

WORKING PAPER · NO. 2026-41

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MARCH 2026

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JEL No. D91, I31, J22

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates household preferences over who should work and whether these preferences are malleable. We document that men and women prefer that husbands work over wives. To understand why, we randomly assign a six-week job to either the husband or wife and document asymmetry: women's work improves their own wellbeing but not their husbands', while men's work improves both partners' wellbeing. One year later, we surprise households with a work opportunity. Both women and men in households where women were previously employed are more likely to prefer the woman take the job and express fewer concerns about women's employment in general.

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A randomized controlled trials registry entry is available at
<https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11056>

1 Introduction

Women’s participation in the labor force remains persistently lower than men’s in most parts of the world, despite widespread policy efforts to raise it (World Bank, 2023). Stated preferences are consistent with this pattern: survey data from the World Values Survey show high levels of agreement with the belief that “when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (World Values Survey, 2022). Indeed, countries with higher levels of agreement with this statement tend to exhibit larger gender gaps in labor force participation, a pattern which holds for male and female respondents alike (Figure 1). These preferences may reflect the inequity one observes in one’s labor market: respondents may prefer men to work because more jobs are available to men, and these jobs pay more to men than to women. Alternatively, these responses may reflect a deeper *underlying preference* within households for men to be employed over women holding all else equal: respondents may prefer to adhere to traditional gender roles or avoid being penalized for deviating from such norms. If husbands, wives, or both hold underlying preferences for men to work, then traditional policies aimed at improving the labor market environment alone (such as increasing job opportunities or wages) may have limited impact. Understanding what drives these preferences, and whether they are malleable, becomes critical.

This paper examines households’ underlying preferences regarding who should work. We focus on four research questions. First, do households prefer men to work over women in a context where both parties face scarce job opportunities? Second, what might be driving these preferences? Third, are these preferences – and consequently, women’s labor supply – malleable? Fourth, what produces this shift?

To answer these questions, we combine a randomized control trial with a labor supply elicitation exercise. Working with married couples, we elicit individual preferences over men versus women working. We randomly offer either the man or the woman in the couple the same employment opportunity in a context of widespread unemployment, enabling us to hold external factors (like the nature of the job or availability of employment) constant. We measure the wellbeing of *both* partners, comparing outcomes for both individuals when the husband works relative to when the wife works, yielding insight into what may drive the preferences they express. We then explore the malleability of such preferences, examining whether the *experience of work itself* can shift long term preferences around labor force participation in the household. We do so by revisiting each household fifteen months after their initial employment contract concludes, offering one unexpected paid opportunity for work to both partners, and eliciting each partner’s private preference over who should take the job. Finally, we examine whether exposure to a woman working - fifteen months prior -

alters beliefs about the perceived relative costs of men’s versus women’s employment.

We conduct this work in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, the largest refugee settlement in the world, where unemployment is widespread and future job prospects are scarce. The employment we offer is a six-week surveying task wherein participants document activities transpiring in their camp - a task designed to be amenable to both men and women’s skill sets and validated in a comparable setting in Hussam et al. (2022).¹

Our analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we document a preference for men’s work among both men and women. We ask a question similar to that posed in the World Values Survey (WVS) but specific to one’s own household in an environment of ubiquitous unemployment: “Imagine we could offer six months of employment to you or your partner. Would you prefer to take the opportunity yourself or have your partner take it?” The majority of men, at 71%, *and* the majority of women, at 59%, prefer that the man take the job. This aligns closely with the WVS results for Bangladesh, in which 81% of men and 71% of women believe that a man should receive priority in employment when jobs are scarce.

Second, having observed a *joint* preference for men’s work within the household, we next explore what may be driving these preferences. We do so by randomly assigning the same work task to either the husband or the wife, then comparing outcomes for both the worker and their spouse. We focus on the impact of employment on individuals’ psychosocial wellbeing, interpreting this measure as a summary statistic of what may drive their preferences. We confirm that the experience of employment significantly raises wellbeing for the person who is employed, consistent with a key finding of Hussam et al. (2022). Employed women gain 0.088 SD ($p = 0.036$) in their psychosocial index, an inverse-covariance-weighted index of depression severity, stress, life satisfaction, sociability, purposefulness, self-worth, locus of control, and stability. Employed men gain 0.112 SD ($p = 0.001$) in their psychosocial wellbeing index, which is statistically indistinguishable from the effect for women.

We then depart from existing literature by examining how each worker’s *partner* is affected when the other works. Doing so allows us to capture the household-level impact of employment and informs the documented joint preferences for male employment in the household. We find that the wives of employed men experience large and statistically significant psychosocial gains (0.104 SD, $p = 0.023$) from their husband being employed, reflected in less severe depression and an improved sense of purpose and self-worth. These gains are statistically equivalent both to those of their employed husbands and their employed female counterparts. In contrast, we find that the husbands of employed women exhibit no detectable change in their wellbeing (-0.007 SD, $p = 0.833$).

¹In a companion paper, we identify whether the effects of gainful employment come from engaging in productive activity alone, or from the impact of receiving income (Hsu et al., 2025).

We explore several reasons why wives of employed men benefit, but husbands of employed women do not. We document that having an employed husband enables a woman to occupy a homemaker norm and exist in greater ease in the home: women with employed husbands experience improvements in their sense of self-worth and purpose (0.135 SD, $q = 0.131$ and 0.198 SD, $q = 0.037$, respectively) and significant reductions in an index of intimate partner violence (-0.133 SD, $p = 0.068$). Why might unemployed men remain unaffected by their wives' employment? Our evidence suggests that men do not experience comparable gains, and the potential costs associated with women's work in this context — greater household responsibilities falling upon the husband, challenges to his self worth, or increased household tension — also do not materialize.

Third, having established that partnerships appear to fare better when men work – and thus why both men and women may prefer it – we investigate whether these preferences are malleable. We revisit households fifteen months after our initial employment experiment concludes and offer each spouse the opportunity to take a one-week paid job, with only one job available between the two partners. We [privately] elicit whether each partner prefers to keep the opportunity for themselves or pass it to their spouse. We then progressively increase the proposed wage for the non-preferred partner until the participant states indifference, enabling us to capture the strength of each partner's gendered preference for work.

We find that the experience of a woman having worked for us in the past significantly increases both men and women's preference to have the woman take the new job opportunity. Among female respondents, those women who were formerly employed are 19.1 percentage points (30%) more likely than the wives of formerly employed men to prefer taking the job themselves ($q = 0.005$). Their premium required to give the work opportunity to their husbands also increases significantly, reaching 70% of the base wage rate offer of 200 Tk. Strikingly, among men, husbands of formerly employed women *also* exhibit substantial shifts in their preferences toward women's employment. These men are 25.8 percentage points (103%) more likely than formerly employed men to prefer giving the job opportunity to their wives ($q = 0.001$), despite continued unemployment in the camps. The strength of this preference shift is large. The average man whose wife had previously worked prefers that his wife take the job, but will choose to take it himself for a small wage premium which is not statistically different from zero (essentially expressing indifference in who works). In contrast, the average man who was previously employed will not give the work opportunity to his wife unless her wage is 63% higher than his own. In other words, the experience of a woman working for a mere six weeks appears sufficient to meaningfully shift both the woman and her husbands' revealed preferences towards the woman working more than one year later.

Fourth and finally, we investigate what drives these shifts in preferences. Our results suggest that the experience of working enables women to revise their beliefs about the benefits and costs to women’s employment. Indeed, while women were working, their psychosocial wellbeing improved, and their husbands’ psychosocial wellbeing did not decline.² Moreover, fifteen months later, formerly employed women are also seven percentage points *less* likely (a 70% reduction, q -value = 0.303) to view female employment as socially inappropriate relative to their stay-at-home female counterparts.

Exposure to women’s employment also enables men to update their beliefs. While women were working, men did not assume greater household responsibilities, nor did they experience declines in self-worth or sense of purpose or lose bargaining power to their working wives. Consistent with this absence of negative impacts, we find that, one year later, these men are also significantly less likely to express negative consequences to women’s employment. They are nine percentage points (38%, q -value = 0.080) less likely to believe that employed women will have less time for household tasks; seven percentage points (30%, q -value = 0.093) less likely to say employment changes women’s attitudes; seven percentage points (44%, q -value = 0.043) less likely to say it creates household tension; and ten percentage points (23%, q -value = 0.043) more likely to report that there are *no costs* associated with women working, relative their stay-at-home female counterparts.³

This paper contributes to four literatures. First, our results speak to research that explores labor supply preferences within the household. Much of this research focuses on relative income preferences in high-income countries, and findings are mixed. Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) find a discontinuity in the density of couples where a wife’s income is higher than her husband’s, interpreted as evidence of gender identity norms that discourage women from out-earning their husbands. However, Binder and Lam (2022) do not find support for this breadwinner norm and argue that results in Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) reflect a large point mass of couples earning exactly the same income, an issue further explored by Kühnle, Oberfichtner, and Ostermann (2021). Zinovyeva and Tverdstup (2021) observe a discontinuity among couples where both partners work in the same firm, but find no such pattern elsewhere, suggesting these patterns may arise due to tax or other institutional considerations. We extend this literature into the developing world context and, by randomizing employment across partners and measuring wellbeing for both, speak

²Nor did these husbands experience increased intimate partner violence from their working wives. We can reject violent backlash by unemployed husbands, a phenomenon documented in recent literature (Bergvall, 2024; Perova, Reynolds, and Schmutte, 2023), with some exceptions (Kotsadam and Villanger, 2022).

³We also discuss the role of inertia more extensively in the results: individuals may simply prefer that the same person who worked for us previously continue to do so. We argue that inertia alone cannot be the sole mechanism for the shifts in labor supply preferences we observe, as it does not explain why respondents’ perceptions of the costs of work *in general*—not only in relation to our specific employment task—decline.

directly to what may generate the differentials observed in the existing literature: namely, asymmetric spillovers across partners that is likely driven, in our context, by the homemaker norm and reduced domestic violence when a man works.

Second, we contribute to a growing body of research on the impacts of women’s employment in settings where women’s labor force participation is not the norm. While existing studies focus on the benefits (Jensen, 2012; Heath and Mushfiq Mobarak, 2015; Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Majlesi, 2016; Sanin, 2023) and costs (McKelway, 2024) to women themselves, they do not consider spillover effects to husband’s *wellbeing*. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to explicitly document *both* husbands’ wellbeing from having an employed wife and wives’ wellbeing from having an employed husband. This enables an understanding of whether households make optimal labor supply choices or whether they commit “mistakes” - perhaps a husband would be happier to remain at home while his wife works rather than work himself, for example. On the contrary, we find that when households express their preference for male over female work, it is consistent with the higher aggregate wellbeing the household experiences when men work.

Third, we contribute to an active literature on the malleability of women’s labor supply. Previous studies have examined the impact of a range of interventions, including the provision of bank accounts (Field et al., 2021), commitment savings accounts (Carranza et al., 2025), and social considerations, such as the opinions of others (Subramanian, 2024; Lowe and McKelway, 2025). We focus on the role of *work* itself. Recent work by Ho, Jalota, and Karandikar (2024) underscore the value of exposure to employment, documenting how experience with flexible work arrangements increases a woman’s willingness to accept less-flexible jobs thereafter in India. Our study builds on this work by demonstrating how exposure to employment can shift *both* men and women’s beliefs about employment and, in turn, preferences for women’s labor supply. In our context, we find that a husband’s support for a woman’s future employment doubles when they experience, even briefly, her employment.⁴

Finally, we contribute to the discussion on the optimal delivery of social protection programs. Cash-for-work (or public works) programs frequently target women in an effort to promote women’s empowerment (FAO, 2018). We show that employing women through these programs can indeed shift household preferences around women’s labor. However,

⁴The value of shifting men’s preferences over female employment is underscored in Bursztyn, González, and Yanagizawa-Drott (2020), who find that providing information to husbands on the social acceptability of women’s work raises their wives’ efforts to search for jobs. However, while such information interventions may help correct misperceptions about social norms (what Jalota and Ho (2024) define as “domesticity” constraints), only exposure to work can address beliefs around practical, or material, consequences to women’s employment. As such, we might view exposure to women’s employment - in small doses that enable a household to update beliefs and adapt over time - as initiating a potentially virtuous cycle to greater women’s labor force participation.

this comes with tradeoffs: targeting *men* leads to greater short-term gains in psychosocial wellbeing for both spouses and a larger reduction in intimate partner violence compared to targeting women. This complements recent work by Christian et al. (2025), which also suggests tradeoffs in women’s safety when targeting women with public works programs. Policymakers aiming to promote both gender norm change and household welfare must carefully consider these tradeoffs between short term welfare and long run norm shifts when designing their assistance packages.

We end with a note on context. Our study takes place in the Rohingya refugee camps deliberately. Earlier work in these camps (Hussam et al., 2022) has established the psychosocial value of employment for the employed, making the policy question of who to target with such opportunities especially urgent. The camp setting also enables us to exogenously provide employment in a context where one’s outside option is *unemployment*, rather than alternative employment. In other settings where neither the wife nor the husband is employed, the couple may be highly selected: individuals may not be eligible to work, not wish to work, or have lost their jobs. Our setting allows us to estimate, as cleanly as possible, the value to both the employed and their spouse, bidirectionally, of meaningful gainful employment.

Yet, we acknowledge that the context where we work may also temper the generalizability of our results. In particular, the magnitude of our effects is a product of our context: we operate in refugee camps where households lack reliable income, conservative gender beliefs prevail, and some social structures and expectations may have eroded following forced displacement. We also work with a pool of couples for whom both partners agree *ex ante* to work if offered the opportunity, we deliver a job at random rather than as a signal of ability or need, and employment opportunities are zero-sum insofar as one partner receiving an opportunity precludes the other from the same. Each of these dimensions of our context and experimental design may imply that our results - on psychosocial wellbeing, IPV, and the malleability of preferences - is either smaller or larger than what one might estimate in a different setting. We argue, however, that they are unlikely to change the *asymmetry* in effects that we observe across husbands and wives. We therefore underscore the importance of interpreting the results of this study as a proof of concept, demonstrating how the lived experiences of both men and women within a household differ depending on which partner works, exploring how these differences shape preferences, and probing whether such preferences are malleable.

