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California's Firearm Excise Tax is Almost Fully Passed on to Consumers

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ABSTRACT

We evaluate the effect of California's 11 percent excise tax on firearms, introduced in July 2024, on retail prices. Using price quotes for 48 popular firearms from over 2,200 licensed dealers, we compare California prices to those in other states and to pre-tax trends. We find that prices in California increase by about 10% in response to the 11% tax. Results are consistent across gun types and show no evidence of border spillovers. These findings indicate that firearm excise taxes can effectively raise consumer prices.

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Abstract

We evaluate the effect of California's 11 percent excise tax on firearms, introduced in July 2024, on retail prices. Using price quotes for 48 popular firearms from over 2,200 licensed dealers, we compare California prices to those in other states and to pre-tax trends. We find that prices in California increase by about 10% in response to the 11% tax. Results are consistent across gun types and show no evidence of border spillovers. These findings indicate that firearm excise taxes can effectively raise consumer prices.

Significance Statement: We show that the firearms tax in California passes almost entirely through to retail prices rather than being absorbed by retailers. This has implications for both purchases deterred and revenue collected by the tax. The extent to which firearms taxes are passed through to retail prices has not been well established in the literature.

We examine the prices of firearms in California in the wake of the state's Firearm, Ammunition, and Precursor Parts Excise Tax, which was implemented on July 1, 2024. This 11% ad-valorem excise tax on the retail sales of firearms, firearm precursor parts, and ammunition is levied on top of existing sales and federal excise taxes. We assess the immediate effect of the tax on consumer prices by comparing changes in firearm prices in California before and after the implementation of the tax to contemporaneous price changes in other states where tax policies remained unchanged.

Excise taxes are often implemented either to reduce the consumption of a targeted good or to raise government revenue (*1, 2*). In the case of firearms, proponents of taxation may aim to reduce firearm-related injuries and violence by discouraging purchases. The premise of using taxation to reduce consumption is twofold: first, taxes increase the prices consumers face, and second, consumers respond to higher prices by purchasing less. This reduction in purchasing may in turn reduce the frequency of any negative outcomes caused by consumption.[1][2][3] Alternatively, taxes

[1]Topher L. McDougal. "California is imposing a new tax on guns. Will it impact sales?" The Guardian. [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/may/20/california-new-gun-tax-sales-violence].

[2]Similar arguments have been made to promote taxes on other consumer goods associated with negative outcomes, including sugary beverages, tobacco, alcohol, and gasoline ((*3*), (*4*), (*5*), among many others)

[3]The success of a tax designed to curb consumption also depends on the extent to which a reduction in sales induced by high prices leads to a reduction in consumption-related externalities. We do not study that link in this paper. Evidence on the link between gun prevalence and crime include (*6–8*).

could be designed to raise funds for government programs, such as initiatives aimed at violence prevention and school safety.[4][5] The efficacy of such policies fundamentally depends on two factors: the extent to which the new tax is passed through to retail prices and consumer price sensitivity (the own-price elasticity of firearm consumers). Although some evidence suggests firearms consumers are relatively price insensitive (*9, 10*), the pass-through rate of firearms taxes remains an open area for empirical study.[6]

The context around firearm tax policy

California is the first state in the U.S. to enact a firearm-specific excise tax. The tax applies at retail and shows up directly in the shelf price quoted to consumers. No complementary policy interventions coincided with its rollout. Other states—e.g., Maryland (proposed 11 percent) and Colorado (6.5 percent, enacted November 2024)—are considering similar measures, making early evidence from California policy-relevant nationwide.[7]

[4]Topher L. McDougal. "California is imposing a new tax on guns. Will it impact sales?" The Guardian. [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/may/20/california-new-gun-tax-sales-violence.]

