Condemning those who criticize or expose wrongdoers is common across cultures. In the United States, we say, “Snitches get stitches,” and “Mind your own business.” The Portuguese warn, “Cagueta morre cedo” (snitches die early), Italians say, “Chi fa la spia non è figlio di Maria” (whoever spies is not Mary’s son), and the Dutch caution, “Wie praat die gaat” (who talks, goes). But does discouraging third-party sanctioning promote fairer outcomes?
In this paper, the authors study this question in the context of a similar social norm in Colombia, “no sea sapo” or, “don’t be a toad.” The authors study the impact of this norm using a series of online experiments with Colombian university students. In the experiments, a first student (the sender) decides the split of a given endowment with a second student (the receiver). In the first version of the experiment, a third student observes but cannot take any action. In a second version, the third player (now a punisher) can penalize the sender for unfair behavior by deducting points and reducing the sender’s payoff. Finally, in a third version of the experiment, the sender, if punished, can send a “mind your own business” message to the punisher. The message doesn’t affect payoffs, but instead serves to invoke the “don’t be a toad” norm.
The authors randomly allocate subjects across the three treatments, and analyze the effect that the possibility of invoking the “don’t be a toad” norm has on the behaviors and expectations of senders, third parties, and receivers. They find the following:
- When third parties can punish unfair behavior (as in the authors’ second experiment), senders tend to split endowments more equally than they do absent the threat of punishment (as in the first experiment). When senders can use the “don’t be a toad” message, however, the fairness boost from punishment disappears. In other words, the mere possibility of invoking the norm completely reverses the benefits of third-party sanctioning to achieve fair social outcomes.
- The authors also investigate players’ attitudes about “don’t be a toad.” Eighty percent believe it is socially appropriate for third parties to punish unfairness, and the same proportion finds invoking the “don’t be a toad” norm socially inappropriate. Despite these beliefs, 55% of the receivers expect the senders to appeal to the norm, should they be punished, while close to a third of senders respond to punishment by invoking the norm at least once. The authors therefore conclude that “don’t be a toad” is an anti-social norm: A social norm that most people disapprove of normatively yet expect to be adhered to by a majority in equilibrium. : Most people disapprove of it, yet also expect the majority to invoke it.
- In light of this apparent paradox, the authors develop a model to explain why the “don’t be a toad” norm persists across generations. In their model, the norm sticks around because it offers personal advantages in certain situations where following it is more rewarding than going against it.
- Finally, the authors explore the norm’s historical origins. They provide tentative evidence that the social norm expanded during Colombia’s 1950s civil war, “La Violencia,” when insurgent groups and armed forces punished people who betrayed them. This period heightened the payoff advantage of invoking the norm–an effect which may have persisted culturally.
The upshot is that the “don’t be a toad” norm does not just offset but entirely counteracts social norm enforcement through third-party punishment. The effects revealed by the authors’ experiment are large enough to suggest that living in a society where people may invoke the “don’t be a toad” norm is equivalent to living without third-party punishment. The results presented here also have important implications for designing interventions to counteract undesirable social norms. Since people already believe the “don’t be a toad” norm is undesirable, one cannot reduce the norm’s influence by targeting people’s views. Rather, it appears critical to alter the payoffs associated with observing (and not observing) the norm.