Subjective performance evaluation is widely used by firms and governments to provide work incentives. However, delegating evaluation power to local leadership could induce influence activities: employees might devote too much effort to impressing/pleasing their evaluator, relative to working toward the goals of the organization itself. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment among Chinese local civil servants to study the existence and implications of influence activities. We find that civil servants do engage in evaluator-specific influence to affect evaluation outcomes, partly in the form of reallocating work efforts toward job tasks that are more important and observable to the evaluator. Importantly, we show that introducing uncertainty about the evaluator’s identity discourages evaluator-specific influence activities and improves bureaucratic work performance.

More on this topic

BFI Working Paper·Mar 19, 2025

The Impact of Employment on Partnerships: Evidence from a Refugee Settlement

Yueh-ya Hsu, Reshmaan Hussam, Erin M. Kelley, and Gregory Lane
Topics: Employment & Wages
BFI Working Paper·Mar 10, 2025

The Rise of Healthcare Jobs

Joshua Gottlieb, Neale Mahoney, Kevin Rinz, and Victoria Udalova
Topics: Employment & Wages, Health care
BFI Working Paper·Mar 10, 2025

The Curious Surge of Productivity in U.S. Restaurants

Austan Goolsbee, Chad Syverson, Rebecca Goldgof, and Joe Tatarka
Topics: COVID-19, Employment & Wages, Industrial Organization