China’s land market features a substantial industrial discount: industrial-zoned land is an order of magnitude cheaper than residential land. In contrast to explanations centered on subsidies to industry or promoting industry growth, we emphasize the importance of future tax revenues from the land and find that local public finance incentives can largely rationalize this price gap. Under the “land finance” system, land sales are an important source of revenues for Chinese local governments. We show that local governments, who serve as monopolistic land sellers in China, face a trade-off between supplying residential or industrial land that is determined by the different time profiles of revenues from industrial and residential land sales, local governments’ financial constraints, and the extent of local governments’ tax revenue sharing with other levels of government.

More on this topic

BFI Working Paper·Aug 31, 2026

Democratizing Private Markets: Equilibrium Predictions

Lubos Pastor, Robert F. Stambaugh, and Lucian A. Taylor
Topics: Financial Markets
BFI Working Paper·Jul 28, 2026

Reserves and the Buyer of Last Resort

Frédéric Boissay and Harald Uhlig
Topics: Financial Markets
BFI Working Paper·Jul 15, 2026

Supply and Demand with Market Heterogeneity

Ingvil Gaarder, Lancelot Henry de Frahan, Magne Mogstad, Alexander Torgovitsky, and Oscar Volpe
Topics: Financial Markets