[5]Jesse Gabriel (D-Encino). "It's shameful that gun manufacturers are reaping record profits at the same time that gun violence has become the leading cause of death for kids in the United States. This law will generate $160 million annually to fund critical violence prevention and school safety programs that will save lives and protect communities across the State of California." [https://a46.asmdc.org/press-releases/20240701-historic-new-tax-gun-industry-goes-effect-california]

[6]Economic theory relates the pass-through rate of an excise tax to both the price elasticity of demand and the competitive landscape in which the relevant product is sold. For example, in a perfectly competitive market, firms price at marginal cost. Accordingly, there is no room for a retailer to lower prices in response to a tax and any taxes will be passed through entirely to the consumer. In a monopolistic market, prices are a function of both consumer price sensitivity and marginal cost. Pass-through is predicted to be greater when demand is less elastic. Specifically, an 11% proportional tax is tantamount to a 12.36% increase in marginal cost. Profit maximization implies the following condition for a single-product monopolist in a market with a proportional tax τ facing demand $Q(p)$ and a constant marginal cost of production c: $p^* = -\frac{Q(p)}{Q'(p)} + \frac{c}{1-\tau}$. Pass-through may be affected by frictions such as menu costs, managerial inattention, or retail price maintenance (*11*).

[7]Colorado: https://www.rmpbs.org/blogs/election-2024/prop-kk-colorado, Maryland and others: https://www.thetrace.org/2024/03/maryland-tax-bill-guns-ammo/

Data: collecting firearm prices

We collected monthly price quotes from GalleryofGuns.com, an aggregator that posts both tax-inclusive and pre-tax prices for participating federally licensed dealers (FFL) in the United States. Between January 2024 and March 2025, we tracked the prices of 48 unique product codes (UPCs) across 20 firearm models sold by 2,267 dealers in 50 states.[8] The sample includes five pistols and three models each of revolvers, non-semi-automatic rifles, semi-automatic rifles, non-semi-automatic shotguns, and semi-automatic shotguns.[9] [10] An observation in our dataset corresponds to a price quote for a particular UPC, dealer, and time period (month-year). Our main analysis focuses on 19 firearm models (23 UPCs) whose prices we observe both before and after the introduction of the tax.[11] Table 1 presents summary statistics on firearm prices separately by type and geography. On average, price quotes were higher in California compared to other states prior to the tax.

Measuring the California tax effect on firearm prices

Our empirical strategy compares gun prices in California relative to other states before versus after the tax. Specifically, within each geography, we calculate the monthly average price for each UPC and normalize by its average price in June 2024. To calculate the average percentage change in price in a month-year t in geography s, we first estimate the following regression equation separately for California and for all other states:

$$\frac{p_{jdt}}{p_{js,\text{June 2024}}} = \sum_{t=t_0}^{T} \lambda_t + \delta_j + \epsilon_{jst},$$

where p_{jst} is the tax-inclusive price of model j at dealer s in month-year t and δ_j are UPC-fixed effects. We then take these estimated month-year fixed effects ($\vec{\lambda}_t$) to arrive at the month-year-

[8] Some models have multiple UPCs that represent slight variants on the model. In particular, some firearm models (e.g., *Smith & Wesson M&P Shield*) have UPCs specifically designed to be compliant with California's Roster of Certified Handguns.

[9] The Supplemental Text section provides more details on the specific models.

[10] Our scraper failed in October 2024, hence we are missing data for this month.

[11] The only model for which we do not observe prices for at least one UPC both before and after the imposition of the tax is the Ruger American Predator (bolt rifle) due to stock outs. Several specific UPCs of other models have similar stock outs, but we observe at least one price quote for each of those models before and after the tax.

specific average percent change:

$$\widehat{\%\Delta p_{st}} = 100 \cdot \frac{\hat{\lambda}_t - \hat{\lambda}_{\text{June 2024}}}{\hat{\lambda}_{\text{June 2024}}}$$

To calculate the average percent change in price in the first two months after the policy change, we estimate the following regression specification using only observations through August 2024:

$$\frac{p_{jst}}{p_{js,\text{June 2024}}} = Post_t + \delta_j + \epsilon_{jst}$$

where $Post_t$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations in July and August 2024 and 0 otherwise. The average percentage price change relative to June 2024 is then

$$\widehat{\%\Delta p_{st}} = 100 \cdot \widehat{Post_t}$$

Evidence of pass-through to consumers

Gun prices increased by an average of $10.405 \pm 1.96 \cdot 0.009\%$ (CI: 95%) in California in the two months following the policy change. Figure 1 plots the estimated percentage price changes by month separately for California and all other states. Figure S1 breaks out price change changes by gun type.