2 Research Context

2.1 Recent Events

In August of 2017, the Myanmar military executed a series of “Clearance Operations” in Rakhine State, Myanmar. The operations were targeted at the Rohingya ethnic minority, who have been denied citizenship in Myanmar since 1982 and are now the world’s largest stateless population. Over the course of four months, gang rapes and sexual violence were perpetrated against an estimated 18,000 women and girls, an estimated 36,000 Rohingya were thrown into fires, and at least 25,000 Rohingya were killed. Among those who survived, over 750,000 entered Bangladesh, building and settling into what is now the largest refugee camp in the world (Habib et al., 2018). They joined several hundred thousand Rohingya refugees from earlier episodes of ethnic violence, with the current population in the camps exceeding 900,000 individuals (Hussam et al., 2022).

2.2 Camp Life

Employment Due to legal restrictions on refugee employment (Bhatia et al., 2018), most refugees find themselves without work opportunities. Some seek employment in the informal sector outside the camps, a risky endeavor given the need to bypass checkpoints secured by the Bangladesh military. Those who find work inside or outside the camps serve as agricultural workers, construction day laborers, street stall operators, or social service delivery agents (at health, cooking, women’s, children’s centers within the camps) with the bulk of employment for refugees coming from NGOs (Mree, 2019). Refugees are engaged in work by these NGOs in two ways. The first is through cash-for-work programs, where they receive a flat daily rate of approximately 350 taka (3.50 USD) for 32 days of work spread over a quarter. The second is through unskilled “volunteering”, where refugees are typically paid 50 taka (0.50 USD) per hour to assist with ad-hoc operational tasks (Refugee Relief, 2018).

Time-use A typical day for a woman in our study sample involves 8.5 hours sleeping, 0.4 hours engaged in wage work, 1.0 hours in self-employment, 2.9 hours doing chores outside the house, 3.0 hours doing chores inside the house, 2.8 hours actively taking care of elders, children, and the sick, 2.0 hours actively taking care of oneself, and 3.4 hours resting, relaxing, or in religious activities. A typical day for a man in our study sample consists of 8.6 hours sleeping, 0.8 hours engaged in wage work, 0.9 hours engaged in self-employment, 2.6 hours doing chores outside the house, 1.6 hours doing chores inside the house, 2.3 hours actively taking care of elders, children, and the sick, 2.0 hours actively taking care of oneself, and 5.2

hours resting, relaxing, or in religious activities (Table A2).

Consumption and Savings Having left the bulk of their possessions in Myanmar and resided for five years in the camps at the time of the study, where income-generating opportunities remain scarce, most refugees possess few economically valuable assets and minimal savings. The average participant in our study reports savings at baseline of 302 taka (USD \$3), with the median participant reporting zero savings.

Refugees receive, at the time of the study, a monthly e-voucher of 1050 taka (10 USD) through the Bangladeshi government and the World Food Programme. This voucher allows them to purchase a limited quantity of food staples, including a maximum of thirteen kilograms of rice, two kilograms of lentils, one liter of oil, and ten eggs. Despite the common grievance that these rations are insufficient, refugees often resell portions of these staples to neighbors in the Bangladeshi host community at discounted rates in order to secure the cash required to purchase other basic foods which the e-voucher does not qualify for, such as salt or vegetables. This e-voucher remains the only reliable source of income for refugees.

Mental Health 22% (18%) of women (men) in our sample qualify as at least moderately depressed according to the PHQ-9 depression screening tool. 44% (54%) of women (men) report thinking of themselves as having little worth, and 22% (18%) report having had suicidal ideation in the week before our baseline survey. These estimates are comparable to those reported in other populations, including female entrepreneurs in Bangladesh in 2016 (Lopez-Pena, 2025) and adults in the United States in 2019 (Villarroel and Terlizzi, 2020).

3 Experimental Design

3.1 Sampling Strategy

We recruit 1080 households from 10 out of the 34 campsites in Cox’s Bazaar. Each campsite is divided into four to seven blocks, and within each block, there are 14 to 42 sub-blocks, which serve as our unit of randomization. We select nine households from each sub-block (which typically contain 60-130 households). Because recruitment was at the level of married couples rather than individuals, women in our sample are younger than men. The average woman (man) refugee in our study is 28 (32) years old; and 76% (61%) of women (men) in our sample have never received formal education (Table A1).

Recruitment follows a random walk procedure. Beginning near the center of a sub-block, the field team randomly identifies a direction along which they approach households door-

to-door. Each household is informed that our partner organization, RTM International, may have an opportunity for *one member of the household* to work for up to four hours per day for four days a week over six weeks. We clarify that we will not have enough work opportunities for everyone due to funding constraints. Our objective is to determine whether both members of the married couple will be able and interested in working for us - as we will be randomly determining which member receives the opportunity - and, in the case that we cannot offer the household an employment opportunity, whether they will be willing to meet with us for ten minutes every week for six weeks to answer survey questions (with compensation of 50 taka weekly). If a household expresses their willingness, the field team confirms the married couple in the household satisfies the following eligibility criteria: both members are between the ages of 18 and 45, are able and willing to work, and have not worked for more than 10 hours in the past two weeks. We also verify that they arrived in the 2017 exodus and are not relatives of the *majhi*, who is the politically most powerful individual within each camp and serves as the liaison with humanitarian groups on humanitarian aid distribution. Prior to all fieldwork, the research team secured permission from government authorities to operate in the camps and offer the interventions through RTM International.

3.2 Experimental Design

We randomly assign 80 sub-blocks to an employment treatment arm and 40 sub-blocks to control (Figure 2). We then further randomize, at the household level, whether to primarily engage the husband or wife. In control sub-blocks, selected participants receive 50 taka (USD \$0.50) per weekly survey. Control households assigned to engage the wife (husband) designate her (him) as the weekly survey respondent. In work sub-blocks, selected participants are offered work for four days per week, earning 300 taka (USD \$3) per day, totaling 1200 taka weekly or 7,200 taka for the full six weeks. Work households assigned to engage the wife (husband) designate her (him) as the weekly survey respondent and the one receiving the employment opportunity. In our companion paper (Hsu et al., 2025), we benchmark the impacts of the employment intervention against two alternative treatments: cash and volunteering.⁵

All households are informed at baseline of the six-week study duration, and surveyors return weekly to conduct brief surveys and provide compensation. We explain the randomization process to each participant and display their randomized treatment status on the

⁵In cash sub-blocks, participants receive the same 1200 taka (USD \$12) weekly as an unconditional cash transfer. In volunteering (unpaid work) sub-blocks, participants have the opportunity to engage in the same activity as those in the employment treatment for no pay, with the exception of the 50 taka received for completing weekly surveys.

surveyors’ tablet screens at the conclusion of our baseline study. Our sample is balanced across arms (Appendix Table A3).

Employment intervention details Our employment task broadly replicates that of Husam et al. (2022). Workers are assigned four workdays per week over six weeks, for a total of 24 days of work. All workdays were predetermined and noted on a calendar given to all participants. Workers receive 300 taka per day of work. Relative to the WFP’s e-voucher of 1050 taka per month, our intervention almost quadruples potential monthly consumption. This wage is also comparable to that of other scarce paid work opportunities in the camps: among those who have previously worked within our study sample, reported past wages vary from 300 taka per day for unskilled work with NGOs to 700 taka for skilled work. 85% (99%) of men (women) report having had no paid work in the past month (Table A1).

Individuals assigned to the work opportunity first watch an instructional video that describes the work task. Enumerators then explain the task verbally. The task involves selecting fifteen same-sex neighbors and marking these individuals’ activities four times per day on a set of illustrated time-use worksheets (Figure 3). We inform participants that we are interested in understanding the typical daily activities of camp residents and that neighbors’ identities, which we never ask for, will remain anonymous to both the surveyors and the research team.

Participants drop off their worksheets at the end of the workday in a tamper-proof box at the home of a pre-assigned refugee neighbor within each sub-block (the ‘facilitator’). Facilitators are also members of the work treatment arm and have no access to the contents of the box. They are asked to place a sheet at the end of the workday with the day’s date, so that any submission below that sheet is time-stamped to having been submitted on that day. The facilitators receive an additional 50 taka per week for providing this assistance.

At the end of the week, each worker comes to the facilitator’s home, where an enumerator checks the participant’s work for any mistakes (eg. no missing sheets, submission made on the correct days; fifteen tick marks per sheet; no replication across days or obvious variation in handwriting suggesting someone else had done their work). To encourage high-quality work, we introduce a pay penalty: mistakes over two consecutive weeks results in no payment for the following week, with penalties starting from the fourth week. However, participants are never at risk of losing their job nor otherwise being punished by the employer (the enumerator). The participant receives their payment after the enumerator verifies the quality of their work and administers the short survey.

We design the work task with several considerations in mind. First, we aim for equal participation between men and women, so we choose a task that does not involve strenuous

manual labor but still requires physical and mental effort. Workers perform repetitive movements outdoors, and completing the task requires focus. Additionally, the task is intended to occupy a substantial portion of the day without being a full-time commitment, requiring approximately four hours each workday. Second, because not all participants are literate, we devise a task that demands no literacy or numeracy skills beyond basic counting. The time-sheet is a visual tool featuring a comprehensive list of activities commonly undertaken by individuals in the camps: for example, eating, napping, going to the market, getting rations, and praying. Workers simply need to place tick marks below the illustrated depictions of the activities they observe their neighbors engaging in. Third, we craft a task that encourages workers to leave their homes and be exposed to others, but does not necessitate socialization. Workers can silently observe their neighbors and complete their worksheets, or they can engage in conversation if they so choose.⁶ In sum, we design a work task that is comparable to the non-manual, publicly observable employment opportunities available in the camp through NGOs. It accommodates the constraints of our study population and seeks to be neither too attractive nor unattractive within the refugee camp context.

4 Data Collection and Survey Instruments

4.1 Timeline and survey instruments

We conducted a baseline survey, administered to both members of each recruited couple, in January of 2023. One week after the survey, enumerators revisited each household to disclose their randomized treatment status and conduct the first midline survey. Thereafter, we met with the participating household member weekly, checked their work if they were assigned to the work arm, conducted a short survey, and then made the relevant payments. We conducted an endline survey five weeks after the start of work: crucially, we wished to perform the endline while treated participants were still engaged with the work. We observe a 3% attrition rate among the treated and 5% among partners at the endline, which does not differ across treatment arms or gender (Appendix Table A4). A follow-up survey took place approximately six weeks after the endline to ensure that participants did not experience any negative effects from the work opportunity.⁷ Fifteen months after the conclusion of the intervention, we conducted a final survey in which we elicited labor supply preferences for a one-week employment opportunity.

⁶Hussam et al. (2022) finds that workers did not engage in additional conversations during workdays, but did on non-work days.

⁷Indeed, we find no evidence of any worsening of outcomes in treatment households; results available upon request.

4.2 Outcome variables

All outcomes we describe below are collected via the surveys described above. The questions in these surveys were drawn from previous work in the camps (Hussam et al., 2022) and piloted extensively with households that were not included in the study sample. We describe the outcomes below and refer the reader to Appendix B for the full list of questions.

Psychosocial wellbeing We measure eight dimensions of psychosocial wellbeing, including depression (PHQ-9), locus of control (Levenson’s Scales), life satisfaction (Diener’s Satisfaction With Life Scale), stress (Cohen’s Perceived Stress Scale), sociability (positive conversations), stability (Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale), purpose, and self-worth. We standardize all outcomes.⁸ We combine these measures into a single psychosocial (PS) index, using an inverse covariance-weighted average of the standardized outcomes.

Intimate partner violence (IPV) We measure intimate partner violence by asking women ten questions about instances of IPV. We draw six questions from the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), and one from (Field et al., 2021), exploring occurrences of psychological abuse. We include a question from the DHS that examines physical abuse, asking whether the husband has threatened the respondent or someone close to them with harm. Due to cultural sensitivities, we could not directly ask about instances of physical abuse (hitting, slapping, etc.) as done in the DHS. Instead, we include two questions to assess attitudes toward and tolerance of physical abuse perpetrated by men. We combine each set of questions on psychological and physical abuse into summary indices, and then further combine these two measures into an overall IPV index. For men, for whom questions on physical abuse and certain forms of psychological abuse by their female partners would be regarded as culturally dissonant, we ask only about their experiences of psychological abuse using four of the seven questions administered to women.

Finances and Time-use We collect three measures of how money is used: consumption, savings, and loans. We rely on a time-use survey module designed by (Field et al., 2022) to capture daily activities.

Agency and Household Bargaining We administer an extensive set of survey questions designed to measure women’s agency within the household. First, we play an incentivized

⁸When standardizing outcomes, we standardize by gender of the respondent to account for differences in distribution between men and women. Note that because we present results by gender subgroups (e.g. partner women), control means presented in tables will not be mean zero.

bargaining game drawn from McKelway (2020). Second, we capture household power dynamics by asking respondents about their actions: how they engage in conversation with their partner through a series of questions drawn from IRC (2022); and how decisions over consumption and time-use are made within the household (as in Christian et al. (2025)). Finally we measure household dynamics by asking about gendered norms with a series of nine questions designed to track how respondents think decisions over consumption and time-use *should* be made within the household (Christian et al., 2025). Next, we draw two questions from IRC (2022) to assess the respondent’s view of the respectability of a man who consults his wife for important decisions or helps her with chores. We also ask three questions around the appropriateness of women working for pay to assess norms for women in the workplace. Finally, we capture aspirations for children.

