We investigate how effective was bank supervision before, during, and after the monetary tightening of 2022. We find that bank supervisors were aware of the interest rate risks that were emerging in the banking system and began downgrading the ratings of banks with significant exposures to such risks as early as the second quarter of 2022. We do not find that bank supervisors were more likely to downgrade banks whose excessive reliance on uninsured deposits posed liquidity risks. Rating downgrades were associated with subsequent declines in exposures to interest rate risks and with increases in bank liquidity. Overall, our evidence supports the idea that regulators made the banking system safer by limiting the interest rate risk exposures and propping up bank liquidity of many banks as the Federal Reserve began raising interest rates in the second quarter of 2022.

More on this topic

BFI Working Paper·Dec 16, 2024

Toward an Understanding of the Political Economy of Using Field Experiments in Policymaking

Guglielmo Briscese and John List
Topics: Monetary Policy
BFI Working Paper·Jul 10, 2024

Destabilizing Digital “Bank Walks”

Naz Koont, Tano Santos, and Luigi Zingales
Topics: Monetary Policy
BFI Working Paper·Jun 11, 2024

Bankruptcy Resolution and Credit Cycles

Martin Kornejew, Chen Lian, Yueran Ma, and Pablo Ottonello
Topics: Monetary Policy