One concern could be that the timing of the California tax coincided with another change in the industry that itself increased firearm prices, causing the pre-post comparison to overstate tax pass-through. For example, an increase in the cost of steel, an input used to manufacture firearms, could lead to higher firearm prices. In such a case, however, we would expect that prices would rise across the country and not just in California. However, during the same period, prices in other states increase by $0.645 \pm 1.96 \cdot 0.001\%$ (CI: 95%) relative to June 2024.

Figure S7 maps price changes across the continental USA between June and July 2024. California is the only state with a material price change over this time horizon. Further, the California price increase persists through March 2025, though comparisons become trickier due to stock outs later in the year (Figure S2). Table S1 in the Supplementary Text presents additional estimates of pass-through using a difference-in-difference framework, which is commonly used in policy evaluation to address concerns about omitted time-varying factors that might affect the outcome of interest (prices). The findings are very similar. Together, these results indicate that this excise tax is almost entirely passed through to Californian consumers.

Discussion of findings and potential impact on gun sales

This paper provides the first evidence on the pass-through of firearm excise taxes. We study a novel 11% tax levied on firearms in California in July 2024. Using data on the prices of 19 different firearm models, we find that prices in California rose by 10.405% following the tax. Over the same time horizon, gun prices in other states rose by less than 1% on average. These findings indicate near-perfect pass-through of the tax to consumers. The pass-through rate is a key to input to understanding whether and to what extent this policy might affect gun sales; for gun taxes to reduce gun sales, they must raise gun prices.[12] Estimates from the past literature suggest price elasticities in the range of -1 for gun demand, which would imply that the observed 10% price increase would reduce gun sales by approximately 10%. More work is needed to bear out this prediction, as well as determine the ultimate effect of the policy on gun-related violence.

[12] Absent retailer exit in the long run.



Figure 1: **Monthly prices for firearms observed monthly between January 2024-August 2024**

In June 2024, the average price of the firearms in this sample was $987.70 in California across the ZIP codes included in the study. Among all other states, the average price was $930.63. Prices increased by 9.79 ± 0.158% (CI 95%) in July 2024 and 10.35 ± 0.08% (CI 95%) in August 2024 relative to June 2024.

Table 1: **Firearm price summary statistics.** This table shows the mean price quotes in USD for firearm UPCs observed in both the pre (January - June 2024) and post (July 2024 - March 2025) period. The sample consists of eleven handgun models, eight semi-automatic long guns, and five non-semi-automatic long guns.

State	Statistic	Pre	Post
Handguns			
CA	Mean	805.51	964.03
	Std. Dev	433.10	482.75
Others	Mean	720.83	789.59
	Std. Dev	394.82	397.39
Long guns			
CA	Mean	791.31	973.07
	Std. Dev	207.78	277.67
Others	Mean	720.72	787.21
	Std. Dev	200.26	237.12
Semi-automatic long guns			
CA	Mean	1,311.99	1,247.38
	Std. Dev	741.44	786.50
Others	Mean	1,190.05	1,025.92
	Std. Dev	690.11	669.21

References and Notes

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Author contributions: All authors contributed equally to this work.

Competing interests: There are no competing interests to declare.

Data and materials availability: We collected the data from GalleryofGuns.com using the SELENIUM library in PYTHON. Since we collected the data over multiple months and years, we have needed to use multiple versions of the software. The newest version of SELENIUM we used was 4.23.1. The newest version PYTHON version we used was 3.11.9. The analysis was performed using R 4.4.3. We will share the replication materials for peer review when requested.

Supplementary materials

Materials and Methods

Supplementary Text

Figures S1 to S9

Tables S1 to S4

Supplementary Materials for

California's firearm excise tax is almost fully passed on to consumers

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All authors contributed equally to this work.

This PDF file includes:

Materials and Methods

Selection of Firearm Models Our sample includes firearms from six categories: handguns, revolvers, semi-automatic rifles, semi-automatic shotguns, non-semi-automatic rifles, and non-semi-automatic shotguns. Our approach is to include a range of firearm models from different manufacturers. We choose the top two best-selling models within each category based on 2022 sales data from GunBroker.com. To maintain some variation in relative firearm popularity, we choose a less popular third model.[13]

Finally, because California serves as our treatment group, we focus on models that are legally available in the state. Many popular firearms are restricted in California (for example, Glock Gen 4/5, Sig Sauer P365/P320, Colt AR15). For restricted models with CA-compliant versions, we collect prices on CA-compliant versions in both California and other states. For restricted models without CA-compliant versions, we substitute with similar models from the same manufacturer that are legal in California. We list the firearm models and UPCs that we observe before and after June 2024 in Table S2. We list all firearm UPCs for which we collect price data in Table S3 and S4 as part of the supplementary materials.