Labor Market Preferences To capture long-term labor market preferences across partners, we design and perform a labor supply elicitation exercise fifteen months after the conclusion of the experiment with households assigned to the work treatment. We privately present each partner in the household with a surprise offer of a one-week work opportunity funded by a surplus budget. We tell each household member that we have funding to offer work to only one person in the household, and we elicit both who they would prefer to work and how strongly they hold that preference. The full script is presented in Appendix E. To understand changes in labor market preferences for women, we also ask respondents about the perceived negative and positive consequences of women (and men) working outside the home.

Multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) We use two strategies to account for the range of hypotheses we test. First, our primary outcome, psychosocial wellbeing, is as an inverse-covariance weighted index (Anderson, 2008). Second, within each table, we calculate the sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values to control for the expected proportion of individual rejections that are type I errors (Anderson, 2008).

Pre-analysis plan (PAP) This study was pre-registered on the AEA Registry. The main deviation from the PAP is that, in order to focus on employment’s impact on oneself and one’s spouse, the analysis of the cash and volunteering treatment arms has been moved to a companion paper (Hsu et al., 2025). As a result of this decision, we also reorganize the outcomes relative to their presentation in the PAP, but all main outcomes are presented here. These deviations from the PAP are described in full detail in Appendix Section C.

5 Experimental Results

5.1 Households engage in the work

We first establish that treated participants engage in the work. Figure 4 exhibits the fraction of individuals assigned to the data-collection task who complete their work each week. Participants consistently exhibit greater than 90% completion rates. We withheld payment for incomplete or poorly completed work on only two occasions.

We also confirm that the job assignment is time-consuming and that households use the earnings it generates. Tables 1 and 2 (Panel A) demonstrate that both working men and women spend approximately 4.5 hours on the work task. They reallocate time away from a range of other activities—including caregiving, personal care, leisure, sleep, and both indoor and outdoor chores. The pattern of time substitution towards work (and away from leisure, chores, and self-care) is strikingly similar across genders, with some small differences: women reduce their time spent on indoor chores by approximately 30 minutes more than men (p -value < 0.001). Women also reduce family care by 13 minutes more than men (p -value = 0.085). Meanwhile, employed men reduce time spent on self-employment activities and relaxation by 13 minutes (p -value = 0.086) and 34 minutes (p -value = 0.005) more than women respectively. However, these differences remain small in the aggregate.

We can also examine how employment affects the time use of partners (Panel B). We find few significant changes in either partner wives' or partner husbands' time use. Partner men report a slight decrease in time spent on daily wage work (21 minutes), possibly indicating reduced effort toward income generation now that their wives are earning wages. We observe no other significant change in how partner men allocate their time. Similarly, we observe minimal changes in partner women's time use, with the only significant shifts being a 22 minute reduction in sleep and a corresponding 20 minute increase in relaxation. In sum, both men and women adjust their time use in comparable ways when they take up work, while their partners experience minimal changes to their days.

Next, we explore how employed individuals and their partners use the money they receive. Tables 3 and 4 explore the impact of the work task on financial behavior. Working increases savings for both women (634 taka, or 6.34 USD) and men (512 taka, or 5.12 USD). We observe substantial reductions in borrowing for women (956 taka, or 9.56 USD) and men (390 taka, or 3.90 USD). We also observe that both treated men and women share their additional income with their spouses, as evidenced by significant improvements in both partner husbands' and partner wives' savings and sense of financial stability as well as a reduction in their outstanding debt. We find no significant changes in overall household consumption, regardless of whether the man or the woman is employed. Nor do we find

meaningfully different consumption patterns between men and women across the range of products we ask about (Appendix Tables A6 and A5).⁹

5.2 Do households prefer men to work over women?

Having established that the employment intervention leads participants to engage meaningfully in gainful employment, we now turn to the impacts of the intervention on oneself and one’s partner. To motivate this analysis, we first document that participants’ express a preference over men’s versus women’s work. We pose a question to our participants that is comparable to that of the World Values Survey (WVS), but is specific to one’s own household: “Imagine we could offer six months of employment to you or your partner. Would you prefer to take the opportunity yourself or have your partner take it?” Respondents answer this question after gaining familiarity with the nature of the employment task and in a context of widespread joblessness. We find, perhaps unsurprisingly, that 71.0% of men prefer to take the job themselves. Importantly, the majority of women, at 59.3%, also prefer that their husband take the job (Table A15). These patterns resemble the WVS findings for Bangladesh, where 81% of men and 71% of women agree that men should have priority in job access when opportunities are scarce.¹⁰

5.3 What are the consequences of each partner working?

Next we explore what could be driving these preferences. We estimate the effects of engaging in work on the worker and their partner using the following specification:

$$Y_{ibc}^1 = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Work}_{ibc} + \gamma_c + \delta_e + Y_{ibc}^0 + X_{ibc} + \varepsilon_{ibc} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ibc}^1 represents the relevant outcome for individual i in sub-block b and camp c , X_{ibc} is a vector of sociodemographic controls selected via double-selection LASSO following Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2014), and ε_{ibc} is an error term which we cluster at the block level. We include fixed effects for camp γ_c and enumerator δ_e .¹¹ We control for

⁹Why did consumption not change, despite the large cash inflow? We suspect that refugees anticipate fluctuating rations (for example, rations at the time of writing this paper in 2026 are approximately half of what they were at the time of the intervention) and may therefore choose to save the windfall as a buffer against future hardship.

¹⁰We ask respondents this question for one week, two months, four months, and six months of hypothetical employment duration. Table A16 shows that unwillingness for the woman to take on the job (in other words, desire for the man to take the job) increases as the duration of employment increases. We consider the responses of those who have experienced male employment to be closest to the population in the WVS survey, where a husband is typically employed while the wife remains a homemaker.

¹¹We include enumerator fixed effects following Di Maio and Fiala (2019) in order to account for the fact

the baseline value of the outcome variable Y_{ibc}^0 , when available, in an ANCOVA specification following McKenzie (2012). Our coefficient of interest is β_1 , the impact of employment.

We estimate this equation separately for four groups: treated women, their husbands, treated men, and their wives. In each case, the reference group consists of individuals of the same gender whose households were assigned to the control group. For example, when estimating the effect of the work treatment on partner men, we compare men whose spouses received the work treatment to men whose spouses were in the control group and only completed short weekly surveys.

Psychosocial wellbeing Our primary outcome of interest is psychosocial wellbeing. Table 5 (6) presents impacts on treated men (women) and their partners. We begin by discussing the results for workers, which reinforce the central finding of Hussam et al. (2022): workers benefit from having access to employment.¹² Employed men experience significant improvements in their psychosocial wellbeing, exhibiting a 0.112 SD increase in their index ($p = 0.001$), driven by reductions in depression severity (0.139 SD) and improvements in their life satisfaction (0.127 SD), sociability (0.100 SD), feeling of purposefulness (0.141 SD), and sense of control over their lives (0.192 SD). Like men, women experience a 0.088 SD improvement ($p = 0.036$) in their psychosocial wellbeing (Panel A, Column 1). This result is driven by a substantial reduction in depressive symptoms (0.203 SD) and a greater sense of stability (0.108 SD) and life satisfaction (0.125 SD). We cannot reject equality between the impacts of employment on treated men and treated women ($p = 0.233$). We underscore this finding; *ex ante* it is not obvious that employment would be a source of improved wellbeing for women in our sample, 99% of whom had never been gainfully employed in their previous lives in Myanmar. And yet, despite the fact that few women in our context have ever worked for pay, they appear to benefit as much as men from the employment opportunity.

These psychosocial effects are large relative to those achieved through comparable alternative interventions. Ridley et al. (2020) conducted a meta-analysis on the mental health impacts of multi-faceted anti-poverty interventions—including livestock transfers, business training, and employment—finding an average effect of 0.1 SD per \$1,000 PPP in cash transfers. Our intervention achieves the same effect size with a fraction of the transfer amount.

We then turn to the effects on spouses. Panel B of Table 5 shows that offering an employment opportunity to a husband leads to significant improvements in a wife’s psychosocial wellbeing (0.104 SD, $p = 0.023$). Notably, we cannot reject that an employed woman and the

that respondents’ answers to sensitive questions may be influenced by the specific enumerator.

¹²Effect sizes are somewhat smaller than four years ago, possibly because work opportunities are slightly easier to find. Interestingly, we show in our companion paper (Hsu et al., 2025), that the relative effect of work vs. cash is remarkably similar to what we found four years ago.

wife of an employed man experience equivalent gains in psychosocial wellbeing ($p = 0.931$). Among these wives, effects manifest in a reduction in depression severity (0.200 SD) and stress (0.177 SD) and a greater sense of purposefulness (0.135 SD) and self-worth (0.198 SD). In contrast, Panel B of Table (6 shows no meaningful impacts of women’s employment on their husbands’ wellbeing, with an index effect size of -0.007 SD.

In sum, while we observe comparable impacts of employment on the psychosocial wellbeing of working men and women, we observe significant differences in spillovers onto beneficiaries’ spouses: wives of treated men exhibit substantial improvements in their wellbeing, while husbands of treated women show little to no reaction. This asymmetry in spillovers implies that a *household’s* overall mental health improves differentially more in our context when the man, rather than the woman, receives the work opportunity. We next explore from where these differential spillovers upon partners may arise.

Why do partner women benefit? Our evidence suggests two main reasons that partner women benefit from their husband’s employment. First, women’s psychosocial wellbeing may increase if their husband’s employment enables them to satisfy prevailing homemaker norms (Ayan et al., 2025). While these women’s time use around childcare or household work do not change – unsurprising as their own occupations have not changed – we find that their psychological state does change. Self-worth and purpose of women whose husbands are employed are 0.135 (q -value = 0.131) and 0.198 (q -value = 0.037) higher, respectively, than their control counterparts, whose husbands remain unemployed (Table 5). While we cannot reject equality, these effects are also larger in magnitude than those exhibited by women who are themselves employed (of 0.054 SD in self worth, q -value = 0.389, and 0.086 SD in purpose, q -value = 0.366, Table 6).

Second, women’s wellbeing may improve if her home becomes a safer place to live; namely, if she experiences less IPV when her husband works. Table 7 presents the impact of employment on IPV within the households of treated men. Offering employment to husbands generates large and statistically significant reductions in IPV reported by their wives (0.133 SD, p -value = 0.068). Though the effects of each sub-component are imprecise when adjusting for multiple hypotheses, all sub-components are negative and we observe a 30% reduction in the probability of women reporting their husbands threatened to harm them or someone close to them in the two weeks prior to the survey and a 23% reduction in the probability of the woman reporting that her husband restricted visits with friends (Appendix Table

A9).¹³¹⁴

Why are partner men not affected? Why might unemployed men remain unaffected by their spouse’s employment? *A priori*, existing literature (Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan, 2015; Heath, 2014; Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Forrester and Klein, 2018) suggests several reasons one might expect a *decline* in a husband’s wellbeing from having a working wife, each of which are echoed as potential concerns by men in our context: women’s work may generate material costs (e.g., more childcare responsibilities for men), traditional gender norms may be violated (men are no longer the primary breadwinners, impacting male identity), or household tensions may rise as women gain greater bargaining power. We examine each of these potential costs in turn and find no evidence that they materialize. Partner men do not assume more childcare responsibilities when their wives work (Table 1), nor do they exhibit signs that their sense of identity is being threatened: their sense of purpose and self-worth do not decline (with impacts of 0.068 SD, $q = 1$ and 0.016 SD, $q = 1$, respectively, relative to their control counterparts whose wives do not work (Table 6).

We measure a broad set of household dynamics and likewise find little change across outcomes capturing behavior, norms, and aspirations within the household. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 present results from an incentivized bargaining game modeled after McKelway (2020) that measures the power exerted by each member of a couple when bargaining over the allocation of a finite budget. Column 1 estimates the treatment effect on whether the wife participated (i.e. spoke up) in the bargaining process at all, as observed by the enumerator; and Column 2 reports whether the respondent successfully obtained, during negotiation, at

¹³What drives the reduction in IPV? Although not the focus of this paper, our additional treatment arms of unconditional cash and volunteering presented in Hsu et al. (2025) offer some insight. We find that IPV declines for women whose husbands receive *any* treatment, indicating that both relaxed financial constraints (from unconditional cash) and reduced time in close physical proximity (from unpaid work) are sufficient to lower IPV, and may act as substitutes for one another (Appendix Tables A11). However, we note that, when women are employed, given cash, or offered the volunteer opportunity, they relax the household budget constraint and/or spend equal time away from their partners, but we do not observe comparable reductions in their experience of IPV from their husbands, suggesting that occupational norms may also be important (Appendix Tables A10). The reduction in IPV when men are treated - whether with employment, cash, or volunteering - may be driven by spouses more comfortably occupying their “spheres of influence”, which may reduce day-to-day frictions and opportunities for conflict in the home.

¹⁴While other mechanisms may be at play, we find little evidence for them when looking at our other treatment arms presented in Hsu et al. (2025). Perhaps women benefit from the relaxed budget constraint of the household when her husband is employed? We find that women’s psychosocial wellbeing improves marginally even when her husband is engaged in volunteer work, receiving the same nominal fee for survey completion as his control counterparts, so this cannot entirely explain the effect (Appendix Table A11). Perhaps women’s wellbeing increases because her husband, now being employed, is now happier? We find that women’s psychosocial wellbeing improves significantly even when her husband receives only cash, which has no impact on his own psychosocial wellbeing, so this cannot entirely explain the effect either (Appendix Tables A11).

least the amount that they stated they privately desired. The dynamics of the bargaining game remain unchanged when women work. In other words, we find no evidence that partner men lose bargaining power within this game when their wives work.

We also capture household power dynamics by asking about the actions of each partner. Column 3 of Table 8 reports impacts on respondents' self-perceived ability to alter their partner's position in the case of disagreement. We find no evidence that working women gain greater influence when employed, and partner husbands report no change in their ability to affect their partners' decisions. Column 4 reports an index of questions around how consumption and time-use decisions are made within the household. Neither employed women nor partner men experience changes in their decision-making power.

