Armed groups routinely delegate domains of rule to pre-existing village chiefs—indirect rule. The larger a village chief’s power over the villagers relative to the group’s, the more there is indirect rule. Over time, enabled by the chief’s efforts to legitimize the group, the group expands the taxes they collect themselves in addition to those collected by the chief for them and substitutes the chief for justice administration—converging to direct rule. This suggests indirect rule is a temporary arrangement by uninformed or illegitimate rulers with an inherent agency problem, overcome when rulers acquire enough skill to replace local elites.

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