Supplementary Text

Difference-in-Differences Analysis

In this supplemental section, we estimate pass-through using a difference-in-differences approach. In the main text, we show that retail prices increase in California in the months following July 1, 2024, when the new tax was levied. This essentially compares prices in two different time periods, before the tax (the "pre" period) and after the tax (the "post" period). If other factors apart from the new tax change between the pre and post periods, then this comparison is confounded and will not reveal the true effect of the tax. To control for other time-varying factors, the difference-in-differences approach leverages a control group, which in this case is other states. The difference-in-differences estimator compares price changes in California to price changes in other states. Our estimating

[13] Typically, ranked around 8 to 12 on GunBroker.com for a given year.

equation is:

$$p_{jst} = \beta \cdot Post_t \times California_s + \gamma_s + \delta_j + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{jst}, \tag{S1}$$

where p_{jst} is the price of gun model j offered in ZIP code s in month t. We include a set of month fixed effects λ_t, ZIP code fixed effects γ_s, and product fixed effects δ_j. The parameter of interest is the coefficient on the interaction between the post indicator and an indicator variable for whether the state is California. Under an assumption that absent the new tax gun prices in California would have evolved on a parallel trend to gun prices in other states, this parameter can be interpreted as the causal effect of the tax on gun prices. The patterns in Figure 1 suggest that the parallel trends assumption is reasonable in this context.

Table S1 presents the estimates of the differences-in-differences specification. The estimates suggest that the new tax increased the average price of firearms in our sample by \$94.17, which is approximately 9.72% of the average price in California (\$968.56) in the pre-period (January-June 2024).

Table S1: **Difference-in-difference estimates of the tax pass-through.**

Dependent Variable:	Total Price
Variables	
Post × California	94.17
	(2.321)
Fixed-effects	
Firearm UPC	Yes
ZIP code	Yes
Month-year	Yes
Fit statistics	
Observations	323,350
R^2	0.99447
Within R^2	0.03635



Panel A



Panel B



Panel C

Figure S1: **% in monthly prices by category for firearms observed January-August 2024.**



Figure S2: **Percent change in monthly prices for firearms observed in both periods.**



Figure S3: **Percent change in monthly prices in California relative to other states.**



Figure S4: **Relative % change in monthly prices (handguns).**



Figure S5: **Relative % change in monthly prices (semi-automatic long guns).**



Figure S6: **Relative % change in monthly prices (other long guns).**



Figure S7: **Map of price changes.**



Panel A



Panel B

Figure S8: **Average monthly prices for each firearm UPC.**



Panel A



Panel B

Figure S9: **Number of firearm dealers by ZIP code.**

Table S2: **A list of firearm models observed in both periods.**

Firearm UPC	Firearm Name on GalleryofGuns.com	Firearm Model	Firearm Type
806703911908	CZ-USA CZ 75 Compact	CZ-USA CZ 75 Compact	Pistol
764503175022	Glock Gen 3 17	Glock Gen 3 17	Pistol
798681691968	Sig Sauer P320 M18 CA Compliant	Sig Sauer P320	Pistol
798681513505	Sig Sauer P320 Nitron	Sig Sauer P320	Pistol
22188147230	Smith & Wesson M&P Shield CA	Smith & Wesson M&P Shield	Pistol
22188867244	Smith & Wesson M&P Shield	Smith & Wesson M&P Shield	Pistol
706397161019	Springfield Armory XD	Springfield Armory XD	Pistol
98289003355	Colt Python	Colt Python	Revolver
727962702949	Heritage Manufacturing Inc. Rough Rider	Heritage Manufacturing Inc. Rough Rider	Revolver
22188636031	Smith & Wesson Model 629	Smith & Wesson Model 629	Revolver
23614739883	Browning X-Bolt Composite Stalker	Browning X-Bolt Composite Stalker	Rifle
619835060631	Henry Repeating Arms Big Boy With Loading Side	Henry Repeating Arms Big Boy With Loading Side	Rifle
736676011032	Ruger 10/22 Carbine	Ruger 10/22 Carbine	Semi-automatic Rifle
22188868227	Smith & Wesson M&P15-22 SPORT CA Approved	Smith & Wesson M&P15-22 SPORT	Semi-automatic Rifle
22188868210	Smith & Wesson M&P15-22 SPORT CT, MA, NJ Compliant	Smith & Wesson M&P15-22 SPORT	Semi-automatic Rifle
706397019228	Springfield Armory M1A CA	Springfield Armory M1A	Semi-automatic Rifle
706397012229	Springfield Armory M1A	Springfield Armory M1A	Semi-automatic Rifle
82442582269	Beretta A400 Xplor Action	Beretta A400 Xplor Action	Semi-automatic Shotgun
23614439578	Browning A5 Sweet Sixteen	Browning A5 Sweet Sixteen	Semi-automatic Shotgun
48702006869	Winchester Repeating Arms Super X4	Winchester Repeating Arms Super X4	Semi-automatic Shotgun
806703063911	CZ-USA CZ Bob White G2	CZ-USA CZ Bob White G2	Shotgun
15813507783	Mossberg Model 590 Tactical	Mossberg Model 590 Tactical	Shotgun
810070688646	Remington 870 Field Master	Remington 870 Field Master	Shotgun

