The Right Type of Legislator
by Mattozzi and Snowberg

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What is the main assumption of the paper?
ASSUMPTION

- The arguments in support of this assumption are a bit circular.
- Representation seems to favor the wealthy at the expense of the median.
- The assumption plus the model explains why voters would elect representatives with preferences to the right of them.
- Representatives are to the right of voters and therefore favor the wealthy
What is the Assumption about?

- Given the citizen candidate environment, the assumption comes down to a question about the transferability of skills between the productive sector of the economy and the legislative sector of the economy.
- This seems like a difficult empirical question.
- Alternatively, might look to a more palatable set of assumptions.
Different Preferences, Different Skills

- Politicians from different parties or with different abilities have different skill sets in the legislature. (For example: Krasa and Polborn (2010))
- Politician from one party might be better at the tax stage and vice versa.
Other Results

- Possible that two-thirds majority of low types might prefer a lower tax rate than a legislature composed only of high types.

- Starve the enemy type strategy here and opens up questions about the increasing share of non-discretionary spending in the budget.

- Decision by low types in low and middle district resemble a prisoner’s dilemma when $\beta$ is high enough. They would each prefer a high tax rate, but deviate to electing a high type in order to gain from greater redistribution for their district.

- Useful and interesting interpretations about the level of $\beta$ and the strength of parties.