Finally, we evaluate household power dynamics through a series of questions about norms and beliefs. Column 5 of Table 8 reports respondents' answers to how they believe decisions about consumption and time-use *should* be made in the household. Neither employed women nor their spouses experience any significant change in their beliefs about who should hold power over these decisions. Columns 6 and 7 report respondents' agreement with non-traditional gender norms: whether men should help within the household, whether women should be able to work outside the home. We find no evidence that women who worked – or their spouses – are more likely to say that women should be able to work outside the home or that men should help with household tasks. These findings align with a broad literature showing that shifting deeply held social norms is challenging (Jayachandran, 2021). Finally, we show that aspirations for children remain largely unchanged, providing further evidence that norms do not appear to be shifting (Table A13).

Summary and generalizability In sum, we find that women report substantial improvements in wellbeing when their husbands work, plausibly due to a decline in IPV from their husbands and an ability to fulfill a homemaker norm. Men, in contrast, exhibit no improvement in wellbeing when their wives work, consistent with the result that they experience neither clear benefits nor significant costs from their wives' employment. These patterns offer a potential explanation for the stated preferences for men's work (that we document both in our own surveys and in the World Values Survey) and potentially the persistently low women's labor supply we observe in such settings: if households face a choice around who will work, as they often do when work is scarce, our results suggest they will be more likely to choose the man to maximize household wellbeing.

Before turning to the paper's second main objective, we reflect on external validity. We see this context as offering a unique opportunity to isolate preferences in a more precise way. We offer the same job to men and women in a context where opportunities are scarce,

so the preferences we elicit are not driven by unequal access to jobs. Instead, they reflect households underlying preferences, holding the job opportunity constant. That said, we acknowledge that the magnitude of the well-being gap between wives and husbands could vary across settings. Our study takes place in an environment characterized by widespread unemployment and limited labor demand, where households may have greater flexibility in how they allocate time—potentially explaining, for example, the relatively high levels of male participation in household chores compared to other contexts. Moreover, the transition from dual unemployment to a wife’s employment may be substantively different from a transition in which a wife begins working while the husband remains employed. While these factors suggest that the size of the wellbeing gap may differ elsewhere, our objective is to provide proof of concept that the asymmetric pattern we document – wives of employed men experiencing larger psychosocial gains from employment than husbands of employed women – can be an important mechanism underlying preferences for men’s work.¹⁵

5.4 Are preferences over female labor malleable?

We next explore whether past exposure to women’s employment can shift preferences around who, within a partnership, should take on new work opportunities. To this end, we revisit households fifteen months after the conclusion of the experiment and therefore interpret our results as a measure of *long-term* changes in preferences from a fairly brief intervention. We design a choice experiment to elicit individuals’ preferences for their own relative to their partner’s employment. We return to households in which one partner had previously received an employment opportunity in our experiment, and we inform them that we have one last opportunity to work with us. More specifically, we inform each member of the couple (i.e. both the formerly employed and their spouse) that we have a budget surplus with which we can offer one week of work, but the surplus only permits us to hire one member of the couple. We first ask each respondent to indicate, at a daily wage rate of 200 taka, who they prefer take the job. Conditional on their preference (self or partner), we then progressively raise the proposed wage for the non-preferred partner (keeping the preferred person’s wage at 200 taka) until the respondent decides to shift their choice to the non-preferred. We use the switching point as a measure of the strength of their preference for their own versus their partner’s employment. For example, if a female respondent prefers that her husband take the work opportunity at the base wage of 200 Tk and she requires a daily wage rate of 300

¹⁵We also note that our experiment does not test the impact of both individuals being employed. We refrain from this in order to keep income effects constant across treatment groups - both at the partner and individual level - and because aid organizations typically identify an individual, not a partnership, to be the beneficiary of cash or employment programs. This is an area we leave to future work.

Tk to switch to working herself, we define her value of women’s work as -100 Tk. Conversely, if she herself prefers to work at the base wage of 200 Tk and requires a daily wage rate of 300 Tk in order to pass the opportunity to her husband, her value of women’s work is +100 Tk. The analog follows for men. We cap the maximum permissible wage at 600 taka; responses that exceed the cap are excluded from the set of possible draws.

Respondents are informed that the computer tablet will then randomly assign the task to either (i) the preferred worker at 200 taka, (ii) the non-preferred partner at their switching wage, (iii) the preferred worker at a “secret-keeping wage” of 220 taka (the amount unknown beforehand to the respondent and included to protect anonymity of the partner’s responses), or (iv) one of these three options from the partner’s survey, which is conducted separately but simultaneously.¹⁶

We compare respondents in households in which the woman was formerly assigned to work (in our initial experiment fifteen months prior) to households in which the man was assigned to work (the latter serving as our comparison group in reported results, most closely approximating the *status quo* in broader contexts).

Results are presented in Table 9. Panel A presents women’s responses and Panel B presents men’s. Column 1 presents the proportion of respondents who prefer the woman to work at parity (200 Tk/day). In households where men were formerly employed by our experiment, 64.5% of women prefer taking the one-week job over giving it to their husband.¹⁷ However, in households where *women* were previously employed, 83.8% of women prefer taking the job themselves, a 19.3 percentage point (30%) increase in their preference for women’s employment. Column 2 reports the value that women place on being employed over their partner, or the additional daily wage required to incentivize the respondent to

¹⁶We note that this game is not fully incentive compatible. If participants knew the maximum wage we were willing to offer, they could strategically repeatedly answer “no” to switching in order to push the offered wage to its maximum, increasing the chance that their household receives a higher wage. We do not view this as a major concern for three reasons. First, this does not affect our first measure of *who* a respondent believes should work. Second, strategic play is unlikely: the task is unfamiliar, participants do not know the wage cap, and attempting to push wages up would be risky because responses that exceed the cap are excluded from the set of possible draws. Finally, our analysis focuses on treatment effects, not levels – namely, differences in preferred wages between households where the husband previously worked and those where the wife previously worked. We see no reason why strategic behavior should differ systematically across these two groups; empirically, we observe that there is no difference across treatment in likelihood of reaching the 600 taka maximum switching point.

¹⁷This is twenty percentage points higher than the share of women who say they would prefer to take the job themselves in the WVS-style question reported in Section 5.1. A plausible explanation for this difference is that our labor supply elicitation exercise describes an additional *week* of work, whereas the WVS-like question asks about a *six-month* job opportunity, more closely approximating stable long-term employment with high stakes. We could not afford to offer six additional months of employment, and therefore chose to conduct this exercise incentivized with one week of work. Importantly, the object of interest in this exercise is the treatment effect of having previously worked (as a woman), rather than absolute levels.

choose that the man take the work opportunity. In households where men were formerly employed, women price the value of the woman working at 19.0 Tk, a negligible premium to pass the opportunity to the man. However, for women who were previously employed, the premium required to give up the work opportunity increases by 120 Tk, reaching a total of 139 Tk, which is equivalent to 70% of the base wage rate of 200 Tk.

These behavioral shifts are even more pronounced among male respondents (Panel B). Among households where men were formerly employed, 25% of men prefer that their wife take the one-week job over themselves. Among households where these men's *wives* were formerly employed, this fraction jumps to 50.8%, a 25.8 percentage point (103%) increase, in preference for their wives' employment over their own. The differential strength of this preference is large. Among formerly employed men, we observe a negative value of women working of -126 Tk, implying that they would require an additional 126 Tk in the daily wage rate should their wife take the employment opportunity instead. Conversely, men whose wives were formerly employed are largely indifferent between taking the opportunity for themselves or assigning it to their spouse, with the estimate of 56 Tk (-126 Tk + 182 Tk) statistically indistinguishable from zero.

5.5 What are potential drivers of this change?

Women's preference shifters We begin by returning to the experience of employed women in our study. We find that women's psychosocial wellbeing improves through employment. We also detect no backlash from their husbands: husbands' psychosocial wellbeing remains unchanged, and employed women do not report higher IPV from their spouses relative to their unemployed control counterparts.¹⁸

At the fifteen month follow up, we also ask our female respondents a series of questions around the negative consequences of female employment *in general* (Panel A, Table 10). Each column presents the proportion of respondents who name the given negative outcome indicated in the column label. Broadly, women appear confident that women's employment will not reduce their ability to dedicate time to household activities, alter their attitudes, nor lead to relational difficulties within the household. Among women who we formerly employed, we observe a four percentage point increase in the belief that fewer household tasks will be performed and a seven percentage point decline in the belief that society disapproves of female work, although these individual effects do not survive multiple hypothesis testing. In sum, women benefit psychosocially from employment and exhibit little to no change in their

¹⁸Table A7 presents the impact of employment on the IPV index – an index of experiences of psychological abuse and physical abuse – within the households of treated women. We observe moderate but statistically insignificant reductions in IPV experienced by employed women (Panel A).

experience of costs to the activity, consistent with the observed increase in willingness to work in our incentivized labor supply elicitation exercise.

Men’s preference shifters We turn next to men, considering both their experience when their wives are employed by us and their responses to the same set of questions on the perceived costs of women’s work in general. When their wives work, we find no evidence of higher material costs (such as a greater burden of household work or childcare), no loss of purpose or self-worth, and no increase in household tension. Their psychosocial wellbeing remains broadly unchanged. Fifteen months later, men’s survey responses on the perceived costs of women working align with their experience (Panel B, Table 10). Husbands of women who were formerly employed by us are nine percentage points (38%) less likely to report concerns about women having reduced time for performing household tasks or caring for the family and seven percentage points (30%) less likely to report concerns about changes in women’s attitude. They are seven percentage points (44%) less likely to report household tension from women’s work and ten percentage points (23%) more likely to respond that there are no negative outcomes to women’s work at all.¹⁹ In sum, large reductions in experienced and expected costs to women working appear to translate to the substantially higher willingness we observe among men to allow, or even marginally *prefer*, that their wives work in our labor supply elicitation exercise.

We note that other mechanisms may be leading to the large labor supply shifts we observe. In particular, our results may be driven in part by inertia: households that experienced women working may simply want that arrangement to continue because it is most familiar to them in the context of our NGO partner. We underscore that this is itself a policy-relevant feature: if inertia alone can reshape entrenched gender norms around work, that is rather encouraging. However, inertia is unlikely to fully explain the shifts we observe, because our questions around the negative consequences to women’s work refer to women’s work *in general*, not to our specific task or with our specific partner. Rather, learning appears important: upon experiencing a woman work, men (and some women) update their beliefs about employment and come to view the costs of women’s work as lower than they initially expected.

We caveat this exercise in several ways. First, our employment offer in our followup exercise is for only one week’s worth of work. Perhaps gender preferences over employment would differ were the work of a longer duration. While we do not provide incentivized offers for long-term work, we do ask respondents who they would prefer take the work were their

¹⁹We also ask men and women about the positive outcomes associated with women’s work. Interestingly, men are 11 percentage points more likely to recognize at least some positive value to women’s employment (Panel B, Table A17).

employment contract extended to two months, four months, and six months. Results remain robust: both formerly-employed women and the husbands of formerly employed women continue to express significantly stronger preferences to work (Appendix Table A15) than those households who have not experienced the woman working for pay.

6 Conclusion

Despite widespread efforts to increase women’s labor supply, women’s participation in the labor market remains low in many parts of the world. This paper explores the possibility that these patterns are not only due to unequal opportunities or pay, but also reflect a preference for men’s employment—even when opportunities are equalized. Establishing this is important: if underlying preferences help sustain gender gaps in labor supply, then policies seeking to increase women’s labor force participation must address the underlying determinants of these preferences, and assess whether they are malleable.

This study is motivated by evidence from our context, and others, that men and women both express preferences for men’s work. We design a targeted experiment to explore what may drive these preferences: we randomly offer the same job, under identical conditions, to men and women, and compare key outcomes when the woman works to when the man works. We find that the psychosocial benefits of employment are similarly large for both men and women. However, we find asymmetry in spillovers to one’s spouse: husbands of employed women experience no change in wellbeing, while wives of employed men show substantial improvements in psychosocial wellbeing. We offer suggestive evidence on the sources of these asymmetric responses. Women appear to benefit from men’s employment because IPV declines and because it allows them to fulfill the homemaker norm. Men, in contrast, do not experience comparable gains when women work—but they also do not appear to incur measurable losses. In particular, we find little evidence that men take on substantially more household responsibilities, that breadwinner norms are meaningfully threatened, or that men lose bargaining power within the household. These findings help explain households’ preferences for men’s work, which may be a driver of persistently low women’s labor supply: if households must choose who works when work opportunities are scarce, and only men’s employment generates broader household benefits, they may consistently favor men for work opportunities.

While our study suggests that households prefer men to work, we find that these preferences are malleable. We observe labor supply preferences more than one year later that suggest that households update their gender preferences substantially based on their past experience, despite such experience having lasted only six weeks and transpired fifteen months

prior. Men, specifically, become significantly less concerned by women's employment in general and significantly more likely to prefer their wife work in particular. Our evidence suggests that experiencing their wife's employment firsthand helps ease anticipated concerns to such an arrangement. This is reflected both in their material outcomes from the randomized experiment – where we see no negative changes in material costs, breadwinner norms, or household dynamics – and in men's own reported concerns, which decline after the experience.

The results present a complex trade-off for policymakers: households appear to feel happier when the man works, but they are more likely to prefer that the woman work if she has had prior experience doing so. How might we reconcile these? While speculative and an avenue for further work, our findings suggest that policymakers might facilitate learning opportunities that enable both members to experiment with employment, and then enable beneficiaries themselves to choose who in the household should be targeted with an employment opportunity – a decision that necessarily considers the full set of impacts they experience, many of which the policymaker herself may not be able to observe.

