Self-image Bias and Lost Talent

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Abstract

We propose an overlapping-generation model wherein researchers belong to two groups, $M$ or $F$, and established researchers evaluate new researchers. Group imbalance obtains even with group-neutral evaluations and identical productivity distributions. Evaluators’ self-image bias and mild between-group heterogeneity in equally productive research characteristics lead the initially dominant group, say $M$, to promote scholars with characteristics similar to theirs. Promoted $F$-researchers are few and similar to $M$-researchers, perpetuating imbalance. Candidates’ career concerns and institutions’ hiring practices exacerbate talent loss. Mentorship reduces group imbalance, but increases $F$-group talent loss. Affirmative action reduces both. Our mechanism explains existing evidence and suggests different policies.

Keywords: gender discrimination, self-image bias, affirmative action

JEL codes: A11, J16, J7

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1. Introduction

The economics profession has long been male-dominated. The Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession (CSWEP), a standing committee of the AEA since 1971, has been regularly documenting the progress of female economists (or lack thereof): see Chevalier (2020). This phenomenon has recently received renewed attention, possibly due to the very slow progress attained in the last 25 years. The top panel of Figure 1 shows that, while in this time span the fraction of women in undergraduate majors increased to almost 40% in the top-20 schools, the fraction of women PhD students has been flat at around 30%. More troubling, perhaps, is the middle panel, which shows that, among assistant professors—i.e. the intake for the academic career—the fraction of women has been flat at around 22% since 1994. The bottom panel shows a striking difference between schools with and without a PhD program, with the latter hiring over 40% of female tenure-track faculty while the former below 30%, and with the top-10 schools only 20%. In sharp contrast, the share of women among teaching faculty is quite uniform across schools at around 37%.

This lack of progress is puzzling given the initiatives aimed at increasing female representation in the economics profession over the past several decades. Many of these interventions are however informed by existing theories of discrimination, such as taste-based and statistical discrimination, implicit bias, and stereotyping, which we review in Section 7. From this perspective, recent empirical evidence may suggest that efforts to remove such sources of discrimination or bias have only partially succeeded. For instance, Card, DellaVigna, Funk, and Iriberri (2020) documents that acceptance rates for women-authored papers is lower conditional on quality (proxied by future citations); Sarsons (2017) and Sarsons, Gërxihani, Reuben, and Schram (2021) show that female coauthors tend to receive less credit for published papers that are joint with male coauthors; Dupas, Modestino, Niederle, and Wolfers (2021) document a bias against female presenters in economics seminars. Large differences in women representation exist across fields, however (e.g. Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2018), which would then suggest that gender-bias is more prominent in some economic fields than others.

The present paper provides a different perspective on these empirical findings, which suggests alternative policy approaches to addressing gender imbalance. We propose a novel theory that is consistent with the empirical evidence above but that does not depend on stereotypes or gender discrimination, whether taste-based or statistical. In our model, gender imbalance is due to the combination of self-image bias, i.e. the tendency of individuals

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1 See https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/committees/cswep/about.
Figure 1: Percentage of Women in Academia

to place more weight on their own positive attributes when judging others, and mild pop-
ulation heterogeneity in equally-valuable research characteristics. Both assumptions have
strong empirical and experimental support, as we discuss below. Our model, which we cali-
brate to the data, explains why female under-representation persists in the long run—even
when reviewers apply gender-neutral criteria to evaluate others’ work—and why this phe-
nomenon is especially concentrated in research-oriented institutions, and differs across fields.
In addition, our mechanism predicts that women are held to higher standards and their con-
tributions are valued less than men in co-authored work, notwithstanding gender-neutral
evaluation criteria. From a normative standpoint, our model suggests different interventions
to promote gender balance and reduce talent loss, as discussed in the concluding section.

To be clear, we do not suggest that outright gender discrimination does not exist in
academia. However, our paper identifies a subtle, yet powerful, mechanism that can per-
petuate a bias against an initially underrepresented group even if other forms of bias or
discrimination are eliminated. This calls for policies that are not just “gender-blind,” but
instead aim at achieving gender balance and preserving a diversity of talents in the profession.

Our model features overlapping generations of agents that belong to one of two groups,
labelled $M$ and $F$. A new cohort of young $M$- and $F$-researchers appears in every period,
in equal proportions. Each researcher is endowed with a set of characteristics. Examples
of such characteristics include research approach (e.g. empirical or theoretical), methodol-
ogy (e.g. structural versus reduced form), field, topic, type of questions asked, depth vs.
breadth, writing style, ties to reality, policy relevance, and so on. Research characteristics
are randomly distributed in the population of young researchers, with some of them slightly
more common in the $F$-group and others symmetrically slightly more common in the $M$-
group. As in the data, we let between-group heterogeneity be far smaller than within-group
heterogeneity. Moreover, all research characteristics are equally valuable: each has the same
positive effect on the likelihood of quality research (i.e., that which achieves its objectives).
This implies the distribution of the likelihood of quality research in the $M$ and $F$ populations
is the same. We emphasize that we do not make any assumptions about the origins of these
distributional differences, which can very well be socially determined, but only that some
mild differences exist, as documented in the empirical evidence discussed below.

We assume that the quality of a young researcher’s output is objective and observable.
However, each young researcher who has produced quality work must also be evaluated
by a randomly matched member of the established population. This evaluator (hereafter,
referee) decides whether or not to accept the young researcher as a member of the estab-
lished population—and thus as a referee of future cohorts. Each referee’s perceptions of
young researchers’ output reflect self-image bias (Lewicki, 1983): evaluators use their own characteristics as yardstick to assess others’ research. Importantly, the referees’ evaluation is group-neutral: each given referee uses the same set of research characteristics to assess young $M$ and $F$ researchers. If the referee’s evaluation is positive, the latter becomes a recognized, permanent member of the population; otherwise, he or she leaves the model.

We first show that when research is evaluated on a large number of characteristics, the combination of self-image bias and even mild between-group heterogeneity generates a persistent bias that favors young researchers who belong to the group that is initially larger, say the $M$-group. Moreover, there is no convergence. While researchers from the $F$-group are also successful, not only are they a minority: they are endogenously selected to be the ones whose research characteristics are closer to the ones that are more prevalent among $M$-researchers; this perpetuates the bias forward. Intuitively, it is as if the initially larger $M$-group decided for society which characteristics are important and worthy of reward, and which are not, despite the fact that all research characteristics are equally conducive to quality research. Thus, valuable characteristics that are (mildly) more common among the $F$-group, but also very common in the $M$-group, are vastly underrepresented in the steady state. This implies a persistent loss of talent and knowledge, and a sub-optimal steady state.

Our model thus features gender-blind evaluations, and yet $M$-researchers are more likely to meet with the approval of the profession than $F$-researchers who are their equal in terms of objective quality. In this sense, the “bar” for $F$-researchers is higher, consistently with the evidence in Card et al. (2020) that women-authored papers are accepted less frequently conditional on quality (proxied by future citations).2 Similarly, while our model does not explicitly allow for co-authorships, its basic force helps explain why female coauthors tend to receive less credit for published papers that are joint with male coauthors (Sarsons, 2017; Sarsons et al., 2021). In the online appendix we show that when coauthored work reflects the characteristics of both $M$ and $F$ coauthors, but referees are unaware of each coauthor’s characteristics, then conditional on their joint work being accepted, the expected objective quality of the $M$-coauthor increases more than the one of the $F$-coauthor. Intuitively, the referees’ population mostly reflects the characteristics of the $M$-group and thus the positive characteristics of joint research are mostly ascribed to those of the $M$ coauthor. Finally, self-image bias implies that $M$ and $F$ researchers cluster around types whose characteristics are (mildly) more common in their own groups, explaining differences in women representation across fields (e.g. Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2018).

2The evidence in Card et al. (2020) is more nuanced and we discuss it in Section 5. This “higher bar” for $F$-researcher is also evident in the empirical finding that female presenters are subject to more frequent and more hostile questioning than “equivalent” male presenters in economics seminars (Dupas et al., 2021).
Gender imbalance and loss of talent are exacerbated by candidates’ career concerns. We extend the model to allow young agents from both groups $F$ and $M$ to choose whether to pay a cost to become researchers, or enjoy an outside option. Anticipating a bias against their research characteristics, the mass of $F$-agents who pays the cost shrinks over time, and eventually converges to a smaller fraction of “applicants” than their $M$ counterparts. If costs are sufficiently high, characteristics (mildly) more common in the $F$-group disappear altogether. This intuitive result can help explain why the applications of women to PhD programs in Economics are low to start with.

Gender imbalance is also exacerbated by institutions’ hiring practices. In a second extension, we assume that hiring institutions bear a cost to hire a young researcher, and receive a payoff from hiring those who later become recognized members of the profession. Such payoff may be in terms of visibility, recognition, grant money, and so forth. Crucially, institutions anticipate that new hires’ research will be reviewed by established scholars who are affected by self-image bias. For this reason, hiring institutions skew the distribution of their hires towards characteristics more prevalent in the $M$-group and thus exacerbates the loss of talent. This result may explain why “the share female [sic] falls as the research intensity of the department increases (e.g. from top 20 to top 10)” (Chevalier, 2020, p. 15) as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. Indeed, consistently with this interpretation, we see little difference in the female share of teaching faculty.

In a further extension, in the online appendix, we allow for different levels of seniority for established researchers. Senior researchers evaluate junior researchers, and both senior and junior researchers evaluate new entrants. This mimics the career dynamics in academia. Our results about the persistent bias in hiring carry through. Moreover, under suitable parameter configurations, there is a “leaky” pipeline (cf. Chevalier, 2020): senior researchers are even more biased towards characteristics prevalent in the $M$-group than junior researchers.

We finally investigate the impact of some policy actions. We first investigate the impact of mentorship. We assume that young researchers are matched with random advisors from the set of established researchers. Given self-image bias, advisors advise young researchers to become like them; young researchers can do so by paying a cost that increases in the distance between them and their advisors. We show that, while mentorship may help reduce (but not necessarily eliminate) gender imbalance, it also accelerates the loss of $F$-group characteristics. Intuitively, mentors are drawn from the dominant population, which over-represents $M$-group characteristics. Thus, young $M$-researchers have lower costs of switching than $F$-researchers, on average. Moreover, since referees are drawn from the same dominant population, young $F$ researchers may find it profitable to adopt their mentors’ characteristics,
but they also give up their own characteristics. This exacerbates the loss of talent.

We then consider the impact of affirmative-action policies. Specifically, we consider a mandate to accept the same number of $F$ researchers as $M$ researchers each period. Clearly, such policy mechanically leads to gender balance. However, we also find that such a policy additionally ensures that all characteristics are represented in the limit: thus, qualitatively, there is no loss of talent. Intuitively, increasing the $F$-group representation by mandate also increases heterogeneity in the future pool of referees, which in turn makes it more likely that research characteristics (mildly) more prevalent across $F$ researchers will be accepted.

