

DISCUSSION OF:

“ACCELERATOR OR BRAKE? CASH FOR CLUNKERS, HOUSEHOLD LIQUIDITY, AND AGGREGATE DEMAND”

Green Melzer Parker Rojas (2017)

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Overview

- ¶ Goal is to identify how household financial constraints (access to liquidity) affect the impact of fiscal stimulus
 - ¶ CARS program was both a rebate and provided immediate liquidity
- ¶ Combine data on vehicle (model) with household balance sheet position
- ¶ Using a diff-in-diff approach, find that CARS strongly increases the probability of buying a new car.
 - ¶ Effect is a temporary shift of purchases
- ¶ Effect drops to 0 for households with loans on the “clunkers”.
- ¶ Very good paper, clearly written
 - ¶ Great example of how to write a good empirical paper.
 - ¶ Comments on main contribution – identification of liquidity effects (sample size, others)

CARS (“Cash for clunkers”) program

Overview

- Trade-in for old vehicles (<25 yrs), Jul-Aug 09
- New vehicles of better MPG (cars: <\$45k, >=22MPG)
- Subsidy is \$3,500 or \$4,500, depends on Δ in MPG


Economic subsidy

- $Max(S - V, 0)$, $S \in \{3,500, 4,500\}$, V is value of the trade-in
- Liquidity w/ program: $S - L$, L is the loan on the vehicle

Empirical methodology


- Use BLS Cons. Exp. Survey + EPA + Edmunds
- Diff-in-diff for subset of “at-risk” households
- Treatment: MPG ≤ 18 , Control: MPG ≥ 19 .

Effect of the subsidy




Estimates of the effect of the program on trade-ins are very clean


- ▮ RDD “feel”, and unlikely that household unobservables sort very strongly once condition on value < \$5,000 and MPG between 12 and 25.
- ▮ Also convinced that this represents mostly an anticipation of purchases




Interaction with liquidity



Interaction with liquidity



Interaction with liquidity - control



Small sample for secured loans + clunker subsample

	Clunker	Close to clunker
No Loan	1,580	2,102
With Loan	96	163
Total	1,676	2,265

¶ 2-3% over 6 months is small (2-3 households for “clunker, with loan” sample).

Characteristics of households by trade-in value x liquidity?

Sample characteristics	Subsample: <i>Classified</i>	
	<i>Clunker</i>	<i>Close-to-Clunker</i>
Number of vehicles	1,676	2,265
Number of households	1,480	2,014
Sample mean		
Vehicle age (years)	13.1	11.8
Vehicle value (\$ thousands)	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>
Vehicle fuel economy (MPG)	15.6	21.0
Vehicle loan outstanding (indicator)	5.7%	7.2%
Vehicle loan balance, if > 0 (\$ thousands)	<u>5.0</u>	<u>4.7</u>



Clunkers with loans – alternative hypotheses


1. Severely constrained households

- ¶ For these cars, as long as $L \leq V$, the liquidity provision is still substantial.
 - ¶ What is typical down-payment for relevant set of new cars?
- ¶ Summary statistics suggest that $L > V$ for at least some, potentially many of them.
- ¶ May indicate these are particularly constrained households, who may not have access to new car loans in the crisis
 - ¶ Maybe these households only had access to loans with higher down-payments?

Clunkers with loans – alternative hypotheses

2. High value cars – economic subsidy is small

- ¶ Estimated effects are largest for cars of trade-in value of <2,000



- ¶ Is subsample of clunkers with loans of higher average value?

- ¶ Relative to sample owned outright
- ¶ May help explain the results as pure value of subsidy effect (not liquidity)