Policy versus Distribution

- High vs Low Quality actors
- Three districts: L, M, H
- M district Voter
  - Wants low taxes—prefer L
  - Wants share of pork —prefer H
Relation to Other Questions

- Seniority
  - Vote for senior guy – more pork

- Professionalization
  - Staff size
  - Wealth of Candidates

- Comparative Politics
  - Why US differs from UK?
Relation to Other Questions

- Seniority
  - Vote for senior guy – more pork
- Professionalization
  - Staff size
  - Wealth of Candidates
- Comparative Politics
  - Why US differs from UK?
  - apart from inability to speak English
  - and cold beer
  - obsession with guns
- Mechanism
  - How does economic skill enhance legislative ability
  - Over time variance? Committee assignment variance?
Mechanism = Proposal Power

- H crafts more bills
- But H needs supporters
- Simple legislative game
  1. A bill opportunity arises
  2. Random recognition
  3. Proposal in form \((x_1, x_2, x_3)\) (sum to 1)
  4. Majority vote
  5. If reject then with probability \(\delta\) chance to cram another bill in the slot.
  6. Random recognition and \((x_1, x_2, x_3)\)
  7. Majority vote—pork is \((0,0,0)\) if bill rejected

Recognition:
- Suppose 2H and L in legislature:
- \(r_H = \frac{\beta}{2\beta + 1}\) and \(r_L = \frac{1}{2\beta + 1}\)
At 6 (1,0,0) is proposed and passes.

Continuation value at 4)

For $H$: $V_H = \delta \frac{\beta}{2\beta+1}$

For $L$: $V_L = \delta \frac{1}{2\beta+1}$

At 3:

- If $H$ proposes then $(1 - \delta \frac{1}{2\beta+1}, \delta \frac{1}{2\beta+1}, 0)$
- If $L$ proposes then $(1 - \delta \frac{\beta}{2\beta+1}, \delta \frac{\beta}{2\beta+1}, 0)$

Expected value of each legislative slot is:

- for $H$: $\frac{\beta}{2\beta+1}(1 - \delta \frac{1}{2\beta+1})$
- for $L$: $\frac{1}{2\beta+1}(1 - \delta \frac{\beta}{2\beta+1}) + (1 - \frac{1}{2\beta+1})(\delta \frac{1}{2\beta+1})$

So $H \text{ pork} - L \text{ pork} = -\frac{(\beta-2\beta^2+2\beta\delta+1)}{(2\beta+1)^2}$
Backward Induction: H L L legislature

- At 6 (1,0,0) is proposed and passes.
- Continuation value at 4)
  - For $H$: $V_H = \delta \frac{\beta}{\beta+2}$
  - For $L$: $V_L = \delta \frac{1}{\beta+2}$
- At 3:
  - $H$ proposes $(1 - \delta \frac{1}{\beta+2}, \delta \frac{1}{\beta+2}, 0)$
  - $L$ proposes $(1 - \delta \frac{1}{\beta+2}, \delta \frac{1}{\beta+2}, 0)$
- Expected value of each legislative slot is:
  - for $H$: $\frac{\beta}{\beta+2} (1 - \delta \frac{1}{\beta+2})$
  - for $L$: $\frac{1}{2\beta+1} (1 - \delta \frac{1}{\beta+2}) + \frac{1}{2\beta+1} (\delta \frac{1}{\beta+2}) + \frac{\beta}{2\beta+1} \frac{1}{2} (\delta \frac{1}{\beta+2})$
- $H$ pork - $L$ pork = $-\frac{(4\beta - 8\beta^2 - 4\beta^3 + 4\beta\delta + 5\beta^2\delta + 8)}{2(\beta+2)^2(2\beta+1)}$
When does H get more Pork?
How Much More Pork?

$\delta = 1/2$
Conclusions

- Relation to Other Questions
  - Seniority
  - Professionalization

- Comparative Politics

- Where does superiority come from?
  - Proposal power?
  - Legislature need to support bills
  - Market for supports