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Tables

Table 1: Time use components, households where women are treated

Panel A: Treated Women								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(8)	
	Sleeping	Daily Wage	Self-employed	Chores Outside	Chores Inside	Care Family	Care Self	
	Relaxing							
Work	-0.903*** (0.103)	4.677*** (0.278)	-0.035 (0.087)	-0.583*** (0.072)	-0.690*** (0.079)	-0.647*** (0.067)	-0.565*** (0.069)	-1.269*** (0.160)
Control Mean	8.023	0.164	0.508	2.887	3.124	2.989	2.299	4.006
Shrp. q-val Work	0.001	0.001	0.094	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

Panel B: Partner Men								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(8)	
	Sleeping	Daily Wage	Self-employed	Chores Outside	Chores Inside	Care Family	Care Self	
	Relaxing							
Work	-0.026 (0.114)	-0.354* (0.207)	-0.001 (0.086)	0.066 (0.082)	-0.003 (0.069)	0.003 (0.082)	0.074 (0.061)	0.252 (0.158)
Control Mean	8.124	1.406	0.882	2.506	1.571	2.379	1.776	5.356
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	0.792	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.828	0.792
Observations	505	505	505	505	505	505	505	505

Notes: We ask about the number of hours that respondents engage in the following activities: (1) Sleeping; (2) Income generating work specific to daily/regular wage; (3) Self-employed income generating work; (4) Household chores/unpaid work outside the house; (5) Household chores/unpaid work inside the house; (6) Actively taking care of sick/elderly/children; (7) Actively taking care of oneself; (8) Relaxing/leisure. All outcomes are in hours. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Time use components, households where men are treated

Panel A: Treated Men								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(8)	
	Sleeping	Daily Wage	Self-employed	Chores Outside	Chores Inside	Care Family	Care Self	
	Relaxing							
Work	-0.621*** (0.111)	4.219*** (0.321)	-0.274*** (0.076)	-0.420*** (0.084)	-0.157* (0.091)	-0.434*** (0.092)	-0.467*** (0.055)	-1.828*** (0.189)
Control Mean	8.147	0.929	0.776	2.579	1.624	2.474	2.006	5.465
Shrp. q-val Work	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.011	0.001	0.001	0.001
Observations	524	524	524	524	524	524	524	524

Panel B: Partner Women								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(8)	
	Sleeping	Daily Wage	Self-employed	Chores Outside	Chores Inside	Care Family	Care Self	
	Relaxing							
Work	-0.357*** (0.123)	0.057 (0.053)	-0.029 (0.081)	-0.123 (0.077)	0.067 (0.065)	-0.013 (0.064)	0.043 (0.070)	0.320*** (0.149)
Control Mean	8.335	0.218	0.529	2.853	3.071	2.871	2.253	3.871
Shrp. q-val Work	0.032	0.440	0.955	0.279	0.440	0.955	0.809	0.129
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

Notes: We ask about the number of hours that respondents engage in the following activities: (1) Sleeping; (2) Income generating work specific to daily/regular wage; (3) Self-employed income generating work; (4) Household chores/unpaid work outside the house; (5) Household chores/unpaid work inside the house; (6) Actively taking care of sick/elderly/children; (7) Actively taking care of oneself; (8) Relaxing/leisure. All outcomes are in hours. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Financial portfolio, households where women are treated

Panel A: Treated Women					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Total Consumption	Savings	Borrowing	Lending	Can Spend 1000
Work	132.961 (299.615)	633.656*** (80.318)	-956.081*** (303.058)	0.007 (0.015)	0.167*** (0.038)
Control Mean	3833.531	166.800	2285.876	0.028	0.706
Shrp. q-val Work	0.357	0.001	0.002	0.357	0.001
Observations	518	494	518	518	518
Panel B: Partner Men					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Work	-92.650 (301.539)	418.328*** (75.273)	-1066.551*** (358.945)	0.018 (0.018)	0.071** (0.032)
Control Mean	4482.576	422.976	3345.176	0.029	0.759
Shrp. q-val Work	0.436	0.001	0.007	0.186	0.029
Observations	505	469	505	505	505

Notes: All outcomes are unstandardized; (1)-(3) are in taka, and (4)-(5) in percentage points. (1) is the total amount of money the respondent has spent in the last two weeks. (2) is the total savings the respondent holds. (3) is the total amount the respondent is currently borrowing. (4) is whether the respondent currently has money lent to anyone. (5) is whether the respondent can currently cover an emergency expense of 1000 taka. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Financial portfolio, households where men are treated

Panel A: Treated Men					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Total Consumption	Savings	Borrowing	Lending	Can Spend 1000
Work	-139.538 (331.227)	511.670*** (110.683)	-390.823 (346.569)	-0.014 (0.023)	0.099*** (0.032)
Control Mean	4458.772	591.176	2679.532	0.076	0.772
Shrp. q-val Work	0.679	0.001	0.352	0.671	0.004
Observations	525	492	525	525	525
Panel B: Partner Women					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Work	27.942 (278.665)	305.342*** (96.031)	-133.389 (254.314)	0.041*** (0.014)	0.128*** (0.041)
Control Mean	3810.947	286.310	1745.882	0.018	0.747
Shrp. q-val Work	0.583	0.005	0.429	0.005	0.005
Observations	518.000	494.000	518.000	518.000	518.000

Notes: All outcomes are unstandardized; (1)-(3) are in taka, and (4)-(5) in percentage points. (1) is the total amount of money the respondent has spent in the last two weeks. (2) is the total savings the respondent holds. (3) is the total amount the respondent is currently borrowing. (4) is whether the respondent currently has money lent to anyone. (5) is whether the respondent can currently cover an emergency expense of 1000 taka. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Psychosocial wellbeing, households where men are treated

Panel A: Treated Men		Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	PS Index	PHQ	Stress	Life Sat.	Social	Purpose	Self-Worth	Control	Stability
Work	0.112*** (0.033)	0.139* (0.074)	0.094 (0.083)	0.127** (0.064)	0.100* (0.061)	0.141* (0.077)	0.069 (0.091)	0.192*** (0.073)	-0.009 (0.077)
Control Mean	-0.018	0.030	0.026	-0.069	-0.058	-0.013	-0.020	-0.040	0.068
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.135	0.191	0.135	0.157	0.135	0.240	0.076	0.520
Observations	525	525	524	524	524	524	524	524	524
Panel B: Partner Women		Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	PS Index	PHQ	Stress	Life Sat.	Social	Purpose	Self-Worth	Control	Stability
Work	0.104** (0.046)	0.200* (0.103)	0.177* (0.096)	0.056 (0.076)	-0.093 (0.085)	0.135** (0.064)	0.198*** (0.069)	-0.010 (0.074)	0.154* (0.092)
Control Mean	-0.043	-0.024	-0.029	-0.052	-0.134	-0.041	-0.058	0.004	-0.035
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.131	0.131	0.247	0.180	0.131	0.037	0.503	0.152
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. (2) is an index created from the nine-question PHQ-9 (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression). (3) is an index of three questions inspired by Cohen's Perceived Stress scale (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress). (4) is an index created from Diener's Satisfaction With Life Scale. (5) is how many people the respondent had conversations with yesterday. (6) is an index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who does the most in their family and community. (7) is similar to (6), but relative to the person who is respected the most. (8) is an index created from Levenson's Multidimensional Internal Locus of Control Scales. (9) is an index assessing stability by asking respondents how secure they feel at the moment and expect to feel in the future. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the previous eight outcomes. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Psychosocial wellbeing, households where women are treated

Panel A: Treated Women		Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	PS Index	PHQ	Stress	Life Sat.	Social	Purpose	Self-Worth	Control	Stability
Work	0.088** (0.042)	0.203** (0.081)	0.132 (0.089)	0.125* (0.064)	-0.063 (0.086)	0.054 (0.077)	0.086 (0.078)	-0.036 (0.074)	0.108* (0.060)
Control Mean	0.047	0.033	0.026	0.034	0.133	0.061	0.070	0.020	0.036
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.112	0.239	0.203	0.389	0.389	0.366	0.452	0.203
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

Panel B: Partner Men		Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Work	-0.007 (0.035)	-0.012 (0.082)	0.004 (0.085)	-0.042 (0.073)	-0.000 (0.074)	0.068 (0.086)	0.016 (0.094)	-0.094 (0.073)	0.065 (0.098)
Control Mean	0.027	-0.030	-0.026	0.069	0.058	0.013	0.020	0.040	-0.068
Shrp. q-val Work	-	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	505	505	505	505	505	505	505	505	505

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. (2) is an index created from the nine-question PHQ-9 (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression). (3) is an index of three questions inspired by Cohen's Perceived Stress scale (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress). (4) is an index created from Diener's Satisfaction With Life Scale. (5) is how many people the respondent had conversations with yesterday. (6) is an index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who does the most in their family and community. (7) is similar to (6), but relative to the person who is respected the most. (8) is an index created from Levenson's Multidimensional Internal Locus of Control Scales. (9) is an index assessing stability by asking respondents how secure they feel at the moment and expect to feel in the future. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the previous eight outcomes. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Self-reported IPV, households where men are treated

	Panel A: Treated Men		
	Psych Abuse		
Work		0.112	
		(0.073)	
Control Mean		0.022	
Shrp. q-val Work		-	
Observations		524	

	Panel B: Partner Women	Components of IPV Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IPV Index	Psych Abuse	Phys Abuse
Work	-0.133*	-0.109	-0.158*
	(0.073)	(0.090)	(0.084)
Control Mean	0.013	0.052	-0.024
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.138	0.138
Observations	518	518	518

Notes: Outcomes in the negative direction indicate a decrease in IPV or its acceptability. All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. (2) is an index of the frequency of seven (four for men) psychological abuse IPV actions, including jealousy, humiliation, and insulting, with a higher score corresponding to higher frequency. (3) is an index of the frequency of one physical abuse action (not included for men) and two questions about the acceptability of physical violence against women. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of these two outcomes, computed only for women, because the physical abuse questions are asked only with respect to her experience. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Household bargaining, households where women are treated

Panel A: Treated Women						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)
Barg Participate	Barg Success	Act Infl	Act Deci	Norm Action	Norm Men HH	Norm Women Work
Work	0.010 (0.035)	0.043 (0.046)	-0.008 (0.059)	0.007 (0.073)	-0.024 (0.062)	0.058 (0.060)
Control Mean	0.689	0.696	0.016	0.087	0.064	-0.032
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	499	500	518	518	518	518

Panel B: Partner Men						
	Barg Success	Act Infl	Act Deci	Norm Action	Norm Men HH	Norm Women Work
Work	0.045 (0.043)	-0.063 (0.046)	-0.089 (0.057)	-0.053 (0.057)	0.110 (0.086)	0.051 (0.055)
Control Mean	0.753	-0.017	0.034	0.027	-0.090	0.034
Shrp. q-val Work	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.539
Observations	502	505	505	505	505	505

Notes: Columns (3)-(7) are standardized. (1) is an indicator of whether the wife participated during the bargaining game. (2) is an indicator of whether the respondent received at least the amount they privately wanted. (3) is an index of how much ability the respondent has to influence their partner in case of disagreement. (4) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who decides how much to spend on a set of five item types, (b) an index of what percentage of the household's budget they can spend, and (c) an index of who decides who performs a set of four time use categories. A higher index value means that the *respondent* holds greater sway over decision-making. (5) is similar to (4), but of who *should* decide how to spend or do, and how much. (6) is an index of level of disagreement with the statements "A husband who helps his wife with the household chores should not be respected" and "A husband who makes important decisions jointly with his wife is weak". (7) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of hours women should be allowed to work in/outside the block and level of disagreement with the statement "A wife who prioritizes work outside the home over household-chores is not a good wife". Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Labor supply: preference for woman to work

	Panel A: Women	
	(1) Pref. Women	(2) Value of Woman Working
Woman Assigned Work	19.3*** (6.3)	120.4*** (31.3)
Man Assigned Work Mean	64.5	19.0
Shrp. q-val	0.002	0.001
Observations	215	215

	Panel B: Men	
	(1) Pref. Women	(2) Value of Woman Working
Woman Assigned Work	25.8*** (7.1)	182.3*** (43.7)
Man Assigned Work Mean	25.0	-126.2
Shrp. q-val	0.001	0.001
Observations	217	217

Notes: Outcomes are unstandardized. (1) is the proportion (in percentage points) of respondents that prefer the woman to work at parity (200 Tk/day). (2) is a measure of the strength of this preference; how much additional daily wage would be required for the man to work. For example, if a respondent prefers the woman to work at a wage of 200 Tk and would require 300 Tk to switch to the man working, we define the value placed on the woman working as +100Tk. Conversely, if the respondent prefers the man to work at a wage of 200 Tk and would require 300 Tk for the woman to work, we define the value placed on the woman working as -100 Tk. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 10: Negative outcomes from women’s work


Panel A: Women							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Less tasks	Less family	Attitude	Tension	Familial	Societal	None
Woman Assigned Work	0.04*	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.07**	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.10	0.85
Shrp. q-val	0.303	0.557	0.343	0.521	0.825	0.303	0.825
Observations	215	215	215	215	215	215	215

Panel B: Men							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Less tasks	Less family	Attitude	Tension	Familial	Societal	None
Woman Assigned Work	-0.09*	-0.12**	-0.07	-0.07***	-0.01	-0.01	0.10**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.16	0.03	0.12	0.43
Shrp. q-val	0.080	0.046	0.093	0.043	0.188	0.226	0.043
Observations	217	217	217	217	217	217	217

Notes: Observations are restricted to men and women who received the work treatment. The columns take the value of 1 if the respondent listed that response (unprompted, multiple choice allowed) to the question “What are the negative outcomes from a woman working outside the home?” (1) is less time to spend on household tasks, (2) is less time to take care of the family, (3) is it will change her attitude, (4) is it will create more tension in the household, (5) is it is not her role in the family, (6) is it is not appropriate in this society, (7) is no negative outcome. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Figures

Figure 1: Gender Gap in Labor Force Participation



Notes: The first panel shows the gap in labor force participation rates between men and women, using data from the World Bank–Data Indicators and the ILO (labor force participation rate, percent of the population ages 15–64). The second panel shows the correlation between the gender gap in labor force participation and the share of respondents who agree or strongly agree with the statement, “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women,” using data from the World Values Survey (2022). Within this second panel, the left figure presents responses from men, while the right figure presents responses from women.