Our results depend on two main assumptions: mild heterogeneity in research characteristics between $M$ researchers and $F$ researcher, and self-image bias, i.e. the tendency of reviewers to use their own research style to judge the importance and worth of others’ research output. Both assumptions are grounded in the empirical and experimental literature.

First, there is a considerable body of research studying gender differences in personality traits, preferences, and attitudes. Regarding personality traits, Hyde and Linn (2006) reviews the literature and concludes that medium-sized effects are found for aggression (Cohen’s $d$ between 0.40 and 0.60) and activity level in the classroom ($d = 0.49$)\(^3\). Similarly, Hyde (2014) reports the following $d$ statistics of gender differences in the “big-5 personality traits,” earlier studied by Costa, Terracciano, and McCrae (2001): among US subjects, there are small-to-moderate differences in neuroticism ($d = -0.40$), extraversion ($d = -0.21$), openness ($d = 0.30$) and agreeableness ($-0.31$), but a trivial difference in conscientiousness ($d = -0.05$). Within economics, Croson and Gneezy (2009) provide a review of the experimental literature and find “robust differences in risk preferences, social (other-regarding) preferences, and competitive preferences.” Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman, and Meijers (2009) also find differences in risk aversion, but less so on ambiguity aversion. Dittrich and Leipold (2014) find that women tend to be more patient than men, and Dreber and Johannesson (2008) that males are more likely to lie in order to secure a monetary gain; see also Betz, O’Connell, and Shepard (1989). Goldin (2014) discusses the higher gender pay gap in professions where “working long hours” is rewarded, and suggests a (possibly socially determined) preference for flexible work hours on the part of women.

As mentioned, we do not need to take a stand on the origins of these (small) distributional differences. Indeed, the evidence suggests that many of the traits for which a gender difference exists may be socially determined—they are the result of cultural attitudes and gender stereotyping. Guiso, Monte, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) argue that gender dif-

\(^3\)Cohen (2013)’s $d$ measures the standardized mean difference between two populations. $d \approx 0.2$ is considered “small” and $d \approx 0.5$ is considered “medium.”
ferences in math scores across countries, as measured by the PISA assessment, are largely explained by broad measures of gender equality in those countries. Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde (2018) document variation in preference traits across 76 countries and find that women are more risk-averse than men in most countries; however, for trust and patience, the correlation with gender is only significant for a subset of countries. This suggests that cultural factors may partly account for gender differences in preference traits. Andersen, Ertac, Gneezy, List, and Maximiano (2013) provide experimental evidence indicating that the gender gap in competitiveness does not arise in a matriarchal society.

The second important assumption of our model is researchers’ self-image bias. The psychological literature on self-image bias (Lewicki, 1983) suggests that, when evaluating others, individuals tend to place more weight on positive attributes that they themselves possess (or believe they possess). Hill, Smith, and Hoffman (1988) show that this is true in particular when subjects are asked to select a partner in a competitive game. Dunning, Perie, and Story (1991) argue that a similar principle is at work when judging social categories by means of prototypes (e.g., what makes a good economist?): “people may expect the ‘ideal instantiation’ of a desirable social category to resemble the self in its strengths and idiosyncracies” (p. 958). Story and Dunning (1998) document a “rational” source for self-image bias and self-serving prototypes: in their experiment, “those who received success feedback came to perceive a stronger relationship between ‘what they had’ and ‘what it takes to succeed’ than did those who received failure feedback” (p. 513). Translated to our environment, established researchers view their personal success in research as evidence that their own research characteristics are the right ones to produce quality research that, in addition, is valuable to society. Hence, they use the same characteristics to evaluate the research of others.

Our assumption that referees accepts young researchers who are similar to them can also be due to referees’ preferences (e.g. theorists like theorists, and empiricists like empiricists). However, this interpretation must be subject to two caveats. First, referees’ preferences do not take group membership into account; thus, even this “homophily” interpretation of our model differs from Becker’s taste-based theory of discrimination. Moreover, in this interpretation, referees do not value heterogeneity (e.g., theorists derive no benefit from interacting with empiricists, and conversely), nor the candidate’s objective productivity. That is, they completely disregard the benefits that would accrue to a department—or, in fact, from the profession as a whole—from advancing a productive young researcher who however does not share their own characteristics. This strikes us as extreme.
2. The Basic Model

We consider an overlapping-generations model in which unit masses of two groups of young researchers, the $M$-group and $F$-group, appear at discrete times $t = 1, 2, \ldots$. Each researcher $i \in M \cup F$ is endowed with a type drawn from a set $\Theta$, and distributed heterogeneously across $M$ and $F$ researchers. While systematic, these distributional differences may well be small. Research output fully reflects the researcher’s type; in fact, we assume that the characteristics of a paper written by a researcher of type $\theta$ are $\theta$ itself.

We adopt a simple symmetric environment in which each type corresponds to a vector of $N$ characteristics which can only take two values, 0 and 1: that is, $\Theta \equiv \{0, 1\}^N$. (see online appendix for a more general case.) For each agent $i$ of type $\theta^i \in \Theta$, $\theta_n^i$ denotes the value of the $n$-th characteristic. The number $N$ of characteristics is even, characteristics are mutually independently distributed, and their distributions depend on a single parameter $\phi > 0.5$. Our main assumption, illustrated in Figure 2, is that characteristics are distributed symmetrically in the $M$ and $F$ population, in the sense that for $n = 1, \ldots, \frac{N}{2}$, $Pr(\theta_n^i = 1) = \phi$ for $M$-researchers and $Pr(\theta_n^i = 1) = (1-\phi)$ for $F$-researchers, and the opposite for $n = \frac{N}{2}+1, \ldots, N$.

For every $\theta \in \Theta$, let $p^{\theta,f}$ (resp. $p^{\theta,m}$) denote the fraction of types in the $F$ (resp. $M$) population of young researchers. Also let $p^g = (p^{\theta,g})_{\theta \in \Theta}$ for $g = f, m$. To sum up,

$$p^{\theta,m} = \prod_{n=1}^{\frac{N}{2}} \phi^{\theta_n}(1-\phi)^{1-\theta_n}, \quad p^{\theta,f} = \prod_{n=\frac{N}{2}+1}^{N} (1-\phi)^{\theta_n} \phi^{1-\theta_n}, \quad p^g = \prod_{n=1}^{\frac{N}{2}} (1-\phi)^{\theta_n} \phi^{1-\theta_n}, \quad \prod_{n=\frac{N}{2}+1}^{N} \phi^{\theta_n}(1-\phi)^{1-\theta_n}. \quad (1)$$

We model each characteristic as a desirable research attribute, which makes it more likely for the researcher to produce quality research. “Quality” research is one that achieves its stated goals—estimating a parameter of interest, establishing a causal effect, documenting a phenomenon experimentally, or proving a theorem. We assume that whether a research
paper achieves its goals is observable and can be objectively determined; this may involve, for instance, checking a formal argument regarding a theoretical claim or the application of a statistical procedure, evaluating an experimental procedure for possible biases or ambiguities, or ensuring that the formal results are clearly explained and interpreted, and that the contribution is correctly placed within its literature.

Again, we adopt a simple symmetric specification: we fix \( \gamma_0 \in (0, 1) \), \( \rho \in [1, \frac{1}{\gamma_0}] \), and assume that type \( \theta = (\theta_n)_{n=1}^{N} \) writes a quality paper with probability

\[
\gamma^\theta = \gamma_0 \rho \sum_n \theta_n. \tag{2}
\]

Thus, \( \gamma^{(0, \ldots, 0)} = \gamma_0 \), and the probability of producing quality research depends solely on the number of 1’s in \( \sum_n \theta_n \), with the maximum attained for \( \gamma^{(1, \ldots, 1)} = \gamma_0 \rho \in [\gamma_0, 1] \). A young scholar with many desirable characteristics is more likely to produce quality research than another scholar with fewer desirable characteristics. Still, even scholar type \((0, \ldots, 0)\) has probability \( \gamma_0 > 0 \) to produce quality research, perhaps by sheer luck. The parameter \( \rho \) reflects the relative impact of characteristics on the probability of producing “quality” research. If \( \rho = 1 \), for instance, then all types produce quality research with probability \( \gamma_0 \). If \( \rho = 4 \), instead, it means that the best researcher \((1, \ldots, 1)\) is four times more likely to produce quality research than the worst researcher, \((0, \ldots, 0)\).

To sum up, the free parameters in our model are \( \phi \), \( \gamma_0 \), \( \rho \), and \( N \).

### 2.1. Objective Refereeing

This section studies a benchmark system where the evaluation by established scholars is objective and only certifies whether the research is of sufficient quality or not. Since each young scholar with type \( \theta \) produces quality research with probability \( \gamma^\theta \), given in (2), this is also the probability with which the research is “accepted” by referees.

For every type \( \theta \in \Theta \), let \( a^\theta, m_t \) and \( a^\theta, f_t \) denote the mass of young researchers of group \( M \) and, respectively, group \( F \) of type \( \theta \) that produce quality research and are thus “accepted” at the end of period \( t \):

\[
a^\theta, g_t = \gamma^\theta \cdot p^\theta, g, \quad g \in \{f, m\}. \tag{3}
\]

Denote the total mass of accepted young researchers by \( a_t = \sum_{\theta \in \Theta} \sum_{g \in \{f, m\}} a^\theta, g_t \).

Denote \( \lambda^\theta, g_t \) the mass of established researchers of type \( \theta \) and group \( g \) at time \( t \). We normalize the initial mass of all established researchers to one: \( \sum_{\theta} \sum_{g} \lambda^\theta, g_0 = 1 \). In order

\[
\text{4 The fact that the total mass of established scholars (a stock) equals the mass of young M and F}
\]
to keep the mass of referees constant, we assume that each young agent whose research is
accepted replaces a randomly drawn established one. This is not necessary for the results
but keeps the analysis balanced. As we discuss in Section 2.2. below, this assumption is also
g geared towards maximizing the impact of young researchers on the evolution of the system.\footnote{We also considered a similar model with a fix retirement rate of existing researchers to be replaced
by cohorts of hired young researchers. The results are similar. The assumption in the text has one less
parameter and it is more favorable to an eventual convergence to group balance.}

The resulting dynamic is then described by the following equation:

\[ \lambda^\theta_t = (1 - a_t)\lambda^\theta_{t-1} + a_t \theta, \quad g \in \{f, m\}. \tag{4} \]

The limiting behavior of this system is readily characterized. First, initial conditions
have no long-run effect. Eq. (3) shows that \( a^\theta_t \) is time-invariant for \( g \in \{f, m\} \); hence, so
is \( a^\theta_t \), and therefore \( a_t \). Then, dropping time indices, for \( g \in \{f, m\} \),

\[ \lambda^\theta_t = (1 - a)\lambda^\theta_{t-1} + a^\theta = (1 - a)^t \lambda^\theta_0 + a^\theta \frac{1 - (1 - a)^t}{a} \to \frac{a^\theta}{a} \tag{5} \]

so the limiting fraction of \( M \)- to \( F \)-researchers is

\[ \frac{\sum_\theta a^\theta, m}{\sum_\theta a^\theta, g} = \frac{\sum_\theta \gamma^\theta p^\theta, m}{\sum_\theta \gamma^\theta p^\theta, f}. \]

Second, in our symmetric model, for every type \( \theta = (\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_N) \), there is a corresponding
type \( \tilde{\theta} = (\theta_{N/2+1}, \ldots, \theta_N, \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_{N/2}) \) such that \( p^\theta, m = p^{\tilde{\theta}, f} \) and \( \gamma^\theta = \gamma^{\tilde{\theta}} \); hence, the above
fraction equals 1. This establishes the main result of this section: regardless of initial
conditions, the system converges to equal shares of \( M \) and \( F \) established researchers, and
the limiting type distribution is fully characterized by the probability of producing quality
research and the relative frequency of each type in the population of young researchers.

