Stanford GSB PhD Piotr Dworczak studies mechanism and information design, with interests in auction design, matching theory, and information in financial markets.
In particular, his research examines design problems that arise when a mechanism is embedded in a larget market that influences agents' continuation payoffs. In such environments, the designer decides how much information to disclose as part of the mechanism design problem. The theory has applications to auctions followed by bargaining or resale and to the design of financial over-the-counter markets.
In work with Darrell Duffie and Haoxiang Zhu, he has studied the role and appropriate design of financial benchmarks, addressing converns arising from recent scandals involving manipulation of LIBOR and foreign exchange benchmarks. Summary of this research is available at the CEPR's Policy Portal VOX.
Another strand of his work considers classical topics in matching theory. He introduced a class of algorithms, called deferred acceptance with compensation chains, that generalize the Gale-Shapely algorithm by allowing both sides o the market to make offers. This work was honored as the best paper with a student lead author at the 2016 Conference on Economics and Computation.
He also has applied his market design expertise to help design the Polish kidney exchange program.
He will participate in the Review of Economic Studies Tour meetings in Europe in May 2017 before beginning his fellowship at the Institute. He will join the Northwestern University economics faculty in 2018.
Before seeking his PhD at Stanford, he earned a bachelor's degree in mathematics at the University of Warsaw and one in economics at the Warsaw School of Economics.