Figure 2: Experimental design




Notes: This figure presents the experimental design. We randomly assign 80 sub-blocks to “work” and 40 sub-blocks to “control”. We then randomize which member of the household we engage with. In the treatment group, the assigned household member receives the work, in the control group, the assigned household member receives USD \$0.50 for answering our surveys weekly.

Figure 3: Work task worksheets

(a) women's




(b) men's



Notes: This figure presents the time sheets provided to the women (Panel A) and men (Panel B) who were randomized into the employment intervention. Each individual received four identical sheets per work day, with the time of day they were intended to be completed pre-filled on the top right, and space to put tally marks below each picture. Each sheet includes an exhaustive pictorial list of the activities one might be engaged in within the camps. For women, from top left to bottom right: being idle, praying in the tent, cooking in the tent, caring for children, sowing in a women's center, cooking in a cooking center, spending time with friends or family, washing clothes or bathing, going to the market, fetching water, fetching firewood, waiting in line for rations, or napping. For men, from top left to bottom right: being idle, sitting in a tea stall, bathing, going to the market, napping, doing agricultural labor, praying at the mosque, doing construction labor, waiting in line for rations, eating, or feeding children/spending time with children.

Figure 4: Task completion



Notes: This figure shows task completion rates for men and women in our sample. Visit number 1 is missing because the respondents received their assigned treatment status at that meeting; they had not yet completed any work at that point.

THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT ON PARTNERSHIPS:
EVIDENCE FROM A REFUGEE SETTLEMENT

Online appendix

Yueh-ya Hsu, Reshmaan Hussam, Erin Kelley, and Greg Lane

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A Appendix Tables and Figures

A.1 Tables

A.1.1 Descriptives

Table A1: Descriptives, baseline

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Men	Women	All
Age	31.70	28.16	29.94
People in Household	5.44	5.45	5.44
Children (18-) in Household	3.21	3.21	3.21
Formally Educated	0.39	0.24	0.32
Religious Education	0.40	0.63	0.52
Prev. Agricultural Work	0.40	0.00	0.20
Work in Last 30 Days	0.15	0.01	0.08
Worked in Myanmar	0.66	0.01	0.34
Healthy Days in last 30	26.35	23.65	25.00
Moderately or Severely Depressed	0.18	0.22	0.20
Savings (BDT)	360.91	240.84	300.26
Consumption in Last 2 Weeks (BDT)	3960.12	3497.19	3728.98
Observations	1080	1077	2157

Notes: This table includes data for all individuals surveyed at baseline, whether treated or partner. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the average value of the variable for men, women, and everyone, respectively.

Table A2: Time use, baseline

	(1)	(2)
	Men	Women
Sleeping	8.6	8.5
Daily Wage	0.8	0.4
Self-Employment	0.9	1.0
Chores Outside House	2.6	2.9
Chores Inside House	1.6	3.0
Caring for Family	2.3	2.8
Caring for Self	2.0	2.0
Relaxing	5.2	3.4
Observations	1080	1077

Notes: This table includes data for all individuals surveyed at baseline, whether treated or partner. Columns (1) and (2) show the **mean** value of the variable for men, and women, respectively.

A.1.2 Balance

Table A3: Balance in observables across treatment arms

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Control	Work	(1) vs. (2)
Age	29.69	30.10	0.23
People in HH	5.40	5.45	0.94
Pct. Formal Educ.	0.37	0.29	0.02
Math Literacy Index	-0.00	-0.05	0.21
Digit Span Index	-0.00	-0.04	0.43
Life Satisfaction Index	-0.00	-0.11	0.09
Self-Worth Index	0.00	0.12	0.52
Purpose Index	-0.00	0.11	0.87
Work Last 30 Days	0.08	0.07	0.69
Worked Myanmar	0.33	0.33	0.69
Hrs Idle/Day	3.94	3.98	0.49
Locus of Control	15.04	14.90	0.58
Healthy Days	24.84	25.32	0.04
PHQ Index	0.00	0.05	0.62
Stress Index	0.00	0.02	0.53
Diff. Conversations	12.56	12.55	0.80
Savings (BDT)	276.73	251.44	0.93
Consumption 2 Wks (BDT)	3710.52	3645.39	0.84
IPV Verbal Index	0.00	0.08	0.27
IPV Norms Index	-0.00	-0.10	0.05
Men in Home Norms Index	0.00	-0.16	0.00
Women at Work Norms Index	-0.00	0.05	0.45
Aspirations for Working Daughter Index	-0.00	-0.00	0.99
Observations	360	720	
Joint F-Test			0.17

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show the average value of the variable in the respective treatment arm, for individuals who received the treatment. Indices are standardized. Column (3) shows the p-value of the difference in means between the control and work treatment groups.

A.1.3 Attrition

Table A4: Attrition, endline survey

	(1) Treatment	(2) Partner	(3) Male	(4) Female
Work	0.002 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.005 (0.012)
Mean in Control	0.033	0.056	0.053	0.036
Observations	1080	1080	1080	1080

Notes: This table reports attrition for the endline survey in the treatment arm relative to control. The four columns are different sub-samples: Column (1) reports attrition for treated individuals (both men and women). Column (2) reports attrition for their partners. Column (3) reports attrition of men's respondents (both treated and partner). Column (4) reports attrition for women's respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.1.4 Additional First Stage

Table A5: Selected consumption components, households where women are treated

Panel A: Treated Women							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Better Food	Paan	Education	Healthcare	Give Loans	Festivals	Small HH
Work	82.889 (77.973)	63.007** (30.558)	14.950 (15.098)	36.906 (76.414)	50.060 (61.498)	-96.079 (88.520)	0.702 (11.831)
Control Mean	1525.085	431.441	126.789	828.192	94.914	305.148	130.554
Shrp. q-val Work	0.938	0.386	0.938	1.000	0.997	0.938	1.000
Observations	516	517	501	515	498	498	513
Panel B: Partner Men							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Work	45.659 (79.185)	-18.821 (27.984)	-24.235 (16.615)	-78.544 (82.107)	17.686 (52.341)	70.088 (149.985)	-0.118 (11.586)
Control Mean	1671.635	578.894	146.746	849.500	165.704	365.976	171.382
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	505	505	488	500	484	490	497

Notes: All outcomes are in taka and unstandardized. Each column represents the amount of money spent on a particular consumption category: (1) Food (meat, fish, fruits, vegetables); (2) Paan (paan, cigarettes, tea and coffee); (3) education; (4) healthcare; (5) giving loans; (6) festivals/dawat (eid, funeral, wedding, ear piercing); (7) small/regular (non-food) household expenditures (phone bill, mosquito nets, kitchen materials). Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Selected consumption components, households where men are treated

Panel A: Treated Men							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Better Food		Paan	Education	Healthcare	Give Loans	Festivals	Small HH
Work	1.134 (70.884)	-4.237 (30.050)	30.084* (16.342)	8.423 (98.999)	16.324 (37.500)	-109.247 (144.208)	3.067 (11.296)
Control Mean	1678.830	553.392	87.895	768.047	66.830	476.520	169.673
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	0.865	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	524	525	508	516	506	508	519

Panel B: Partner Women							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Work	-69.677 (58.405)	37.637 (28.367)	16.362 (16.654)	32.026 (70.130)	-40.217 (46.409)	-69.064 (116.119)	1.504 (12.656)
Control Mean	1597.235	426.706	104.793	733.471	152.530	314.012	124.888
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	514	515	498	515	505	500	512

Notes: All outcomes are in taka and unstandardized. Each column representst the amount of money spent on a particular consumption category: (1) Food (meat, fish, fruits, vegetables); (2) Paan, cigarettes, tea and coffee; (3) education; (4) healthcare; (5) giving loans; (6) festivals/dawat (eid, funeral, wedding, ear piercing); (7) small/regular (non-food) household expenditures (phone bill, mosquito nets, kitchen materials). Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.1.5 Additional IPV

Table A7: Self-reported IPV, households where women are treated

	Panel A: Treated Women	Components of IPV Index	
	(1) IPV Index	(2) Psych Abuse	(3) Phys Abuse
Work	-0.070 (0.071)	-0.073 (0.095)	-0.066 (0.075)
Control Mean	-0.010	-0.047	0.023
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.791	0.791
Observations	518	518	518

	Panel B: Partner Men
	Psych Abuse
Work	-0.069 (0.081)
Control Mean	-0.022
Shrp. q-val Work	-
Observations	505

Notes: Outcomes in the negative direction indicate a decrease in IPV or its acceptability. All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. (2) is an index of the frequency of seven (four for men) psychological abuse IPV actions, including jealousy, humiliation, and insulting, with a higher score corresponding to higher frequency. (3) is an index of the frequency of one physical abuse action (not included for men) and two questions about the acceptability of physical violence against women. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of these two outcomes, computed only for women, because the physical abuse questions are asked only with respect to her experience. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Self-reported IPV components, households where women are treated

Panel A: Treated Women									
Verbal					Physical				
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Jealous	No Money	Humiliate	Insult	Unfaithful	No Friends	No Family	Threaten	Tolerate Beating	Right to Beat
0.020 (0.037)	-0.035 (0.041)	-0.045 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.039)	-0.073* (0.039)	-0.109** (0.043)	-0.045 (0.037)	-0.028 (0.031)	-0.013 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.032)
0.734 1.000 518	0.186 1.000 518	0.424 1.000 518	0.294 1.000 518	0.277 0.378 518	0.350 0.125 518	0.215 1.000 518	0.181 1.000 518	0.864 1.000 518	0.814 1.000 518
Control Mean									
Shrp. q-val									
Work	0.031 (0.040)	0.027 (0.031)	-0.053 (0.040)	-0.101** (0.040)					
Control Mean	0.665	0.276	0.294	0.424					
Shrp. q-val	0.497	0.497	0.385	0.048					
Observations	505	505	505	505					

Panel B: Partner Men

Verbal			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Jealous	No Money	Humiliate	Insult
0.031 (0.040)	0.027 (0.031)	-0.053 (0.040)	-0.101** (0.040)
Control Mean	0.665	0.276	0.424
Shrp. q-val	0.497	0.385	0.048
Observations	505	505	505

Notes: This table presents the effects for each question in the IPV module. Respondents were asked how often the following occurred in the past month: (1) Their partner became jealous or angry when they talked to others; (2) their partner did not trust them with any money; (3) their partner said or did something to humiliate them in front of others; (4) their partner insulted them or made them feel bad about themselves; (5) their partner accused them of being unfaithful; (6) their partner did not allow them to meet with same-gender friends; (7) their partner tried to limit their contact with family; (8) their partner threatened to harm them or someone close to them. Additionally, respondents were asked how often they believe: (9) a wife should tolerate being beaten by her husband to keep the family together; (10) a husband should have the right to beat his wife. All outcomes have been converted into binary variables for ease of interpretation, where a value of 1 indicates *any* occurrence in the past month (actions) or any acceptability (norms). Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9: Self-reported IPV components, households where men are treated

Panel A: Treated Men				
	Verbal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Jealous	No Money	Humiliate	Insult
Work	0.135*** (0.039)	0.026 (0.028)	-0.021 (0.042)	0.001 (0.042)
Control Mean	0.629	0.353	0.359	0.412
Shrp. q-val Work	0.002	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	524	524	524	524

Panel B: Partner Women										
	Verbal					Physical				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Jealous	No Money	Humiliate	Insult	Unfaithful	No Friends	No Family	Threaten	Tolerate Beating	Right to Beat
Work	-0.028 (0.036)	-0.054 (0.037)	-0.072 (0.044)	-0.061 (0.040)	-0.025 (0.036)	-0.084** (0.039)	-0.055 (0.044)	-0.063* (0.037)	-0.050* (0.027)	-0.010 (0.037)
Control Mean	0.753	0.253	0.500	0.359	0.247	0.359	0.241	0.212	0.859	0.753
Shrp. q-val Work	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.427
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

Notes: This table presents the effects for each question in the IPV module. Respondents were asked how often the following occurred in the past month: (1) Their partner became jealous or angry when they talked to others; (2) their partner did not trust them with any money; (3) their partner said or did something to humiliate them in front of others; (4) their partner insulted them or made them feel bad about themselves; (5) their partner accused them of being unfaithful; (6) their partner did not allow them to meet with same-gender friends; (7) their partner tried to limit their contact with family; (8) their partner threatened to harm them or someone close to them. Additionally, respondents were asked how often they believe: (9) a wife should tolerate being beaten by her husband to keep the family together; (10) a husband should have the right to beat his wife. All outcomes have been converted into binary variables for ease of interpretation, where a value of 1 indicates *any* occurrence in the past month (actions) or any acceptability (norms). Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Psychosocial and IPV indices, households where women are treated

	Panel A: Treated Women	
	(1) PS Index	(2) IPV Index
Work	0.081* (0.042)	-0.062 (0.070)
Cash	0.042 (0.041)	-0.073 (0.067)
Unpaid	0.014 (0.039)	-0.068 (0.062)
Control Mean	0.047	-0.012
Observations	1212	1210

	Panel B: Partner Men
	PS Index
Work	-0.002 (0.034)
Cash	-0.039 (0.034)
Unpaid	-0.050 (0.033)
Control Mean	0.027
Observations	1175

Notes: Indices are standardized against the respondent's gender. The psychosocial index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the eight outcomes described in the psychosocial wellbeing tables. The IPV index (2) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the two outcomes described for women in the IPV tables. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Psychosocial and IPV indices, households where men are treated