\textbf{Proposition 1} In the benchmark model with objective refereeing, regardless of the composi-
tion \((\lambda_0^\theta, m, \lambda_0^\theta, f)_{\theta \in \Theta}\) of the initial population of established researchers, we have

\[ \lambda^\theta_t, m \to \frac{\gamma^\theta p^\theta, m}{a}, \quad \lambda^\theta_t, f \to \frac{\gamma^\theta p^\theta, f}{a}, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\sum_\theta \lambda^\theta_t, m}{\sum_\theta \lambda^\theta_t, f} \to 1. \]

\textbf{2.2. Refereeing with Self-Image Bias}

Our main model differs from the benchmark in Section 2.1. in that established researchers
(referees) not only evaluate young researchers on whether their research is of sufficient quality
researchers (flows) is of course not realistic, but immaterial for our analysis. Normalizing the stock of
established researchers to any positive number \( K \) yields the same predictions.
(as in previous section), but they also use their personal research styles to guide their subjective judgement as to the “importance” or “relevance” of the candidate’s output. Specifically, each young researcher $i \in M \cup F$ of type $\theta^i$ is now randomly matched to a referee $r$, who uses his or her own characteristics $\theta^r$ to evaluate agent $i$’s work. Importantly, evaluation is anonymous and group-blind: it depends solely upon referee $r$’s own type $\theta^r$ and the characteristics of researcher $i$’s output, which by assumption coincides with his of her type $\theta^i$.

Consistently with self-image bias, referee $r$ rejects applicants whose type is far from his/her own set of characteristics. We make in fact a stark assumption: referee $r$ has a positive view of young agent $i$’s research if and only if $\theta^r = \theta^i$. (We relax this assumption in the on-line appendix.) If agent $i$’s output is positively evaluated, $i$ becomes an established researcher, and will serve as referee for future cohorts of young researchers.

As in previous section, each young researcher who enters the population of established researchers randomly replaces an existing one. This assumption is the most favorable to young researchers; in particular, if the initial referee population is predominantly made of $M$-researchers, this assumption makes it easier for the dynamics to “push out” old $M$-researchers and replace them with young $F$-researchers. In other words, this assumption is most conducive to attaining group balance in the limit.

Let $\lambda_t^\theta = \lambda_t^{\theta, f} + \lambda_t^{\theta, m}$ be the total mass of established researchers of type $\theta$ at time $t$; also let $\lambda_t = (\lambda_t^\theta)_{\theta \in \Theta}$. Retaining the notation of Section 2.1., the dynamics for the mass of young researchers of type $\theta$ and group $g$ that are accepted in round $t$ is

$$a_t^{\theta, g} = \gamma^\theta \cdot \lambda_{t-1}^\theta \cdot p^{\theta, g}. \quad (6)$$

Importantly, whether a young researcher is accepted or not depends solely on the type $\theta$, and not also on the group $g$. As in Equation (4), the total mass of established researchers of type $\theta$ and group $g$ is given by

$$\lambda_t^{\theta, g} = \lambda_{t-1}^{\theta, g} (1 - a_t) + a_t^{\theta, g} \quad (7)$$

where as above $a_t = \sum_\theta \sum_g a_t^{\theta, g}$. Equations (6) and (7) indicate that there are two forces at play. On one hand, the distribution of incumbent types impacts which research characteristics are likely to be positively evaluated by referees. On the other hand, even among incumbents, types that are more likely to produce quality research tend to be more prevalent. As we shall demonstrate, the interplay of these two forces determines whether the system ultimately attains the first-best outcome in Section 2.1., or if instead an inefficient outcome, characterized by group imbalance, is reached.
2.3. Type Dynamics

We begin by studying the evolution of the mass of each type in the population. The following proposition identifies the types that can potentially survive (i.e. have positive mass) in the limit. All other types vanish over time.

**Proposition 2** Only three types can potentially survive in the limit: either

(i) the types most prevalent across $M$ and, respectively, $F$ researchers,

$$\theta^m = (1, \ldots, 1, 0, \ldots, 0) \quad \text{and} \quad \theta^f = (0, \ldots, 0, 1, \ldots, 1); \quad \text{or} \quad (8)$$

(ii) the type most likely to produce quality research,

$$\theta^* = (1, \ldots, 1). \quad (9)$$

Types $\theta^m$ and $\theta^f$ have frequency $\phi^N$; type $\theta^*$ has frequency $\phi^{N/2}(1 - \phi)^{N/2}$, and is thus less prevalent among both $M$ and $F$ researchers.

**Proof:** This and all subsequent results are proved in the Online Appendix.

Not all three types can survive simultaneously. Except for knife-edge parameter choices, either $\theta^*$ dominates in the limit and all other types (including $\theta^m$ and $\theta^f$) disappear, or $\theta^m$ and $\theta^f$ dominate (and $\theta^*$ disappears). Thus, one of the two forces at play—the initial distribution of types and the likelihood of producing quality research—eventually prevails.

In the next proposition, recall that the parameter $\rho$ measures the impact of research characteristics on the probability of producing quality research (see equation (2)).

**Proposition 3** Let $\bar{\lambda}^\theta = \lim_{t \to \infty} \lambda^\theta_t$ for all $\theta \in \Theta$ and

$$\bar{\rho}(\phi, N) = \frac{1}{4} \left( \left( \frac{1 - \phi}{\phi} \right)^{N/2} + \left( \frac{\phi}{1 - \phi} \right)^{N/2} \right)^2. \quad (10)$$

(a) If $\rho < \bar{\rho}(\phi, N)$, then only types $\theta^m$ and $\theta^f$ survive in the limit. In addition, if at time $0$, all referees are in the $M$-group with $\lambda_0 = p^m$, then

$$\bar{\lambda}^\theta_0 \frac{\phi^N}{\phi^N + (1 - \phi)^N} > \frac{1}{2}; \quad \bar{\lambda}^{\theta^f} = 1 - \bar{\lambda}^\theta_0. \quad (11)$$

(b) If $\rho > \bar{\rho}(\phi, N)$ then, regardless of the distribution of time-0 referees, only type $\theta^*$ survives in the limit.
In part (a), the impact of research characteristics on the probability of producing a quality paper, which is a function of $\rho$, is comparatively small. In this case, the dynamics of the system are driven primarily by the initial conditions and the flows of young researchers. In particular, if all referees are initially in the $M$-group, then in the limit $M$-researchers will represent the majority—despite the fact that an equal mass of young $M$ and $F$ researchers enters the model in every period, and that the research characteristics of both types are equally conducive to quality research.

Interestingly, even type $\theta^*$ disappears in this scenario, despite the fact that such type has all desirable research characteristics. For instance, when a young researcher of type $\theta^*$ is matched with a referee of type $\theta^m$, the latter “disapproves of” the $\theta^*$ traits from $N/2 + 1$ to $N$, even if they are objectively desirable. Similarly, a referee of type $\theta^f$ “disapproves of” characteristics from 1 to $N/2$. To interpret, recall that research characteristics may also include e.g. research topics or methodologies. More generally, the nature of self-image bias is exactly that each reviewer considers his or her traits as the important ones, and discounts the other ones.

Part (b) characterizes a more “meritocratic” scenario in which research characteristics significantly improve the odds of producing quality research. In this case, regardless of the initial conditions, the system reaches an efficient steady state in which all researchers possess every research characteristic—regardless of their group. Self-image bias is still at work in this scenario, but each characteristic is important enough that, over time, referees themselves will tend to possess more and more of them, and hence select in a “virtuous” way.

Taken together, parts (a) and (b) show that our simple symmetric model is capable of generating both long-run outcomes that are affected by group imbalance, as well as meritocratic and balanced outcomes. The next corollary shows that, however, that irrespective of parameter values, if the number $N$ of research characteristics is large enough, the biased outcome in part (a) of Proposition 3 will prevail—even if between-group differences are arbitrarily small (i.e. if $\phi$ is close to 0.5):

**Corollary 1** For any $\phi \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$, $\gamma_0 \in (0, 1)$, and $\rho \in (1, \frac{1}{\gamma_0})$, if $\lambda_0 = p^m$, then

1. there exists $N$ large enough such that outcome (a) of Proposition 3 realizes;

2. as the number of characteristics $N \to \infty$, $\bar{\lambda}^{\theta^m} \to 1$.

Thus, if the number of research characteristics is large and the $M$-group dominates the initial population, its most prevalent type $\theta^m$ will dominate in the steady state. Informally,
M-researchers effectively determine on behalf of society that the only important research characteristics are their own. It follows that F-researchers have no chance to grow to equality, even without any explicit bias against them.

2.3.1. Higher “Bar” for F-researchers

If the initial population of referees is entirely from the M group, a basic force in our model implies that young researchers from the F group are, in a sense, held to a higher standard. Recall that, in our parameterization of objective quality $\gamma^\theta$, all characteristics are equally important. Now consider the set of all types $\theta$ that possess exactly $L$ characteristics. All such types have the same objective productivity, independently of group membership. Furthermore, the same mass of young researchers in the M and F groups possesses exactly $L$ characteristics. Yet, if the referees are initially all from the M group, the mass of accepted M-group researchers of such types is always at least as large as for the F group. This is true even if parameters are consistent with the “meritocratic” regime.

**Proposition 4** Assume that initially $\lambda_0 = p^m$. For every $L \in \{0, \ldots, N\}$ and $t > 0$, the acceptance rate of M-researchers of quality $L$ is higher than the one of F-researchers of the same quality:

$$\sum_{\theta: \sum_n \theta_n = L} a^{\theta, m}_t \geq \sum_{\theta: \sum_n \theta_n = L} a^{\theta, f}_t$$

and the inequality is strict if there is $\theta \in \Theta$ with $\sum_n \theta_n = L$ and $\theta_n \neq \theta_{N+1-n}$ for some $n$.

