We show that Peru’s chronic inflation through the 1970s and 1980s was a result of the need for inflationary taxation in a regime of fiscal dominance of monetary policy. Hyperinflation occurred when further debt accumulation became unavailable, and a populist administration engaged in a counterproductive policy of price controls and loose credit. We interpret the fiscal difficulties preceding the stabilization as a process of social learning to live within the realities of fiscal budget balance. The credibility of policy regime change in the 1990s may be linked ultimately to the change in public opinion, which gave proper incentives to politicians, after the traumatic consequences of the hyper stagflation of 1987- 1990.

More on this topic

BFI Working Paper·Feb 21, 2025

Central Bank Communication with the Polarized Public

Pei Kuang, Michael Weber, and Shihan Xie
Topics: Fiscal Studies
BFI Working Paper·Jan 6, 2025

The Claiming of Children on U.S. Tax Returns

Geoffrey Gee, Jacob Goldin, Joseph Gray-Hancuch, Ithai Z. Lurie, and Vedant Vohra
Topics: Tax & Budget
BFI Working Paper·Jan 6, 2025

Interest Rate Risk in Banking

Peter M. DeMarzo, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and Stefan Nagel
Topics: Fiscal Studies