Panel A: Treated Men		
	(1)	
	PS Index	
Work	0.109*** (0.037)	
Cash	0.025 (0.039)	
Unpaid	0.024 (0.040)	
Control Mean	-0.017	
Observations	1217	
Panel B: Partner Women		
	PS Index	IPV Index
Work	0.102** (0.044)	-0.151** (0.074)
Cash	0.094** (0.044)	-0.157** (0.074)
Unpaid	0.073 (0.045)	-0.179** (0.073)
Control Mean	-0.042	0.015
Observations	1188	1188

Notes: Indices are standardized against the respondent's gender. The psychosocial index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the eight outcomes described in the psychosocial wellbeing tables. The IPV index (2) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the two outcomes described for women in the IPV tables. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.1.6 Additional Household Dynamics (Norms)

Table A12: Household bargaining, households where men are treated

Panel A: Treated Men						
	Barg Success	Act Infl	Act Deci	Norm Action	Norm Men HH	Norm Women Work
Work	-0.008 (0.038)	-0.124** (0.055)	0.024 (0.053)	0.037 (0.048)	-0.106 (0.078)	0.059 (0.071)
Control Mean	0.786	0.017	-0.034	-0.027	0.090	-0.034
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	0.174	1.000	1.000	0.769	1.000
Observations	517	524	524	524	524	525

Panel B: Partner Women							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Barg Participate	Barg Success	Act Infl	Act Deci	Norm Action	Norm Men HH	Norm Women Work
Work	-0.010 (0.032)	-0.043 (0.042)	-0.029 (0.063)	-0.093** (0.045)	-0.080 (0.056)	-0.009 (0.070)	-0.021 (0.049)
Control Mean	0.680	0.728	-0.015	-0.522	-0.077	0.023	0.029
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.378	0.878	1.000	1.000
Observations	515	515	518	518	518	518	518

Notes: Columns (3)-(7) are standardized. (1) is an indicator of whether the wife participated during the bargaining game. (2) is an indicator of whether the respondent received at least the amount they privately wanted. (3) is an index of how much ability the respondent has to influence their partner in case of disagreement. (4) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who decides how much to spend on a set of five item types, (b) an index of what percentage of the household's budget they can spend, and (c) an index of who decides who performs a set of four time use categories. A higher index value means that the *respondent* holds greater sway over decision-making. (5) is similar to (4), but of who *should* decide how to spend or do, and how much. (6) is an index of level of disagreement with the statements "A husband who helps his wife with the household chores should not be respected" and "A husband who makes important decisions jointly with his wife is weak". (7) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of hours women should be allowed to work in/outside the block and level of disagreement with the statement "A wife who prioritizes work outside the home over household-chores is not a good wife". Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A13: Aspirations for children, households where women are treated

Panel A: Treated Women				
	Eldest Daughter	Eldest Son	Daughter-in-Law	Son-in-Law
Work	0.021 (0.077)	-0.001 (0.081)	0.172** (0.069)	-0.067 (0.072)
Control Mean	0.061	0.032	-0.542	-0.446
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	0.027	0.211
Observations	518	518	518	518

Panel B: Partner Men				
	(1) Eldest Daughter	(2) Eldest Son	(3) Daughter-in-Law	(4) Son-in-Law
Work	0.317*** (0.091)	-0.070 (0.079)	-0.105* (0.063)	-0.105 (0.069)
Control Mean	-0.096	-0.051	-0.618	-0.600
Shrp. q-val Work	0.002	0.231	0.146	0.146
Observations	505	505	505	505

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the preferred level of education for the oldest daughter. (2) is preferred level of education for the oldest son. The raw score for (1) and (2) are as follows: 0 for no education, 1 for Grades 1-5, religious or vocational education, 2 for Grades 6-10, 3 for Grades 11-12, and 4 for university or higher. (3) is preference for a daughter-in-law who wishes to work outside the home. (4) is preference for a son-in-law who allows his wife to work outside the home. The raw score for (3) and (4) are as follows: -1 for less working freedom for the woman, 0 for no preference, and 1 for more working freedom. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A14: Aspirations for children, households where men are treated

Panel A: Treated Men				
	(1) Eldest Daughter	(2) Eldest Son	(3) Daughter-in-Law	(4) Son-in-Law
Work	-0.050 (0.094)	-0.155* (0.080)	-0.014 (0.045)	-0.046 (0.051)
Control Mean	0.096	0.051	-0.594	-0.588
Shrp. q-val Work	0.423	0.123	1.000	1.000
Observations	524	524	524	524
Panel B: Partner Women				
	(1) Eldest Daughter	(2) Eldest Son	(3) Daughter-in-Law	(4) Son-in-Law
Work	0.153* (0.086)	0.157* (0.084)	0.023 (0.067)	0.160** (0.067)
Control Mean	-0.049	-0.017	-0.524	-0.518
Shrp. q-val Work	0.083	0.083	0.585	0.036
Observations	518	518	518	518

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the preferred level of education for the oldest daughter. (2) is preferred level of education for the oldest son. The raw score for (1) and (2) are as follows: 0 for no education, 1 for Grades 1-5, religious or vocational education, 2 for Grades 6-10, 3 for Grades 11-12, and 4 for university or higher. (3) is preference for a daughter-in-law who wishes to work outside the home. (4) is preference for a son-in-law who allows his wife to work outside the home. The raw score for (3) and (4) are as follows: -1 for less working freedom for the woman, 0 for no preference, and 1 for more working freedom. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.1.7 Additional Labor Supply

Table A15: Preference for woman to work for 6 months

	Panel A: Women
	(1)
	Pref. Women
Woman Assigned Work	28.9*** (7.4)
Man Assigned Work Mean	40.7
Shrp. q-val	0.001
Observations	175

	Panel B: Men
	(1)
	Pref. Women
Woman Assigned Work	21.4*** (7.3)
Man Assigned Work Mean	29.0
Shrp. q-val	0.004
Observations	177

Notes: Outcomes are unstandardized. (1) is the proportion (in percentage points) of respondents that prefer the woman to work at parity (200 Tk/day), if the work task were to last six months. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A16: Women's preferences to work for different lengths

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	1 Week	2 Months	4 Months	6 Months
Woman Assigned Work	19.3*** (6.3)	34.8*** (7.4)	25.5*** (7.6)	28.9*** (7.4)
Man Assigned Work Mean	64.5	46.2	46.2	40.7
Shrp. q-val	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
Observations	215	175	175	175

Notes: Outcomes are unstandardized. Each column presents the proportion (in percentage points) of female respondents that prefer the woman to work at parity (200 Tk/day), if the work task were to last the duration specified in the column label. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A17: Positive outcomes from women’s work

Panel A: Women					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Bring in money	Friends outside	Other activities	New skills	No positive
Woman Assigned Work	0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.02)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.94	0.25	0.34	0.44	0.04
Shrp. q-val	1.000	0.298	0.210	0.498	1.000
Observations	215	215	215	215	215

Panel B: Men					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Bring in money	Friends outside	Other activities	New skills	No positive
Woman Assigned Work	0.10** (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.79	0.22	0.40	0.36	0.16
Shrp. q-val	0.121	0.879	0.879	0.391	0.121
Observations	217	217	217	217	217

Notes: Observations are restricted to men and women who received the work treatment. The columns are possible responses (multiple choice allowed) to the question “What are the positive outcomes from a woman working outside the home?” (1) is to bring in money to help the household, (2) is she can make friends outside the house, (3) is she gets to do other activities, (4) is she can get to learn new skills, (5) is no positive outcome. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A18: Negative outcomes from men's work

	Panel A: Women				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Less tasks	Less family	Attitude	Tension	None
Woman Assigned Work	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.97
Shrp. q-val	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	215	215	215	215	215

	Panel B: Men				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Less tasks	Less family	Attitude	Tension	None
Woman Assigned Work	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.09	0.08	0.14	0.09	0.61
Shrp. q-val	0.447	0.447	0.447	0.447	0.447
Observations	217	217	217	217	217

Notes: Observations are restricted to men and women who received the work treatment. The columns are possible responses (multiple choice allowed) to the question “What are the negative outcomes from a man working outside the home?” (1) is less time to spend on household tasks, (2) is less time to take care of the family, (3) is it will change his attitude, (4) is it will create more tension in the household, (5) is no negative outcome. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A19: Positive outcomes from men's work

Panel A: Women							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Money	Friends	Activities	Skills	Family	Society	No positive
Woman Assigned Work	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.92	0.25	0.26	0.29	0.42	0.40	0.05
Shrp. q-val	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	215	215	215	215	215	215	215

Panel B: Men							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Money	Friends	Activities	Skills	Family	Society	No positive
Woman Assigned Work	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.06 (0.05)	0.01 (0.01)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.94	0.36	0.44	0.40	0.40	0.44	0.00
Shrp. q-val	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	217	217	217	217	217	217	217

Notes: Observations are restricted to men and women who received the work treatment. The columns are possible responses (multiple choice allowed) to the question “What are the positive outcomes from a man working outside the home?” (1) is to bring in money to help the household, (2) is he can make friends outside the house, (3) is he gets to do other activities, (4) is he can get to learn new skills, (5) is it is his role in the family, (6) is it is appropriate in this society, (7) is no positive outcome. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

B Details on outcome measures

Outcome Variable Descriptions

Psychological wellbeing	
PHQ9	The standardized total score of 9 questions from the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ9). Inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression.
Locus of Control	The standardized total score from responses to four locus of control questions (Levenson's Scales). "In the last 7 days, how many days did you feel that to a great extent your life is controlled by accidental/chance happenings..."
Life Satisfaction Index	A standardized average of survey responses to four questions from Diener's standardized scale, responses made along a six-point Likert scale.
Stress Index	The standardized total score from three elements of adapted from the Cohen Stress scale. "How many of the last 7 days have you [been able to fall asleep peacefully / felt nervous / felt frustrated]?". Inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress.
Sociability	The number of conversations with other adults in the previous day.
Stability Index	The standardized total score from responses to two stability questions using a Cantril ladder. "How secure [do you feel / think you will feel] [at present / five years from now]"
Purpose	Index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who <i>does the most</i> in their family and community (as in Hussam et al. (2022)).
Self-Worth	Index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who is <i>respected the most</i> in their family and community (as in Hussam et al. (2022)).
Intimate Partner Violence	
Psychological Abuse	Index of the frequency of seven (four for men) psychological abuse IPV actions, including jealousy, humiliation, and insulting, with a higher score corresponding to higher frequency. See Table A9 notes for exact questions
Physical Abuse	Index of (a) the frequency of threatened physical abuse and (b) two questions about whether physical abuse should be tolerated/is justified (How often should a wife tolerate being beaten by her husband in order to keep the family together; How often should a husband have the right to beat his wife)
Bargaining and Norms	

Bargaining:	We play an incentivized bargaining game drawn from McKelway (2020). We invite both members of a couple to decide how to allocate 250 taka (2.50 USD) between themselves and their spouse. Both respondents play this game independently with separate enumerators, and then together. Their responses at each stage are written on chits and placed in a tin alongside a random number. One chit is drawn at random, which corresponds to the amount the respondent receives. We create a number of measures from this game, which we outline below:
Bargaining: Wife Participated	Bargaining game: Wife participated in decision making process (binary)
Bargaining: Success	Bargaining game: Received at least desired bargaining amount (binary)
Actions: Influence Index	Inverse covariance weighted index of (a) how often the spouse takes the respondent's input into consideration, how often the respondent expresses their disagreement, how often the respondent tries to change their spouse's mind, and how often the respondent changes their mind in response, and (b) who makes the final decision in case of disagreement.
Actions: Decision Index	Inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who decides how much to spend on a set of five item types (small/large household purchases, child, health, and luxury), (b) an index of what percentage of the household's monthly budget they can spend, and (c) an index of who decides who performs a set of four time use categories (such as raising children). A higher index value means that the respondent holds greater sway over decision-making.
Norms: Actions	Inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who should decide how much to spend, (b) an index of what percentage of the household's monthly budget they should be able to spend, and (c) an index of who should decide who should do the task. A higher index value means that the respondent believes they should hold greater sway over decision-making.
Norms: Men in Household	Index of level of disagreement with the statements "A husband who helps his wife with the household chores should not be respected" and "A husband who makes important decisions jointly with his wife is weak".
Norms: Women at Work	Inverse covariance weighted sum of hours women should be allowed to work in/outside the block, level of disagreement with the statement "A wife who prioritizes work outside the home over household-chores is not a good wife".
Aspirations for Children	
Eldest Daughter	Preferred level of education for the oldest daughter. Raw score: 0 for no education, 1 for Grades 1-5, religious or vocational education, 2 for Grades 6-10, 3 for Grades 11-12, and 4 for university or higher.

Eldest Son	Preferred level of education for the oldest son, with scoring as above.
Daughter-in-law	Preference for daughter-in-law who wishes to work outside the home. Raw score: -1 for a daughter-in-law who does not want to work, 1 for one who does, and 0 for no preference.
Son-in-law	Preference for son-in-law who allows his wife to work outside the home, with scoring as above.

Disaggregated Consumption

Better Food	In the last 2 weeks, how much did you spend on daily groceries (rice, lentils, oil)?
Paan	...paan, cigarettes, tea and coffee?
Education	...education (private tutor)?
Healthcare	...healthcare?
Give Loans	...giving loans?
Festivals	...festivals/dawat (eid, funeral, wedding, ear piercing)?
Small Household	...small/regular (non-food) household expenditures (phone bill, mosquito nets, kitchen materials)?

Other Outcomes

Days Healthy	Number of days not sick in the past 30 days
Cognitive Ability	A standardized weighted index of the number of correct responses to i) a digit span (forward and backward) memory test and ii) basic arithmetic problems including addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.
Risk Tolerance	Button “gambling” game: 10 minus the button level reached, so that a higher value indicates greater risk tolerance.

Labor Supply Exercise

Preference for Women	Indicator with value 1 when the respondent prefers that the woman of the household works at parity (200 taka/day).
Value of Woman Working	Additional daily wage required for the man to work. For example, if the respondent only prefers that the man work at 300 Tk (when the woman makes 200 Tk), the value of a woman working is +100 Tk. A negative wage premium indicates that the respondent prefers the man to work.