That is, in aggregate, it is easier for young M-researchers researchers to be accepted than for F-young researchers, controlling for objective quality—the number of desirable characteristics $\sum_n \theta_n = L$. This is in line with the cited evidence in Card et al. (2020) that, conditional on quality (proxied by citations post-publication) women-authored papers tend to be accepted less frequently than men’s.\(^6\) Indeed, the following Proposition shows that accepted F-researchers are of higher quality than accepted M researchers, on average, for the case $N = 2$. Based on extensive numerical exploration, we conjecture the same conclusions to hold for arbitrary $N$—but we are unable to prove this at this time.

---

\(^6\) Card et al. (2020) also show that, unconditionally, men- and women-authored papers are equally likely to be accepted. The model in this section does not generate this finding: summing over $L = 0, \ldots, N$ in the displayed equation of Proposition 4, one readily sees that young M researchers are more likely to be accepted on average. The model with endogenous choice in Section 5, yields more uniform unconditional acceptance across genders, and fewer female acceptance overall due to self-selection.
Proposition 5  

(i) Let $N = 2$. The average quality of accepted $F$-researchers is higher than the one of accepted $M$-researchers:

$$E[L|f,\text{accepted}] = \sum_{\theta} L^{\theta} w^{\theta,f} > \sum_{\theta} L^{\theta} w^{\theta,m} = E[L|m,\text{accepted}]$$

where $L^{\theta} = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \theta_n$ is the quality type $\theta$ (i.e. its number of 1’s in $\theta$), and

$$w^{\theta,g} = \frac{a^{\theta,g}_t}{\sum_{\theta'} a^{\theta',g}_t}$$

(ii) As $t \to \infty$ the average quality of both $F$ and $M$ converges to either $N/2 = 1$ if only $\theta^m$ and $\theta^f$ survive in the limit, or $N = 2$ if only $\theta^*$ survives in the limit.

The intuition builds upon Proposition 4. With $N = 2$, referees accept the same mass of $M$ and $F$ researchers of types $(0,0)$ and $\theta^* = (1,1)$. However, among types with $L^{\theta} = 1$ (that is, $\theta^m$ and $\theta^f$), since established researchers are predominantly from the $M$ group, type $\theta^m$ is accepted more frequently than $\theta^f$. But this type is more common among young $M$ researchers than among young $F$ researchers. Thus, overall, more $M$-researchers of quality $L = 1$ are accepted. This implies that the relative frequency of type $\theta^* = (1,1)$ is higher among accepted $F$-researchers than accepted $M$-researchers. This turns out to imply that the average quality of accepted $F$-researchers is higher.\footnote{The argument above is incomplete because the fraction of accepted type-(0,0) researchers is also higher among $F$ rookies than $M$ rookies; the proof of Proposition 5 takes this into account. The same basic forces are at play with $N > 2$. However, in this case there are many different intermediate types, and this makes extending the argument given above non-trivial.}

2.3.2. Group Imbalance in the Limit

Proposition 3 mostly concerns the distribution of researcher types irrespective of their group. In the Online Appendix we analyze in detail how the mass of each type $\theta$ evolves among $M$- and $F$-researchers separately, and also characterize group (im)balance in the limit. Here we report the main result about group imbalance.

Proposition 6 Assume that all referees are initially from the $M$-group with $\lambda_0 = p^m$.

(a) If $\rho < \bar{\rho}(\phi, N)$, then the total mass of $M$ and $F$ researchers are

$$\bar{\Lambda}^m = 1 - \bar{\Lambda}^f = \frac{1 + \left(\frac{\phi}{1-\phi}\right)^{2N}}{1 + \left(\frac{\phi}{1-\phi}\right)^{2N} + 2 \left(\frac{\phi}{1-\phi}\right)^N} > 0.5.$$
(b) If $\rho > \bar{\rho}(\phi, N)$, then $\bar{\Lambda}^m = \bar{\Lambda}^f = \frac{1}{2}$.

The result in part (a) intuitively follows from the corresponding result in Proposition 3. Eventually, only $\theta^m$ and $\theta^f$ survive, but $\theta^m$ is more common in the $M$ group than $\theta^f$. Thus, the limiting total mass of $M$-researchers is larger than 0.5. The next corollary illustrates the limiting case as the number of research characteristics $N$ diverges to infinity:

**Corollary 2** For all $\phi \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$, $\gamma_0 \in (0, 1)$, and $\rho \in (1, \frac{1}{\gamma_0})$, if $\lambda_0 = p^m$,

1. there exist $N$ large enough such that case (a) in Proposition 6 realizes;
2. as $N \to \infty$, $\bar{\Lambda}^m \to 1$ and $\bar{\Lambda}^f \to 0$.

This reinforces and refines the message of Corollary 1: in particular, for all parameter values, as $N$ increases, the fraction of $M$-researchers always dominates in the limit, and in the limit converges to one.

### 2.3.3. Talent Loss and Clustering

One further implication of our model is that, when self-image bias prevails, the characteristics $n = N/2+1, \ldots, N$ that are more common in the $F$-group are under-represented in the limit.

**Corollary 3** In part (a) of Proposition 6, in the limit,

\[
0.5 = \frac{\bar{\lambda}^{\theta^f, f}}{\lambda^{\theta^m, f} + \lambda^{\theta^f, f}} = \frac{\bar{\lambda}^{\theta^m, f}}{\lambda^{\theta^m, f} + \lambda^{\theta^f, f}} \tag{14}
\]

This result is in stark contrast with $\theta^f$ being the prevalent type in each cohort of young $F$-researchers. The selection mechanism makes the type most prevalent among $M$-researchers, $\theta^m$, be a frequent type in the established $F$-researchers (50% of the time), even if such type only has $(1 - \phi)^N < 0.5$ frequency in the population of young $F$-researchers. That is, $F$-group research characteristics are underrepresented in the limit.

Self-image bias also implies clustering of characteristics and groups. In particular, $M$-researchers will be mostly of type $\theta^m$; in contrast, $F$-researchers, while a minority, will tend to be mostly of type $\theta^f$. Thus, if at least some of the characteristics correspond to research topics, we conclude that different groups will be relatively more prevalent in different “fields:”
Table 1: Type Frequencies in a Simple Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>$p_m^θ$</th>
<th>$p_f^θ$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(0, 0)$</td>
<td>$0.2 \times 0.8 = 0.16$</td>
<td>$0.8 \times 0.2 = 0.16$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$θ^m = (1, 0)$</td>
<td>$0.8 \times 0.8 = 0.64$</td>
<td>$0.2 \times 0.2 = 0.04$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$θ^f = (0, 1)$</td>
<td>$0.2 \times 0.2 = 0.04$</td>
<td>$0.8 \times 0.8 = 0.64$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$θ^* = (1, 1)$</td>
<td>$0.8 \times 0.2 = 0.16$</td>
<td>$0.2 \times 0.8 = 0.16$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corollary 4 In part (a) of Proposition 6, in the limit, $M$-researchers are relatively more frequent as type $θ^m$ and $F$-researchers are relatively more frequent as type $θ^f$:

$$\frac{\bar{X}^θ,m}{X^θ,m + X^θ,f} = \frac{1}{1 + \left(\frac{1-\phi}{\phi}\right)^N} > 0.5;\tag{15}$$

This result is qualitatively consistent with the evidence documenting large gender differences across economics topics (see e.g. Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham (2018)), although it is too extreme, as women’s frequency never breaks the 50% threshold in economics (although it does in other areas, such as psychology). This result is also in stark contrast with the case of meritocracy that is illustrated in Proposition 3(b). In that case, $θ^*$ prevails in the limit which generates a symmetric distribution of $M$ and $F$ researchers across characteristics.

3. A Simple Numerical Example

To illustrate the intuition of our model, we first provide a simple example. Consider the case in which agents have only two characteristics, so $N = 2$. Thus, we have a set of four types:

$$\Theta = \{(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)\}.$$  

In the notation of the preceding subsections, $θ^m = (1, 0)$, $θ^f = (0, 1)$, and $θ^* = (1, 1)$.

To characterize the population of young researchers, we choose $\phi = 0.8$. That is, 80% of $M$-researchers have characteristic 1, but only 20% have characteristic 2; conversely, 80% of $F$-researchers have characteristic 2, but only 20% have characteristic 1. The probability distributions of types $θ$ are in Table 1. The between-group heterogeneity in this example is large and not realistic. Our objective in this section is simply to illustrate the patterns that our model can generate. Section 4. provides a numerical analysis of a more realistic case, with between-group heterogeneity in line with the data.

We first consider parameters $γ_0$ and $ρ$ for which self-image bias prevails. Specifically, we let $γ_0 = 0.2$ and $ρ = 4$. This implies that type $θ^*$ is twice as likely as types $θ^m$ and $θ^f$ to
produce quality research; in turn, these types are twice as likely as the worst type \((0,0)\) to do so. Thus, research characteristics do matter in this scenario; however, it turns out that, with \(\phi = 0.8\), by Proposition 3 self-image bias prevails:

\[
\rho = 4 < 4.51625 = \bar{\rho}(\phi, N) = \frac{1}{4} \left( \left( \frac{0.2}{0.8} \right)^{2/2} + \left( \frac{0.8}{0.2} \right)^{2/2} \right)^2.
\]

Part (a) of Proposition 3 states that, in the limit, only the two intermediate types have positive mass. So, in particular, the “best” researcher type \((1,1)\) disappears in the limit. Furthermore, if \(\lambda_0 = p_m\), then eventually \(\theta^m = (1,0)\) becomes the majority type; specifically,

\[
\bar{\lambda}^{(1,0)} = \bar{\lambda}^{\theta^m} = \frac{0.8^2}{0.8^2 + 0.2^2} \approx 94\%.
\]

As may be expected, correspondingly, established researchers are predominantly \(M\)-type in the limit: from Eq. (13) in Proposition 6, the fraction of \(M\)-researchers in the limit is

\[
\bar{\Lambda}^m = \frac{1 + \left( \frac{\phi}{1-\phi} \right)^{2N}}{1 + \left( \frac{\phi}{1-\phi} \right)^{2N} + 2 \left( \frac{\phi}{1-\phi} \right)^{N}} = \frac{1 + \left( \frac{8}{2} \right)^4}{1 + \left( \frac{8}{2} \right)^4 + 2 \left( \frac{8}{2} \right)^2} \approx 89\%.
\]

This is the case despite the fact that an equal mass of young \(M\)- and \(F\)-researchers appear in every period, and also despite the absence of any explicitly group-biased evaluation of young researchers. The result is driven solely by the initial condition and the referees’ self-image bias. To give a sense of the dynamics of the system at finite times, panel (a) of Figure 3 displays the evolution of the fraction of \(M\)- and \(F\)-researchers in the population (that is, \(\Lambda_t^m\) and \(\Lambda_t^f\)) over 100 periods, assuming that all established researchers at time \(t = 0\) are \(M\)-researchers (\(\lambda_0 = p^m\)) and that \(p^m\) and \(p^f\) are as in Table 1.

Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows the average objective quality of accepted \(F\) and \(M\) researchers, with the former being uniformly higher than the latter. This is consistent with Proposition 5 and the intuition provided there. Graphically, the two panels of Figure 4 show the percentage of established \(F\)-researchers (left) and \(M\)-researchers (right). Concentrating on \(M\)-researchers first, type \(\theta^m = (1,0)\) prevails from the beginning, compared to other types. As discussed in Proposition 5, this is due to referees being from \(M\)-group initially, and thus oversampling the characteristics \((1,0)\). The opposite is true for the \(F\)-researchers. In this case, the population of successful \(F\)-researchers are initially mostly of type \(\theta^* = (1,1)\) (blue line), with smaller—and equal—masses of types \(\theta^m = (1,0)\) and \(\theta^f = (0,1)\). (The masses are small in all three cases.) Hence, conditional on being accepted, \(F\)-researchers have a large representation of the best characteristics \((1,1)\) initially, as explained in Proposition 5.
Figure 3: Fraction of $M$ and $F$ Researchers and Acceptance Rates

(a) $M$ and $F$ researchers

(b) Average Quality

Fraction of $M$ and $F$ researchers (Panel a) and average acceptance rates of $M$ and $F$ researchers, i.e. $\sum_{g} L^{\theta} w_{t}^{\theta,g}$ where $L^{\theta} = \sum_{\theta=1}^{N} \theta_n$ and $w_{t}^{\theta,g} = \frac{a_{t}^{\theta,g}}{\sum_{\theta'} \theta'_n}$, $g = f, m$ (Panel b). Initially $\lambda_0 = p^m$. Parameters: $\phi = 0.8$, $\gamma_0 = 0.2$, $\rho = 4$, $N = 2$.

Figure 4: Types of Established $F$ and $M$ Researchers

(a) $F$ researchers

(b) $M$ researchers

Types of established $F$ (left) and $M$ (right) researchers. We show types $\theta^* = (1, 1)$, $\theta^{m} = (1, 0)$, and $\theta^{f} = (0, 1)$. Initially $\lambda_0 = p^m$. Parameters: $\phi = 0.8$, $\gamma_0 = 0.2$, $\rho = 4$, $N = 2$.

The fact that successful $F$-researchers have equal mass of types $\theta^{m}$ and $\theta^{f}$ should be contrasted with the fact that $\frac{\phi^2}{(1-\phi)^2} = \frac{0.64}{0.04} = 16$ times as many $\theta^{f}$ types as $\theta^{m}$ types appear among $F$-researchers in every period. It turns out that this ex-ante difference in the masses of types $\theta^{m}$ and $\theta^{f}$ in the $F$ population is offset by the fact that $\theta^{m}$ types are much more likely to be matched with referees of the same type. In our symmetric model, these two effects exactly offset each other.
In summary, the system “weeds” out the least productive types $\theta = (0, 0)$, but also the efficient type $\theta^* = (1, 1)$, despite its higher objective quality. Moreover, because the $M$-population dominates, and, in this population, characteristic $n = 2$ is under-represented, we end up with a self-perpetuating state in which the dominant $M$-characteristic $n = 1$ is over-sampled at the expense of the dominant $F$-characteristic $n = 2$.

3.1. Convergence to Efficiency

We now demonstrate how group balance may arise even with an unbalanced initial population. We continue to assume that the initial population is $M$-dominated: $\lambda_0 = p^m$, and that $N = 2$ and $\phi = 0.8$. However, we now take $\gamma_0 = 0.1$ and $\rho = 9$. Compared with our previous parameterization, research characteristics now have a greater impact on the likelihood of producing quality research. For instance, type $\theta^*$ is 3 times as likely to produce quality research as types $\theta^f$ and $\theta^m$, who are themselves 3 times as likely to do so as type $(0, 0)$. Thus, the system is now more “meritocratic.” Now

$$\rho = 9 > 4.25 = \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{0.2}{0.8} + \frac{0.8}{0.2} \right)^2 = \bar{\rho}(0.8, 2),$$

so Proposition 3 part (b) implies that type $\theta^*$ will dominate in the limit. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the dynamics. Now the percentage of $F$-researchers indeed converges to 50%. Moreover, the system weeds out those researchers that do not possess both characteristics. Panel (b) of Figure 5 shows that accepted $F$ researchers are of higher quality than accepted $M$ researchers, as in Proposition 5, until convergence to quality $L = 2$.

4. Many Characteristics and a Calibration

The previous section illustrated the dynamics and the implicit bias that arises from the case with only two research characteristics. The bias was evident and extreme when we considered a large difference in the distribution of each characteristic in the population—we assumed $\phi = 0.8$, so 80% of young $M$-researchers and 20% of young $F$-researchers were endowed with characteristics 1, while the opposite was true for characteristics 2. The parameter $\phi$ can be easily related to Cohen’s $d$ statistic for an individual characteristic: for $n = 1, \ldots, \frac{N}{2}$,

$$d = \frac{E[\theta^i_n | i \in M] - E[\theta^i_n | i \in F]}{\sigma_{pooled}(\theta^i_n)} = \frac{2\phi - 1}{\sqrt{\phi(1 - \phi)}}.$$ 

(16)

For $n = \frac{N}{2} + 1, \ldots, N$, the $d$ statistic is the negative of the above expression. Cohen (2013) suggests that values of $d$ around 0.2 should be considered “small,” values around
Figure 5: Fraction of $M$ and $F$ Researchers and Acceptance Rates with More Meritocracy

(a) $M$ and $F$ researchers

(b) Average Quality

Fraction of $M$ and $F$ researchers (panel a) and average acceptance rates of $M$ and $F$ researchers, i.e. $\sum_{\theta} L_{\theta} w_{\theta}^g$ where $L_{\theta} = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \theta_n$ and $w_{\theta}^g = a_{\theta}^g / \sum_{\theta'} a_{\theta'}^g$, $g = f, m$ (Panel b). Initially $\lambda_0 = p^m$. Parameters: $\phi = 0.8$, $\gamma_0 = 0.1$, $\rho = 9$, $N = 2$.

Figure 6: Types of Established Female and Male Researchers with More Meritocracy

(a) $F$ researchers

(b) $M$ researchers

Types of established $F$ (left) and $M$ (right) researchers. We show types $\theta^* = (1, 1)$, $\theta^m = (1, 0)$, and $\theta^f = (0, 1)$. Initially $\lambda_0 = p_m$. Parameters: $\phi = 0.8$, $\gamma_0 = 0.1$, $\rho = 9$, $N = 2$.

0.5 “medium,” and values around or above 0.8 “large.” In the example in the previous section, Cohen’s $d$ statistic for each characteristic then equals

$$d = \frac{2\phi - 1}{\sqrt{\phi(1 - \phi)}} = \frac{0.6}{\sqrt{0.16}} = 1.5,$$

which is excessively large for most characteristics likely to be relevant to research activity. However, Proposition 3 shows that, if the number of characteristics is sufficiently large, such extreme across-group differences are not required for our conclusions to hold.

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This section considers a more realistic parametrization of our model. The first issue is the number of characteristics that lead to quality research and are taken into account by referees when they evaluate a candidate. We suggest that the number of characteristics is actually large. The following is but a partial list: (i) Economic motivation; (ii) “Nose” for good questions; (iii) Institutional knowledge; (iv) Ability to find new data sources; (v) Solid identification strategy; (vi) Sophisticated empirical analysis; (vii) Clever experimental design; (viii) Skilful theoretical modelling; (ix) Ability to highlight insights, strategic effects, etc. (x) Mathematical sophistication, proof techniques, etc. (xi) Ability to position within the literature; (xii) Ability to highlight policy implications; (xiii) Presentation skills; (xiv) Ability to address questions from audience; (xv) Honesty; and so on. Likely, there are many others. Perhaps some of these research traits are more important than others, but as a first pass, it is indeed plausible that the positive or negative result of a review depends on a combination of research characteristics, and not just a small number. In light of these considerations, and to be conservative, we assume that $N = 10$.

The second issue is the magnitude of between-group differences, which depends on the parameter $\phi$. We set $\phi = 0.5742$, so the implied Cohen’s $d$ is

$$
d = \frac{2 \times 0.5742 - 1}{\sqrt{0.5742 \times (1 - 0.5742)}} = 0.3,
$$

This value is considered “small” and in line with the estimated group differences of the various traits discussed in the introduction.

As for the parametrization of $\gamma^\theta = \gamma_0 \rho^\frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n$, we proceed as follows: First, we assume the best researchers $\theta^* = (1, 1, ..., 1)$ has 100% probability of producing quality research, ie. $\gamma^{\theta^*} = 1$. Second, we calibrate $\gamma_0$ to match the rate at which economics PhD students succeed in getting an academic job. We compute the latter from the NSF Survey of Doctoral Recipients. We take the ratio of economics PhD recipients who are employed in 4-year educational institutions over the total of economics PhD recipients, both inside and outside the US. That ratio is 0.462. Choosing $\gamma_0 = 0.2$ yields an objective success rate $\sum_{\theta} \gamma^\theta (p^{\theta,f} + p^{\theta,m})/2 = 0.462$. Interestingly, the implied $\rho = \gamma^{\theta^*}/\gamma_0 = 5$ entails that researcher $N$ is objectively five times as productive as researcher 0, which is roughly in line with the evidence

\[\text{For instance, some researchers may be more keen to “torture” the data than others, or search for variables that lead to statistical significance. See e.g. discussion in Mayer (2009) and, on the impact of conflict of interests on economic research, Fabo, Jancokova, Kempf, and Pastor (2020).}\]

\[\text{The 2017 survey is the latest as of the time of this writing and it is available at https://ncsesdata.nsf.gov/doctoratework/2017/index.html. The total number of economics PhD recipients is 32,000 in US and 12,750 outside the US. The total number of them working in a 4-year educational institution are 12,750 in the US and 7,900 outside the US. The ratio of economics PhDs who undertake an academic career is (12,750+7,900)/(32,000+12,750) = 0.462.}\]
Figure 7: Fraction of $M$ and $F$ Researchers and Acceptance Rates with Ten Characteristics

(a) $M$ and $F$ researchers

(b) Average Quality

Fraction of $M$ and $F$ researchers (Panel a) and average quality of $M$ and $F$ researchers, i.e. $\sum_\theta L^\theta w^{\theta,g}$ where $L^\theta = \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n$ and $w^{\theta,g} = a^{\theta,g}/\sum_{\theta'} a^{\theta',g}$, $g = f, m$ (Panel b). Initially $\lambda_0 = p^m$. Parameters: $\phi = 0.5742$, $d = 0.3$, $\gamma_0 = 0.2$, $\rho = 5$, $N = 10$.

on research productivity reported in Conley and Önder (2014).\textsuperscript{10}

The result is in Figure 7. Panel (a) shows that the system converges to a large imbalance between $M$- and $F$-researchers, with $F$-researchers representing less than 10% of the population.\textsuperscript{11} This large imbalance obtains despite the fact that the distribution of characteristics is now very similar across $M$ and $F$ types. Panel (b) plots the average quality of accepted $F$- and $M$-researchers, and shows the average quality of the former group is uniformly higher, although both eventually converge to $N/2 = 5$. This plot is consistent with Proposition 5 and our conjecture that the result should hold for every $N$.