Table S3: **A list of handguns, revolvers, and non-semi-automatic long guns with any price data.**

	Handguns
UPC	**Name**
22188147230	Smith & Wesson M&P Shield CA
22188867244	Smith & Wesson M&P Shield
706397161019	Springfield Armory XD
806703011905	CZ-USA CZ 75 Compact CA
806703911908	CZ-USA CZ 75 Compact
764503175022	Glock Gen 3 17
798681691968	Sig Sauer P320 M18 CA Compliant
798681513505	Sig Sauer P320 Nitron
706397163013	Springfield Armory XD XD9301
706397164010	Springfield Armory XD XD9401

	Revolvers
UPC	**Name**
98289003355	Colt Python
727962702949	Heritage Manufacturing Inc Rough Rider
22188636031	Smith & Wesson Model 629

	Rifles, Non-Semi-Automatic
UPC	**Name**
736676011032	Ruger 10/22 Carbine
23614739883	Browning X-Bolt Composite Stalker
619835060631	Henry Repeating Arms Big Boy With Loading Side Gate
736676269440	Ruger American Predator Rifle
669278305004	Browning X-Bolt Composite Stalker
736676051441	Browning X-Bolt Composite Stalker
706397934514	Browning X-Bolt Composite Stalker
669278378411	Browning X-Bolt Composite Stalker
22188873597	Browning X-Bolt Composite Stalker
850045874773	Browning X-Bolt Composite Stalker
640832009873	Browning X-Bolt Composite Stalker

	Shotguns, Non-Semi-Automatic
UPC	**Name**
15813507783	Mossberg Model 590 Tactical
810070688646	Remington 870 Field Master
806703063911	CZ-USA CZ Bob White G2
810070688615	Remington 870 Field Master R68861
810070688714	Remington 870 Field Master R68871
810070688721	Remington 870 Field Master R68872
806703064147	CZ-USA CZ Bob White G2 06414

Table S4: **A list of semi-automatic long guns with any price data.**

	Rifles, Semi-Automatic
UPC	**Name**
706397019228	Springfield Armory M1A CA
706397012229	Springfield Armory M1A
22188872729	Smith & Wesson M&P15 Sport II CA
22188868104	Smith & Wesson M&P15 Sport II
22188868227	Smith & Wesson M&P15-22 SPORT CA Approved
22188868210	Smith & Wesson M&P15-22 SPORT CT, MA, NJ Compliant

	Shotguns, Semi-Automatic
UPC	**Name**
82442582269	Beretta A400 Xplor Action
48702006869	Winchester Repeating Arms Super X4
23614439578	Browning A5 Sweet Sixteen
82442707686	Beretta A400 Xplor Action J40AW16
82442733302	Beretta A400 Xplor Action J40AW18L
82442582252	Beretta A400 Xplor Action J40AA26
82442709116	Beretta A400 Xplor Action J40AA86
82442709109	Beretta A400 Xplor Action J40AA88
82442707693	Beretta A400 Xplor Action J40AK16
82442733319	Beretta A400 Xplor Action J40AK18L
82442582276	Beretta A400 Xplor Action J40AY26

Caption for Figure S1. Percent change in monthly prices by category for firearms observed January 2024-August 2024. Each panel is analogous to Figure 1 but at the category level. **(A)** includes only handguns. **(B)** includes only semi-automatic long guns. **(C)** includes all other long guns.