Benefits/costs of women's work	<p>These questions are unprompted, and enumerators are trained to code everything that the respondent mentions within the following categories. Negative categories include: (i) less time to spend on household tasks, (ii) less time to care for the family, (iii) changes in attitude, (iv) increased tension in the household, (v) that work is not her familial role, and (vi) that work is not appropriate for her in this society. Respondents also have the option of answering that there is no negative outcome. Positive categories include: (i) bring in money, (ii) make friends outside the house, (iii) do other activities, and (iv) learn new skills. Again, respondents can answer that there is no positive outcome.</p>
Benefits/costs of men's work	<p>Negative outcome options are the same as above, except that familial role and societal role are not offered as options because they are not realistic responses in this context. Positive outcomes are the same, except that familial role and societal role <i>are</i> offered as options.</p>

C Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP)

Below we note the deviations in the analysis from the PAP; available [here](#).

C.1 Sample and Specification

- To focus our exposition on *employment's* impact on the lives of those closest to the employed, we include only work treatment and control groups. This lowers our sample to 1080 households across 120 sub-blocks. The estimating question is updated accordingly. We report outcomes for the cash and volunteer arms in the companion paper (Hsu et al., 2025).
- We report results separately for each sub-group of respondents (treated men, treated women, partner men, partner women), rather than run a pooled regression with interactions. We chose this presentation for ease of comparison across four groups. Formal tests of equality between coefficients are still done via interactions with p-values reported in text.

C.2 Main Outcomes

- **Psychosocial wellbeing:** We expand our psychosocial wellbeing index by including three dimensions listed as mechanisms in our PAP: **purpose**, **self-worth**, and **sociability**. We limit the definition of sociability to only the measure of how many people the respondent had a conversation with yesterday. We made this change to ensure our psychosocial index was inline with (and directly comparable to) our previous work Hussam et al. (2022).
- **IPV:** We report an additional index of intimate partner violence as another main outcome. This includes the pre-specified IPV measures listed in the PAP.
- **Household Power Dynamic:** We re-organize several mechanisms under a discussion of household power dynamics. This includes the pre-specified questions from the incentivized **household bargaining** game.
 - It also includes the pre-specified questions which we refer to in the paper as “actions”: 1) the ability to **influence** one’s spouse in case of disagreement, 2) intra-household **decision making** about consumption and time use decision-making.

- * We combine decision-making over consumption and time-use in a single index rather than leaving them disaggregated (for ease of presentation - there is no movement along this margin).
- It also includes the pre-specified questions which we refer to in the paper as “**norms**”: 1) beliefs around **who should** make decisions about consumption and time use; 2) norms around **men in the household**; and 3) norms around **women in the workplace**.
 - * We combine beliefs about who should make decision-making over consumption and time-use into a single index (for ease of presentation - there is no movement along this margin).
 - * From the norms around women in the workplace: to avoid “double counting” we no longer consider the pre-specified questions about one’s preference for a son-in-law (daughter-in-law) that allows one’s daughter (son) to work to be a reflection of norms of women’s work. Rather we present them in the aspirations for children section.
- **Aspirations for Children:** We re-organize another set of policy-relevant variables under the heading **aspirations for children**. This includes the pre-specified questions about one’s preference for a son-in-law (daughter-in-law) that allows one’s daughter (son) to work. We also include two new variables about the highest level of educational attainment that one desires for their eldest daughter (son) that were included in the survey (time-stamped and public) but that we forgot to mention in the pre-analysis plan.
- **Labor Supply** To investigate the asymmetric nature of the spillover effects in our main outcomes, we returned to our study setting 15 months after the original treatment period. In households that received the work treatment, we used an incentivized choice experiment to reveal respondents’ preferences for whether the husband or wife should work.

C.3 Pre-specified outcomes no longer in the main paper

- The following outcomes are no longer in the main text. We provide justifications for these decisions in what follows, and present the associated tables in the next section.
- While we pre-specified **physical wellbeing** (in the form of sick days in the past month), **cognitive ability** (through a digit span and arithmetic test), and **risk preferences** (through a risk-elicitation game) as dimensions of wellbeing, in retrospect

we do not think these outcomes belong together as measures of wellbeing. Instead, we think these outcomes are likely downstream of psychosocial improvements (as discussed in Hussam et al. (2022)), therefore we do not report them in our main wellbeing analysis.

- We pre-specified a measure of beliefs (norms) around bargaining: “A wife who frequently expresses her opinion in the household is overbearing/talks too much.” This question was not well understood (there was no adequate translation for the word “overbearing”)
- We elicited their willingness to work for an additional week of work. Our findings align with those of Hussam et al. (2022), but we believe a more relevant measure of labor supply decisions—given the focus of this paper—comes from the 15-month follow-up. In this survey, we ask treated individuals *and* their partners about their willingness to accept work, providing deeper insight into their labor preferences.
- We specify a robustness check for one potential confound: participants in the work and volunteering arms may expect their work engagement to unlock other employment opportunities in the future. We replicate (Hussam et al., 2022) using a sub-experiment where we presented certificates of participation to a randomized half of our sample. As with (Hussam et al., 2022) we find no evidence of this confound.
- We tracked several variables through our weekly surveys, which we present below. However, since these surveys were not conducted with partners, they do not directly relate to the focus of this paper.

D Additional Pre-specified results

Table A21: Physical health, cognitive health, and risk preferences, women's-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Women		
	(1) Days Healthy	(2) Cognitive Index	(3) Risk Tol.
Work	0.037 (0.074)	0.053 (0.078)	-0.033 (0.099)
Control Mean	0.049	-0.211	-0.013
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	518	518	518

	Panel B: Partner Men		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Work	-0.027 (0.106)	0.100 (0.067)	-0.092 (0.097)
Control Mean	0.039	-0.097	-0.063
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	0.699	0.699
Observations	505	505	505

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the number of days not sick in the past 30 days. (2) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the digit memory game (sum of level reached) and the number of math questions answered correctly. (3) is the inverse (tolerance, instead of acceptance) of the level at which the respondent was willing to accept the risk game bet. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A22: Physical health, cognitive health, and risk preferences, men's-treated households

Panel A: Treated Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Days Healthy	Cognitive Index	Risk Tol.
Work	0.146** (0.071)	-0.159** (0.065)	0.112 (0.093)
Control Mean	-0.039	0.220	0.063
Shrp. q-val Work	0.048	0.048	0.084
Observations	524	524	524

Panel B: Partner Women			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Work	0.056 (0.097)	0.031 (0.074)	0.020 (0.096)
Control Mean	-0.040	-0.132	0.011
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	518	518	518

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the number of days not sick in the past 30 days. (2) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the digit memory game (sum of level reached) and the number of math questions answered correctly. (3) is the inverse (tolerance, instead of acceptance) of the level at which the respondent was willing to accept the risk game bet. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A23: Psychosocial wellbeing, pooled

Panel A: Treated		Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	PS Index	PHQ	Stress	Life Sat.	Social	Purpose	Self-Worth	Control	Stability
Work	0.092*** (0.030)	0.175*** (0.063)	0.098 (0.062)	0.121*** (0.046)	0.039 (0.041)	0.094* (0.055)	0.066 (0.058)	0.075 (0.056)	0.054 (0.053)
Control Mean	0.004	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.034	0.204	0.034	0.292	0.204	0.292	0.271	0.292
Observations	1043	1043	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042
Panel B: Partner		Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Work	0.043 (0.029)	0.121* (0.073)	0.102 (0.063)	0.006 (0.055)	-0.026 (0.044)	0.104* (0.058)	0.117** (0.056)	-0.047 (0.053)	0.118* (0.064)
Control Mean	-0.020	-0.059	-0.049	0.015	-0.006	-0.041	-0.049	0.032	-0.102
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.210	0.210	0.525	0.317	0.210	0.210	0.230	0.210
Observations	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023


Notes: All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. (2) is an index created from the nine-question PHQ-9 (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression). (3) is an index of three questions inspired by Cohen's Perceived Stress scale (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress). (4) is an index created from Diener's Satisfaction With Life Scale. (5) is how many people the respondent had conversations with yesterday. (6) is an index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who does the most in their family and community. (7) is similar to (6), but relative to the person who is respected the most. (8) is an index created from Levenson's Multidimensional Internal Locus of Control Scales. (9) is an index assessing stability by asking respondents how secure they feel at the moment and expect to feel in the future. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the previous eight outcomes. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A24: Psychosocial index, heterogeneity by participation certificate

	Individual Components of PS Index								
	(1) PS Index	(2) PHQ	(3) Stress	(4) Life Sat.	(5) Social	(6) Purpose	(7) Self-Worth	(8) Control	(9) Stability
Work	0.087** (0.041)	0.153* (0.091)	0.028 (0.087)	0.132** (0.065)	0.077 (0.055)	0.054 (0.074)	0.005 (0.071)	0.045 (0.080)	0.138** (0.067)
Work x Got Certificate	0.004 (0.058)	0.035 (0.127)	0.142 (0.127)	-0.023 (0.091)	-0.094 (0.080)	0.086 (0.113)	0.135 (0.103)	0.044 (0.107)	-0.183* (0.108)
Got Certificate	0.039 (0.052)	0.051 (0.113)	-0.071 (0.102)	0.014 (0.074)	0.171*** (0.064)	-0.074 (0.093)	-0.141 (0.087)	0.094 (0.086)	0.180** (0.087)
Control Mean	0.004	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
Shrp. q-val Work Observations	1.000 1043	1.000 1043	1.000 1042	1.000 1042	1.000 1042	1.000 1042	1.000 1042	1.000 1042	1.000 1042

Notes: This table reports the treatment effect of receiving employment and receiving a certificate (and the interaction) – which we investigate as a robustness check. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Figure A1: Labor supply curve, by gender




Notes: This figure presents the cumulative distribution function of the reservation wage expressed by employment treatment participants for an additional week of work using the incentivized Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. The horizontal axis is in units of Bangladeshi Taka. The vertical dotted line represents the point at which individuals express a willingness to work one additional week for zero pay. Negative reservation wages are a measure of how much respondents are willing to forego earning in an alternative (minimal effort) task in order to continue working for one week with no pay.

Figure A2: Weekly trends in outcomes for participant


(a) Wellbeing Index




(b) Stress Index



(c) Partner Engagement Index



(d) Purpose



Notes: This figure shows the results of our weekly surveys. (a) is an index of how the respondent is currently feeling and how many days they felt well in the past seven. (b) is an index created from the number of days in the past seven that the respondent had trouble sleeping, felt nervous, or stressed. A higher value indicates less stress. (c) is an index of whether the respondent engaged their partner in case of disagreement, and whether they were successfully able to change their mind. (d) asks the respondent to rate themselves relative to someone who does the most for their family. Each figure plots the impact of the work treatment on the participant by gender and by week relative to the control arm. The estimates to the right of the dotted line represent the pooled effect across all six weeks.

E Labor Supply Elicitation

INTRODUCTION TO RESPONDENTS You may recall you previously worked with us. We now have extra budget to offer this type of work for one more week. This will be the last time we will be able to offer any type of work opportunity in the camps.

We have a work opportunity for four days. You will receive at least 200 taka for each day of work. This means that you will receive at least 800 taka for the next week. You must come to the collection point next week for your work to be reviewed, to answer the questions and collect your earnings, you cannot send someone else on your behalf.

Now let me tell you about the work opportunity. We are conducting a research project in which we are trying to understand how you feel about life and how you spend your days in the camps. You do not have to accept the job, but if you do, it will help us with our research. Does it make sense to you?

INITIAL SCREEN: Would you AND your spouse be interested in doing this survey work for four days in the near future? We can guarantee a rate of 200 taka per day, or 800 taka per week. Please note that the work must be completed every day you are assigned without mistakes in order to receive payment. This would be the only week we are able to offer you this opportunity.

PRESENTING CHOICE We only have enough funding to offer the work opportunity for you OR your spouse. Again, we can guarantee 200 taka per day, or 800 taka per week. Who would you prefer to receive this opportunity?

It doesn't matter to us who does the work. We are happy with you doing it or your spouse doing it, but we do need to know ahead of time. Please tell me who, yourself or your spouse, you would prefer takes this opportunity.

EXPLAINING SWITCH POINT Now, we want to understand how strong your preference is that word_pref (name_pref) work. We want to understand how much money it would take for you to switch your preference for who works to word_not_pref (name_not_pref).

For example, you said that you prefer that word_pref (name_pref) works if both you and your spouse can make 200 taka per day. You may even prefer that word_pref (name_pref) works if word_not_pref (name_not_pref) can make 250 taka per day, while word_pref (name_pref) only makes 200 taka per day. But if word_not_pref (name_not_pref) has the opportunity to make 300 taka per day, perhaps you prefer that word_not_pref (name_not_pref) works instead. This is just an example – there is no right answer, and we want to understand what you really want.

Please answer as honestly as possible, because after you give us the wage at which where you are willing to switch the work opportunity to `word_not_pref` (`name_not_pref`), my computer will randomly choose an option given by you or your spouse. (Recall that your spouse is also answering this survey.) There is also one random amount that the computer can pick. This is the “secret-keeping” choice. Why the “secret-keeping” choice? We are adding this to ensure that your choice remains secret from your spouse. Suppose you draw an wage that you have not seen before. This could be the amount that your spouse chose for you or it could be the secret-keeping choice. There is no way for you to know. The same applies for your spouse; there is no way for them to know your choices. We do this so that you can be assured that your choices are known only to you and me. I will not share any information about what you choose in private with your spouse.

Either you or your spouse will then be offered the job for the wage that the computer randomly chooses. Does that make sense?

ELICITING SWITCH POINT If we offered `word_not_pref` (`name_not_pref`): [INCREASING AMOUNTS FROM 200 TAKA] per day of work, would you prefer that they work. Remember, the other option is that we pay `word_pref` 200 taka per day to do this work.