5. Endogenous Entry

In this section we extend the model to consider the optimal choice of young researchers on whether to undertake a research career (Section 5.1.) and the optimal choice of hiring institutions on whether to hire young researchers (Section 5.2.).

\textsuperscript{10}These parallels with the data should be taken with a grain of salt, given that the data would reflect the outcome of the model with self-image bias, and not just objective refereeing. On the other hand, we have more degrees of freedom: recall that we normalized that mass of reviewers to 1, but we can choose another mass $K$ to match the failure rate from the data. See footnote 4.

\textsuperscript{11}Indeed, inserting $\phi = 0.5742$ and $N = 10$ in equation (13), the limiting fraction of $M$ researchers is $\bar{\Lambda}^m \approx 91\%$, which is where the system converges in Figure 7.
5.1. Endogenous Choice of Young Researchers

Consider a potential researcher choosing between an academic career and an outside option. The prospective researcher knows her type $\theta$, and is aware of both the likelihood of producing quality research, and the evaluation criteria used by the referees. Attempting to pursue research entails a cost $C$, which is identical across agents. If the potential researcher is hired (accepted), he or she receives a payoff of $P$; finally, the outside option is normalized to 0. Thus, the total payoff is $P - C$ if the researcher is hired, and $-C$ otherwise. What types of agents decide to pay the cost $C$ and thus take their chance with the academic career?

Assume that the entry decision, research activity, and hiring decision all occur at time $t$. Then, given the time-$t$ distribution $\lambda_t = (\lambda^\theta_t)_{\theta \in \Theta}$ of referees’ types, a prospective researcher of type $\theta$ pursues an academic career—“applies”—if and only if

$$\gamma^\theta \lambda^\theta_t (P - C) + (1 - \gamma^\theta \lambda^\theta_t)(-C) > 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

Consequently, the accepted mass of researchers is as follows: for $g = f, m$,

$$a^\theta_{t,g} = \begin{cases} \gamma^\theta \cdot \lambda^\theta_{t-1} \cdot p^\theta g, & \text{if } \gamma^\theta \lambda^\theta_{t-1} \geq \frac{C}{P} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

$$\lambda^\theta_{t-1} = (1 - a_t) + a^\theta_{t,g}$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

Expression (18) shows that if the mass of type-$\theta$ reviewers drops below $\frac{C}{\gamma P}$ at time $t - 1$, both $M$ and $F$ young type-$\theta$ researchers will not apply at date $t$. From Eq. (19), this implies that the total mass of such types will decrease, at least weakly, because some type-$\theta$ established researchers will have to retire in order to make room for researchers of other types who are accepted. In fact, the mass of such types will decrease strictly, except in case no young researcher wants to apply.

While the dynamics with endogenous entry is considerably more complicated than in the benchmark case, we prove the following Proposition:

**Proposition 7** Assume that at time 0, all referees are from the $M$-group with $\lambda_0 = p^m$.

(a.1) If $\rho < \bar{\rho}(\phi, N)$ and $\frac{C}{P} \leq (1 - \phi)^N \gamma_0 \sqrt{\rho}$, then the steady state is as in Proposition 3(a).

(a.2) If $\rho < \bar{\rho}(\phi, N)$ and $(1 - \phi)^N \gamma_0 \sqrt{\rho} < \frac{C}{P} \leq \phi^N \gamma_0 \sqrt{\rho}$, then only type $\theta^m$ survives in the limit, i.e. $\bar{\lambda}^{\theta^m} = 1$. The limiting mass of $M$ researchers is strictly larger than in (a.1):

$$\bar{\Lambda}^m = \lim_{t \to \infty} \sum_{\theta} \lambda^m_{t,\theta} = \frac{\phi^N}{\phi^N + (1 - \phi)^N} > \frac{1 + \left(\frac{\phi}{1 - \phi}\right)^{2N}}{1 + \left(\frac{\phi}{1 - \phi}\right)^{2N} + 2 \left(\frac{\phi}{1 - \phi}\right)^N}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)
(b) If $\rho > \bar{\rho}(\phi, N)$ and $[\phi(1-\phi)]^{N/2} \geq \frac{C}{\gamma_0 \rho^F}$, then the steady state is as in Proposition 3(b).

In each of the above cases, if $\bar{\lambda} = 0$, then there is $t^\theta \geq 0$ such that $\lambda_t = 0$ for all $t \geq t^\theta$.

Part (a.1) and (b) of this proposition shows that if the cost $C$ is low enough, then the the steady state is the same as in the basic model in Section 2, for the same two conditions about $\rho$, respectively. This is intuitive. The only difference is that all types other than surviving ones drop out in finite time, rather than only in the limit.

The interesting new part is (a.2). In this case, the only type that survives in the long-run is $\theta^m$, the most prevalent type in the $M-$population. In particular, $\theta^f$ now disappears. Thus, the characteristics that are mildly more frequent in the $F-$population, but also common in the $M$-population, eventually disappear. In this case, endogenous entry greatly exacerbates the loss of talent compared to the base case. Indeed, the total mass of $M$ researchers, $\bar{\Lambda}^m$, is now even larger than in its counterpart without endogenous entry, whose expression is in Eq. (11) in Proposition 3. Thus, if the conditions in part (a.2) are satisfied, the distribution of established researchers will be even more skewed towards the $M$ group.

Parts (a.1)–(b) do not exhaust all possible cases; for instance, they do not analyze the possibility that the first condition in part (b) holds, but the second does not—that is, $\theta^*$ is not willing to apply. The following section illustrates a stark instance of one such possibility. The proof of the above Proposition in the Appendix provides a general characterization that can be used to further explore different parametric choices.

5.1.1. Example of Group Imbalance due to Endogenous Entry

We first illustrate how endogenous entry can exacerbate group imbalance, provided the cost of entry is not too small. Consider the parameterization in Section 4. In our basic model, $M$-researchers represent 91% of the overall population in the limit. If we add endogenous entry, Proposition 7 shows that the steady state either remains the same, if the cost $C$ is sufficiently low, as in case (a.1), or it becomes even more skewed towards the $M$ group, as in case (a.2). In the latter case, the limiting fraction of $M$-researchers is $\bar{\Lambda}^m = \phi^N/(\phi^N + (1-\phi)^N) = 95\%$.

We now illustrate how endogenous choice may prevent convergence to group balance even when group balance would in fact attain in the basic model. We use the same parameterization as in Section 4., except that the number of characteristics is $N = 8$ instead of $N = 10$. With these parameter values, Proposition 3 part (b) implies that the system will converge to an equal mass of $M$ and $F$ researchers, because $\rho = 5 > 3.61 = \bar{\rho}(\phi, N)$. The solid and
dashed lines in Figure 8 confirm this.

However, assume now that entry is endogenous; the payoff if a researcher is hired is $P = 1,000$, and the cost of entry is $C = 4$ (i.e., 0.4% of the payoff of becoming a researcher over the outside option). Note that these parameters apply equally to $M$ and $F$ researchers. The key point is that now the efficient type $\theta^* (M$ or $F$) does not want to apply at date 0:

$$\lambda_{\theta^*}^0 = p^{\theta^*,m} = \phi^{N/2}(1 - \phi)^{N/2} = 0.3574\% < 0.4\% = \frac{C}{\gamma^{\theta^*}P}.$$ 

Moreover, type $\theta^f (M$ or $F$) does not want to apply either:

$$\lambda_{\theta^f}^0 = p^{\theta^f,m} = (1 - \phi)^N = 0.1081\% < 0.8944\% = \frac{C}{\gamma^{\theta^f}P}.$$ 

On the other hand, type $\theta^m (M$ or $F$) does:

$$\lambda_{\theta^m}^0 = p^{\theta^m,m} = \phi^{N} = 1.18\% > 0.8944\% = \frac{C}{\gamma^{\theta^m}P}.$$ 

Therefore, while other types are also willing to apply, type $\theta^m$ will prevail, which will lead to a severe imbalance between $M$ and $F$ researchers in the limit, as shown in Figure 8. Indeed, in this case the talent loss is rather severe, as the only surviving type $\theta^m = (1, ..., 1, 0, ...0)$ has none of the research characteristics that are (mildly) more common in the $F$–population. Figure 9 shows that both $F$ and $M$ researchers are of type $\theta^m$ in the long run.

To sum up, even if the basic environment is meritocratic, in the sense that differences in talents $\gamma^\theta$ across types are sufficient to lead to group balance, endogenous entry introduces a bias in favor of $M$-researchers which leads to an imbalance steady state. In this case, policies aimed at lowering the cost $C$ can lead to group balance in the long run.

5.1.2. Characterization of the Applicant Pool

Due to variation in the distribution of characteristics, Proposition 7 also has implications for the mass of young $M$ and $F$ researchers who decide to apply for an academic job:

**Proposition 8** For every $t$, let

$$A^m_t = \sum_{\theta: \lambda_t^\theta \geq \frac{C}{\gamma^{\theta}P}} p^{\theta,m} \quad \text{and} \quad A^f_t = \sum_{\theta: \lambda_t^\theta \geq \frac{C}{\gamma^{\theta}P}} p^{\theta,f}$$

Then $A^m_t \geq A^f_t$. Moreover, if $\lambda_t^{\theta^m} > \frac{C}{\gamma^{\theta^m}P} > \lambda_t^{\theta^f}$, then $A^f_t \to 1 - \bar{\Lambda}^m$, where $\bar{\Lambda}^m$ is as in part (a.2) of Proposition 7.
Figure 8: Fraction of $M$ and $F$ Researchers with Endogenous Entry

Fraction of $M$ and $F$ researchers when $\lambda_0 = p^m$. Parameters: $\phi = 0.5742$ ($d = 0.3$), $\gamma_0 = 0.2$, $\rho = 5$, $N = 8$, $P = 1000$, and $C = 4$.

