Perceived Political Bias of the Federal Reserve

We conduct a survey experiment with a large, politically representative sample of U.S. con-sumers (5,205 participants) to study how perceptions of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s (Fed) political stance shape macroeconomic expectations and trust in the Fed. The public is divided on the Fed’s political leaning: most Republican-leaning consumers believe the Fed favors Democrats, whereas most Democrat-leaning consumers perceive the Fed as favoring Republicans. Consumers who perceive the Fed as aligned with their political affiliations tend to (1) have a more positive outlook on current and future economic conditions and express higher trust in the institution, (2) show greater willingness to pay for and are more likely to receive Fed communications, and (3) assign significantly more weight to Fed communi-cations when updating their inflation expectations. Strong in-group favoritism generally amplifies these effects. Finally, if Trump were elected U.S. president, consumers would overwhelmingly view the Fed as favoring Republicans. The proportion of consumers viewing the Fed as an in-group would remain stable, but its composition would shift: Democrat-leaning consumers would see the Fed as less of an in-group, whereas more Republican-leaning consumers would perceive it in this way. Likewise, overall public trust in the Fed would remain steady, but trust among Democrat-leaning consumers would decline significantly, whereas it would rise among Republican-leaning consumers.