Caption for Figure S2. Percent change in monthly prices for firearms observed in both periods. Analogous to Figure 1 but includes all firearms observed at least once before and after July 2024. Furthermore, it extends the observation period to March 2025. We were unable to scrape price information during October 2024.

Caption for Figure S3. Percent change in monthly prices in California relative to other states. Figure S3 shows the net percentage change in prices in California relative to all other continental US states. The baseline period is June 2024.

Caption for Figure S4. Relative % change in monthly prices (handguns). Figure S4 is analogous to Figure S3 but considers only handguns.

Caption for Figure S5. Relative % change in monthly prices (semi-automatic long guns). Figure S5 is analogous to Figure S3 but considers only semi-automatic long guns.

Caption for Figure S6. Relative % change in monthly prices (other long guns). Figure S5 is analogous to Figure S3 but considers all non-semi-automatic long guns.

Caption for Figure S7. Map of price changes. The map shows the average price change for firearms in each ZIP code in our sample between June and July 2024. We remove outliers, defined as observations in the bottom and top one percentile of the distribution.

Caption for Figure S8. Average monthly prices for each firearm UPC. Each panel shows the average monthly price of a firearm from when it first enters the sample to when it exits because of stock outs. **(A)** shows average monthly prices in California. **(B)** shows average monthly prices in the rest of the continental US. Sig Sauer P320 M18 CA Compliant is highlighted in blue: it is the only firearm that exhibits a significant price drop over time, both in California and the other states.

Caption for Figure S9. Number of firearm dealers by ZIP code. Each panel shows the total number of federally licensed dealers in a given ZIP code in our sample over the whole time period. **(A)** shows the firearm dealers by ZIP code in California. **(B)** shows the firearm dealers by ZIP code in the rest of the continental US.

Caption for Table S1. Difference-in-difference estimates of the tax pass-through. Table S1 presents the results of estimating eq. S1. We cluster the standard errors at the firearm UPC-dealer level; i.e., we allow prices for a specific firearm at a given dealer to be correlated across time. The average price quote for the firearms in our sample in California during January-June 2024 was $969.03.

Caption for Table S2. A list of firearm models observed in both periods. Table S2 lists the firearms whose prices we observe in months both before and after July 2024. The first column lists the firearm UPC: each firearm has a separate UPC. The second column lists the name of the firearm as shown on GalleryofGuns.com. The third column indicates the model of the firearm. Multiple firearms can be of the same model: for example, the Smith & Wesson M&P Shield has two products, a California compliant and non-compliant version.

Caption for Table S3. A list of handguns, revolvers, and non-semi-automatic long guns with any price data. Table S3 lists all handguns, revolvers, and non-semi-automatic firearms with any scraped price data.

Caption for Table S4. A list of semi-automatic long guns with any price data. Table S4 is analogous to Table S3 but lists the semi-automatic long guns.

Caption for Data S1. A CSV file of the average monthly prices by geography.

Row 14 of the dataset is the average price of firearms in June 2024 in California: $987.70. Row 5 of the dataset is the average price of firearms in June 2024 in all other states: $930.63. Both numbers are referenced in the notes for Figure 1.

Caption for Data S2. A CSV file containing the average percent change in prices in July and August 2024 relative to June 2024. Row 1, column 8 of the dataset is the estimate of the average percent change in prices in California in the first two months of the post period. Row 2, column 8 is the analogous estimate for all other states. Both estimates are relative to June 2024. The values are used in the **Evidence of pass-through to consumers** section.

Caption for Data S3. A CSV file containing the monthly average percent change in prices relative to June 2024. Row 7 and 8, column 3 of the dataset show the July 2024 (9.79%) and August 2024 (10.35%) average percent changes in prices relative to June 2024. Each value is referenced in the notes for Figure 1.

Caption for Data S4. A CSV file of the average prices before and after the policy change by geography. Row 3 of the dataset is the average price of firearms in California before the policy: $968.56. The number is referenced in the Difference-in-Difference supplementary section.