Figure 9: Types of Established $F$ and $M$ Researchers with Endogenous Entry

(a) $F$ researchers  
(b) $M$ researchers

Types of established $F$ (left) and $M$ (right) researchers with endogenous entry. $\theta^m = (1, ..., 1, 0, ..., 0)$ dominates; all other types eventually vanish. Parameters: $\phi = 0.5742$ ($d = 0.3$), $\gamma_0 = 0.2$, $\rho = 5$, $N = 8$, $P = 1000$, and $C = 4$.

The intuition stems from the fact that when the majority of referees is from the $M$-group, it is more likely for an $M$-researchers to be accepted than for a $F$-researcher, on average. Thus, mass of applicants from the $M$-group is higher than from the $F$-group.

Figures 10a and 10b show the total masses of $M$ and $F$ applicants and, respectively, the
percentage of $F$ applicants over the total application pool. The parameter values are the same as for Figure 8. Consistently with Corollary 8, the mass of $M$ applicants is always greater than that of $F$ applicants; furthermore, the latter declines over time. The discrete jumps in these masses occur whenever, for some type $\theta$, the population fraction $\lambda^\theta_t$ falls below the cutoff $C/(\gamma^\theta P)$. In the limit, the fraction of $F$ applicants equals the fraction of $F$ researchers of the only surviving type $\theta_m$ over the total:

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{A^f_t}{A^m_t + A^f_t} = \frac{p^{\theta_m,f}}{p^{\theta_m,f} + p^{\theta_m,m}} = \frac{(1 - \phi)^N}{\phi^N + (1 - \phi)^N} = \frac{0.4258^8}{.4258^8 + .5742^8} = 0.0838$$

Finally, the left panel of Figure 11 shows the total acceptance rates of $M$ and $F$ applicants. In the initial period, the acceptance rates of $M$ and $F$ applicants are similar. They though diverge in the intermediate period, in which $M$ applicants are accepted more often than the (fewer) $F$ applicants, and then they finally converge, when only type $\theta_m$ survives. Interestingly, the right panel shows that the average quality of $F$ researchers is uniformly higher until the time of convergence. This implies that in the initial period our model predicts similar acceptance rates of $M$ and $F$ researchers, even if the latter have higher objective quality. This result is reminiscent of Card et al. (2020), who show that unconditionally, acceptance rates of men- and women-authored papers are similar, but that the average quality of accepted women-authored papers, proxied by their future citations, is higher.
5.2. Endogenous Selection by Hiring Institutions

The previous section demonstrates that endogenizing the choice of entry into academia may shrink the supply of talent. We now show that the a similar mechanism operates on the demand side: when hiring decisions are based on the expectation of academic success, the anticipation of self-image bias in the refereeing process (Section 2.2.) induces institutions to hire only those types \( \theta \) that can produce research that is more likely to be “accepted” by the established refereeing population.

Consider the following alternative interpretation of our model. When a hiring institution evaluates a candidate, it takes into account whether or not the candidate will produce quality work that the profession recognizes, or—in the language of Section 2.2.—“accepts.” A candidate who is accepted by the profession yields a payoff \( P \) to the institution; this reflects e.g. visibility, grant money, or increased ability to attract top students. Hiring a candidate involves a cost \( C \), which may be monetary but may also reflect mentoring resources and/or opportunity cost. This cost is borne by the institution whether or not the candidate is eventually accepted, and it is the same for \( M \) and \( F \) researchers. If the candidate is eventually not accepted or if the institution does not hire any candidate, the institution’s payoff is zero. As above, a candidate of type \( \theta \) produces quality work with probability \( \gamma^\theta \). To analyze demand effects, we reinterpret the key assumption of Section 2.2. as follows: the hiring institution anticipates that referees are subject to self-image bias, so that a type-\( \theta \) researcher will be accepted by the profession with probability \( \gamma^\theta \lambda^\theta_t \) at the end of time \( t \).
Under these conditions, the institution hires an agent of type \( \theta \) if and only if

\[
\gamma^\theta \lambda^\theta_t (P - C) + (1 - \lambda^\theta_t \gamma^\theta) (-C) > 0
\]  

(21)

This is the same condition as in Equation (17) in the previous section. Thus, the mass of established researchers \( \lambda^\theta_t \) follows the system dynamics described by Equations (18) - (19). Proposition 7 then applies and group imbalance and loss of talent obtains.

Moreover, under the conditions of case (a.2) of Proposition 7, the system converges, in finite time, to a steady state in which only type \( \theta^m \) survives. That is, if institutions only take acceptance by the profession into account at the hiring stage, type \( \theta^f \) eventually disappears, even when such type would survive without endogenous selection. Again, this implies talent loss: research characteristics that are (mildly) more common in the \( F \)-population disappear.

We can also re-interpret the example in subsection 5.1.1. as a consequence of the hiring practices of hiring institutions. In the absence of endogenous selection, the parametric choices in that example lead to group balance, with both types \( \theta^m \) and \( \theta^f \) being represented in the limit. However, if institutions wish to hire only young researchers who are sufficiently likely to be accepted by the current population of referees, then group imbalance emerges, as in Figure 8. Again, in this example type \( \theta^f \) then disappears completely, as in Figure 9.

This mechanism may explain the patterns in Figure 1. From the top panel, the female representation of undergraduate students with economics major in the top-20 schools has been rising over the past 25 years, reaching almost 40% by the late 2010s. This shows interests in economics among female undergraduates. Yet, in the same period, the percentage of female PhD students has been flat at around 30%, and that of assistant professors has been flat at around 22%. The bottom panel shows a striking difference between schools with and without PhD programs: In the latter group, the share of assistant professors is over 40%, while in the former is below 30%, with the top 10 schools at 20%. These differences do not apply to the female share of teaching faculty, which are around 37% across all schools. This is consistent with our model: when a school has research as the guiding principle in hiring, it tends to skew towards the characteristics of established researchers, i.e. \( \theta^m \) in our model.

6. The Impact of Policy Action

In this section we discuss the impact of policy actions that have been proposed to address gender imbalance. Our discussion of endogenous entry, as in e.g. subsection 5.1.1., already

\[12\text{We use the “top-X schools” terminology as in Chevalier (2020). School names are not reported.}\]
suggests that, if the cost of pursuing an academic career is the main cause of group imbalance, then reducing this cost is the appropriate policy response. This corresponds to outreach, which we discuss in Section 8. Here we focus on situations in which the cost of entry is not the main cause of imbalance; instead, self-image bias is—formally, entry is costless, and \( \rho < \bar{\rho}(\phi, N) \) in point (a) of Proposition 6. We consider (i) the impact of mentoring (section 6.1.); and (ii) the impact of affirmative action (section 6.2.).

6.1. The Impact of Mentoring

The adoption of mentoring to improve the prospects of female economists is one of the most popular proposals. Indeed, there is evidence that mentoring does help increase the success rate of female economists (Ginther, Currie, Blau, and Croson (2020)). We now investigate the implications of mentoring in our model.

We assume that at the beginning of each period \( t \) every young researcher of type \( \theta \) is randomly matched with an advisor \( a \) of type \( \theta^a \) drawn from the established group, whose mass is \( \lambda_{t-1}^{\theta^a} \). Upon matching, the researcher of type \( \theta \) can choose to pay a cost \( C(\theta, \theta^a) \) to “become” the same type of the advisor. Assuming again that \( P \) is the payoff from being hired and \( U \) is the utility from an outside option, researcher \( \theta \) will pay the cost if and only if

\[
\gamma^{\theta^a} \lambda_{t-1}^{\theta^a} (P - C(\theta, \theta^a)) + (1 - \gamma^{\theta^a} \lambda_{t-1}^{\theta^a}) (U - C(\theta, \theta^a)) > \gamma^\theta \lambda_{t-1}^\theta P + (1 - \gamma^\theta \lambda_{t-1}^\theta) U
\]

That is, a young researcher \( \theta \) pays the cost if and only if

\[
\bar{C}(\theta, \theta^a) = \frac{C(\theta, \theta^a)}{P - U} < \gamma^{\theta^a} \lambda_{t-1}^{\theta^a} - \gamma^\theta \lambda_{t-1}^\theta
\]

In words, the increase in the probability of getting hired must be sufficiently high relative to the cost of undergoing mentoring. For instance, if the right-hand-side was negative (type \( \theta \) is already likely to succeed), nobody of that type would pay such a cost.

We assume that the cost itself depends on the distance between the young researcher’s type \( \theta \) and the type of the advisor \( \theta^a \): The larger the distance and the higher the cost, indicating that it will take a higher effort to “learn” to become a type that is likely to be hired. Note that such distance may be high as the young researcher \( \theta \) may have some characteristics that are desirable from an objective standpoint, but that are not viewed as important or relevant by the majority of established researchers. The cost, in that case, is to “unlearn” what is deemed “irrelevant.”

The online appendix contains the details of the system dynamics. For brevity, we only provide the intuition here. Figure 12 illustrates the dynamics resulting from Eq. (A.29),
under the same parameters as in Section 4 and a cost function $C(\theta, \theta') = \beta \sum_{n=1}^{N} (\theta_n - \theta'_n)^2$, with $\beta = 0.075$. We choose this cost so that not all of the young researchers want to pay the switching cost to become like their advisors, which seems plausible. The resulting steady state is roughly consistent with the percentage of female participation in economics.

Initially, the dynamics are as in the base case, as all $\theta_t^\theta$ are small and thus no young researcher wants to pay the cost of mentoring. In this dynamics, as we know, $\theta_t^{m^\theta}$ and $\theta_t^{f^\theta}$ increase, with the former increasing faster, as shown in the in the right panel of Figure 13. At some point, the mass of $\lambda_t^{m^\theta}$ becomes large enough to induce many young researchers, both $M$ and $F$, to pay the mentoring cost, and the system (nearly) jumps. The reason is that many young researchers now expect that their advisor will likely be of type $\theta^m$, which is also the type of established researchers who will evaluate their research. They are thus happy to pay the cost and become like their advisors.

Figure 13 shows, however, that the mass of young $M$-researchers jumps by more than the mass of $F$-researchers. The reason is that even though the cost function is the same for $M$- and $F$-researchers, young $M$-researchers are on average closer to $\theta^m$ and thus have have systematically lower cost to switch than $F$-researchers. For this reason, group imbalance persists forever. Moreover, only type $\theta^m$ survives and therefore the research characteristics mildly more common in the $F$-population, but also very common in the $M$-population, disappear, thus yielding talent loss and loss of knowledge.

