Monetary policy and the welfare cost of inflation cannot be studied without some specification of allowable fiscal instruments. Here, feasible policies are implied by the frictions imposed to get roles for money and credit. The model has extreme versions of an above-ground economy and a benign underground economy. The former consists of people who are perfectly monitored and who, therefore, can be taxed; while the latter consists of people who are anonymous and, who, therefore, cannot be taxed. For various examples, ex ante (representative-agent) optima are computed. For most examples for the outside-money version of the model, it is not optimal to use taxes to raise the return on money held by anonymous people.

More on this topic

BFI Working Paper·Nov 3, 2026

The Price and the Quantity of Bank Money

Elton Dusha and Carlos J. Pérez
Topics: Fiscal Studies
BFI Working Paper·Nov 2, 2026

Risk and Return in Government Bonds

Matteo Leombroni, Carolin Pflueger, and Adi Sunderam
Topics: Financial Markets, Monetary Policy
BFI Working Paper·Nov 2, 2026

A Beckerian Theory of Taxation

Margaret Chen, Mikhail Golosov, and Ilia Krasikov
Topics: Tax & Budget