The Personalist Penalty: Varieties of Autocracy and Economic Growth

Studies of income and regime type typically contrast democracies and autocracies, ig-noring heterogeneity in the character of authoritarian regimes. We focus on the conse-quences of personalist rule, where power is concentrated in an individual or small elite. Extending the dynamic panel strategy of Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, and Robinson (2019), we estimate the di!erential growth performance of democracies, institutional-ized autocracies, and personalist autocracies. Across eight GDP series, eight autocracy codings, and six measures of personalism, we observe a consistent pattern: Whenever an “autocratic penalty” emerges, it is concentrated in personalist regimes. The growth performance of institutionalized dictatorships, in contrast, is statistically indistinguish-able from that of democracies. We document evidence that the “personalist penalty” is driven by some combination of low private investment, poor public-goods provision, and conflict. These findings emphasize the analytic payo! of unpacking autocracy and highlight the di!erent incentives facing leaders with narrow and broad bases of power.