6.2. The Impact of Affirmative Action

A common policy to increase diversity is “affirmative action”, that is, the policy to increase the representation of under-represented groups by mandate. We consider a simple rule in this section: it each round, it is mandated that reviewers must accept in their group of established researchers the same number of $M$ and $F$ researchers. We change just one assumption to the dynamics in the benchmark case: namely, we assume

$$a_t^{\theta,m} = k_t \gamma^\theta \lambda_{t-1}^{\theta,m} \text{ where } k_t = \frac{\sum_{\theta'} \gamma^{\theta'} \lambda_{t-1}^{\theta',f} p^{\theta',f}}{\sum_{\theta'} \gamma^{\theta'} \lambda_{t-1}^{\theta',m} p^{\theta',m}}. \tag{22}$$

The scaling factor $k_t$ ensures that $\sum_\theta a_t^{\theta,f} = \sum_\theta a_t^{\theta,m}$. Figures 14 and 15 provide the dynamics for this case. The affirmative action policy reaches group balance (and this is not surprising, given the definition of $k_t$) as well as diversity in research characteristics, as in the limit $M$ researchers are of type $\theta^m$ and $F$ researchers are of type $\theta^f$. Assuming that maximizing the

\footnote{If the cost function was lower, however, then all young researchers, $M$ and $F$, would pay the cost and the system would jump to group balance. This extreme case is illustrated in Figure A.8 in the online appendix.}
Figure 12: Fraction of $F$ and $M$ Researchers with Costly Mentoring

![Graph showing fraction of F and M researchers with costly mentoring](image)

Fraction of $M$ and $F$ researchers when $\lambda_0 = p^m$. Parameters: $\phi = 0.5742$ ($d = 0.3$), $\gamma_0 = 0.2$, $\rho = 5$, $N = 10$, cost function $C(\theta, \theta') = 0.0750 \sum_{n=1}^{N} (\theta_n - \theta'_n)^2$.

Figure 13: Types of Established $F$ and $M$ Researchers with Costly Mentoring.

(a) $F$ researchers

![Graph showing types of F researchers](image)

(b) $M$ researchers

![Graph showing types of M researchers](image)

Types of established $F$ (left) and $M$ (right) researchers with costly mentoring. We show the masses of types $\theta^* = (1,1,\ldots,1)$, $\theta'^* = (1,0,\ldots,0)$, and $\theta^f = (0,0,\ldots,0,1,\ldots,1)$. Initial reviewers: $\lambda_0 = p^m$. Parameters: $\phi = 0.5742$ ($d = 0.3$) , $\gamma_0 = 0.2$, $\rho = 5$, $N = 10$; cost function: $C(\theta, \theta') = 0.0750 \sum_{n=1}^{N} (\theta_n - \theta'_n)^2$.

representation of research characteristics is beneficial to society, this policy appears superior to mentoring, as it does not skew the distribution onto $\theta'^* even when reaching group balance.

Intuitively, by expanding the set of referee characteristics, affirmative action makes it
Fraction of $M$ and $F$ researchers when $\lambda_0 = p^m$ and there is an affirmative action policy that requires to accept the same number of $M$ and $F$ researchers. Parameters: $\phi = 0.5742$ ($d = 0.3$), $\gamma_0 = 0.2$, $\rho = 4$, and $N = 10$.

Type of established $F$ (left) and $M$ (right) researchers when affirmative action requires accepting the same number of $M$ and $F$ researchers. We show types $\theta^* = (1,1,...,1)$, $\theta^m = (1,...,1,0,...,0)$, and $\theta^f = (0,...,0,1,...,1)$. Initially $\lambda_0 = p^m$. Parameters: $\phi = 0.5742$ ($d = 0.3$), $\gamma_0 = 0.2$, $\rho = 4$, and $N = 10$

possible to reward the research of talented $F$ researchers—those who are more likely to produce quality research. It is still the case that $F$ researchers who are not (objectively) as productive will not survive in the limit and will be weeded out from the system.
7. Literature Review

There is a considerable body of research on the underlying reason of under-representation of women in the economics profession. We do not attempt an exhaustive survey here, but refer the reader to Bayer and Rouse (2016), who review the literature on both “supply-side” and “demand-side” factors. Among supply-side factors, these authors argue that prior exposure to economics, as well as the performance in introductory courses, and the lack of role models all have documented effects on the gender imbalance in applications to Economics Ph.D. programs. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that differences in math preparation do not explain a significant fraction of the imbalance. On the demand side, Bayer and Rouse (2016) suggest that policy changes in most academic institutions have diminished, if not completely removed, the impact of explicit or statistical discrimination in recruiting Ph.D. students. At the same time, these authors argue that the literature suggests that an important role is played by implicit bias and stereotyping. Our model with self-image bias is consistent with the persistence of gender bias even when all structural sources of gender-biases have been removed.

In a more recent contribution, Sarsons et al. (2021)’s work on recognition for coauthored papers shows that, for men, an additional coauthored paper has the same effect on the likelihood of tenure as a solo-authored paper; however, for women, coauthorship entails a significant “discount factor,” especially if the coauthor(s) are men. The large body of research on the gender pay gap and on the “glass ceiling” in other labor markets is also indirectly relevant in our context: see e.g. Blau and Kahn (2017); Goldin and Rouse (2000); Goldin (2014); Weber and Zulehner (2014); Aigner and Cain (1977); Lazear and Rosen (1990).

On the theoretical side, our model is related to the literature on statistical discrimination: a relative recent survey is Fang and Moro (2011). One strand within that literature, originating from Phelps (1972), posits the existence of exogenous differences between groups, either in the distribution of productivity (“Case 1”), or in the quality of signals about it (“Case 2”). In Case 2, the employer does not observe the productivity of individual applicants, but receives a signal about it. Differential average treatment of the two groups can emerge either through risk aversion of the employer (Aigner and Cain, 1977), investment in human capital (Lundberg and Startz, 1983), or if hiring occurs in a tournament (Cornell and Welch, 1996). In Conde-Ruiz, Gauza, and Profeta (2020), the difference in signal quality leads members of the group in the minority of a hiring committee to underinvest in human capital; this perpetuates the imbalance. A recent contribution, Bardhi, Guo, and Strulovici (2019), revisits Phelp’s Case 1, but assume that success or failure is observed over time and is informative.
about the worker's type. This can lead to large differences in ex-post treatment of the two
groups, even if ex-ante productivity differences are small. Differently from this literature,
in our model the ex-ante distributions of productivity are the same in the $M$ and $F$ group,
because all characteristics are equally valuable. Furthermore, productivity is observed. In
our model, standard statistical discrimination does not lead to gender imbalance.

Becker (1957)'s model of taste-based discrimination instead posits that employers may
have a preference for hiring members of one specific group. This is not the case in our model:
while referees only accept applicants whose research characteristics match their own, they
do not take group membership into consideration at all.

Heidhues, Kőszegi, and Strack (2019) proposes a model in which an agent’s ability is un-
observed, both by herself and by others. Agents belong to different groups, each potentially
subject to “discrimination,” and are “stubbornly overconfident” about their own ability.
Overconfidence leads agents to have a more favorable view of individuals in their own social
group, ascribing poor performance to discrimination against them. In our model, ability is
observed, and there is no exogenously imposed discrimination on either group. Incorporat-
ing (possibly biased) learning (cf. e.g. Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg, 2019) about young
researchers’ characteristics is an interesting direction for future work.

8. Conclusions and Policy Implications

Our model highlights a novel mechanism that endogenously perpetuates specific research
characteristics over time without relying on implicit or explicit gender bias. This occurs due
to self-image bias, grounded in the psychology literature, and its application to the reviewing
process: established researchers use their own personal research characteristics as a guidance
to judge others’ output. Findings in psychology and experimental economics point to mild
between-group heterogeneity; yet, in our model, such mild differences are enough to lead the
initially prevalent group to dominate forever. It is as if the initially dominant group decided
for society what are the important research characteristics and topic.

Our results are consistent with empirical evidence and the trends in Figure 1. First,
gender imbalance can persist long after steps are taken to eliminate outright, or structural,
gender bias (see Bayer and Rouse, 2016): if evaluators are predominantly male due to past
discrimination against women, our model predicts that self-image bias will perpetuate this
imbalance forward. Second, our model implies that women are held to higher standards
(Card et al., 2020; Dupas et al., 2021) and receive less credit for joint work with co-authors
Third, it is consistent with a different representation of women across fields (Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2018). Fourth, it predicts that the under-representation of women should be especially severe in research-oriented institutions (Chevalier, 2020 and Figure 1). Finally, it can generate a “leaky pipeline,” with women applying less to Economics PhD programs and their representation being lower the higher the rank (Chevalier, 2020).

Standard solutions to the gender bias problem may not be very effective in our model. For instance, outreach programs to encourage members of a given group to apply to PhD programs may prove ineffective. Such outreach program are akin to lowering the cost of doing research (see Section 5.1.). While lowering the cost may indeed switch the path towards convergence for some parameter configurations, as shown in Section 5.1.1., our basic model in Section 2.2. assumes zero costs and yet, under the conditions of Proposition 3, (2.a), gender bias persists. In particular, if reviewers evaluate others’ research on a multitude of research characteristics, gender imbalance would persist.

Similarly, mentorship programs for female researchers will only be effective to increase female representation in the profession insofar as they induce female researchers to adopt those characteristics that are prevalent in the reviewer population (see Section 6.1.). While this may improve female participation (as it has: see e.g. Ginther et al., 2020), it still propagates the bias towards male research characteristics. This leads to under-representation of valuable research characteristics relative to the efficient benchmark.

Because the problem is self-image bias, the best policy intervention must involve limiting the ability of reviewers to use their own research style as a yardstick while judging others’ research. One solution is to provide strict guidelines in the refereeing process. Indeed, in light of Proposition 1 and 2, editors should guide referees to limit the number of aspects of the submitted research paper they should focus on. For instance, a journal may provide questionnaires with precise, pointed questions and explicitly ask referees to leave aside other judgemental elements that are most susceptible to self-image bias. Dunning, Meyerowitz, and Holzberg (1989) provides suggestive evidence in support of this approach.

Another solution is instead to change the reviewing process to include input from the full distribution of researchers, as opposed to just the established ones. While radical as a proposal, it would be reasonable to consider an editorial policy that requires young researchers to participate in the evaluation process, or in fact, “oversample” young female researchers.

Our model suggests a novel rationale for affirmative-action policies: diversifying the pool of reviewers. In our model, scientific progress requires a combination of all research
characteristics, regardless of whether they are more prevalent among males or females—because all such characteristics are equally productive. If males are initially dominant, they will remain so, and research characteristics more prevalent among females will be underrepresented. Facilitating the promotion of female researchers counteracts this force, and leads to a more balanced representation of research characteristics in the steady-state population.

Finally, in this paper we emphasize gender discrimination in academia. However, a similar force may help explain discrimination against other groups and in other settings. Even if evaluators are group-neutral in their reviews, self-image bias may lead majority evaluators to unconsciously fail to promote socially valuable characteristics that are (possibly slightly) more prevalent in an underrepresented group. We leave this investigation to future research.

References


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