, taxing locals.
The authors begin their analysis by interviewing 118 criminal leaders and group members across 41 groups in Medellín. They supplement their interviews with data from a citywide survey covering nearly 7,000 residents and businesses, whom the authors query concerning state and combo rule in their neighborhood. They document the following concerning gang rule in Medellín:
Building on these results, the authors next turn to determining how combos respond to increased state presence. To do so, they exploit a 1987 policy change that altered policing jurisdictions in Medellín and generated quasi-random changes in the distance to local and state protection across different neighborhoods. The authors use their survey, which was administered in 2019, to measure the long-run impacts of this change on governance by both the combos and the state. They find the following:
This research helps to explain why gang rule is a problem in “semi-strong states,” where governments are powerful enough to create illicit markets and challenge criminal gangs, yet too weak to eliminate them entirely. The same often holds for neighborhoods, where stronger state presence crowds out gangs in higher-income areas, while conceding criminal activity in low- and middle-income neighborhoods.
Policy-wise, these results suggest governments will need to go beyond piecemeal state-building to counter gang rule, perhaps by trying to shape local norms of combo legitimacy, or undermining drug profits. The authors encourage policymakers to proceed with caution, however, as undermining drug profits could result in more ruthless, extractive, and violent organizations.