

# Discussion of: **Krueger, Ludwig (2018)**

BFI'S TAXATION AND FISCAL POLICY CONFERENCE

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# One Page Summary

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- Provides **sharp characterization** of optimal linear tax on capital
- Environment of interest: overlapping generations
- Why this environment?
  - ① Lifecycle component: Income risk → taxes
  - ② Multiple generations: Relative Pareto weights → taxes
  - ③ Log utility + Other: Simplify solution of Ramsey problem (✂ Income risk)
- **Next:** Review formulas; To the data; Review of assumptions

## A SIMPLER EXAMPLE

# Changing Alpha: Theory (I/II)

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- Consider 3 periods and 2 generations
- Let capital share  $\alpha_0 \rightarrow \alpha_1 \rightarrow \alpha_2$
- Maintain **log** utility and Cobb-Douglas production.

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<sup>1</sup>Generalized in Section 6 of the paper for general risk aversion and IES.

# Changing Alpha: Theory (I/II)

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- Consider 3 periods and 2 generations
- Let capital share  $\alpha_0 \rightarrow \alpha_1 \rightarrow \alpha_2$
- Maintain **log** utility and Cobb-Douglas production. Then ( $\approx$  **Proposition 1**):<sup>1</sup>

$$s_0 = \frac{1}{1 + [\alpha_1 \beta (1 - \tau_1) \Gamma]^{-1}}$$

Income Risk  $\Leftrightarrow \Gamma = \int [\kappa \eta_1 (1 - \alpha_1) + \alpha_1]^{-1} d\Psi(\eta_1)$

- Observations:
  - ① **Proof:** Euler equation **+** Express consumption in terms of  $k_{t+1}$
  - ② As  $\alpha_1$  increases income dispersion matters less

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<sup>1</sup>Generalized in Section 6 of the paper for general risk aversion and IES.

## Changing Alpha: Theory (II/II)

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- Let  $\omega_0$ ,  $\omega_1$  weights on first and second generation ( $\theta = \omega_1/\omega_0$ )
- Assume planner can choose saving rate  $s$  only.

## Changing Alpha: Theory (II/II)

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- Let  $\omega_0, \omega_1$  weights on first and second generation ( $\theta = \omega_1/\omega_0$ )
- Assume planner can choose saving rate  $s$  only. Then ( $\approx$  **Proposition 2**):

$$s_0^* = \frac{1}{1 + \left[ \alpha_1 \beta + \frac{\omega_1}{\omega_0} \alpha_1 (1 + \alpha_2 \beta) \right]^{-1}}; \quad s_1^* = \frac{1}{1 + [\alpha_2 \beta]^{-1}}$$

Can implement rate with  $\Rightarrow (1 - \tau) = \frac{1}{\Gamma} \left[ 1 + \frac{\theta}{\beta} (1 + \alpha_2 \beta) \right]$

- Observations:
  - ①  $s_i^*$  independent of  $\Gamma$
  - ②  $s_i^*$  determined by impact on current and future generation

BACK TO THE MAIN MODEL...



# Data


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- Uses Social Security 2006 (public use) earning-master-file
- Restrict to males ages 20 and above with birth-year  $\geq 1910$
- Split in two groups by age: **Young**  $\in [20, 50)$  and **Old**  $\in [50, \infty)$
- If required, restrict to individuals with at least 30 years data centered at age 50 (Ending up with 108,522 individuals)
- Other parameters:  $\beta = 0.4 = 0.97^{30}$  (0.8 in paper);  $\alpha = 0.2$ ,  $\kappa = 0.5$ .

→ Warning: data is W-2 based and top-coded at SS taxable maximum

# Main Model: Gamma

Recall  $\Rightarrow \Gamma = \int [\kappa\eta(1 - \alpha) + \alpha]^{-1} d\Psi(\eta) > 1$




- Potential concern: model assumes stationary  $\Gamma$

## Main Model: Threshold $\theta$

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- **Proposition 3** characterizes threshold values for societal discount factor. If  $\theta$  is above the threshold  $\rightarrow$  capital is subsidized



 In the next slides let's set  $\theta = 1/3$

# Main Model: Saving Rate

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In Paper 


$$s = \frac{1}{1 + [\alpha\beta\Gamma]^{-1}} \quad s^* = \frac{1}{1 + \left[ \alpha\beta + \frac{\theta}{1-\alpha\theta} \alpha(1 + \alpha\beta) \right]^{-1}};$$

# Main Model: Saving Rate

In Paper 

$$s = \frac{1}{1 + [\alpha\beta\Gamma]^{-1}}$$


$$s^* = \frac{1}{1 + \left[ \alpha\beta + \frac{\theta}{1-\alpha\theta} \alpha(1 + \alpha\beta) \right]^{-1}};$$



- Higher income-risk increases (the model) saving rate over time

# Main Model: Taxes

In Paper  $\Rightarrow (1 - \tau^*) = \frac{1}{\Gamma} \left( 1 + \frac{\theta}{\beta} \frac{1 + \alpha\beta}{1 - \alpha\theta} \right)$



- As anticipated: subsidies end in 80s due to increase in income risk

# Room-Based Lit Review (Incomplete)

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- **Farhi, Sleet, Werning, Yeltekin (2012):**

- What about commitment?

- **Golosov, Troshkin, Tsyvinski (2016):**

- What about consumption-labor distortions?

- **Stantcheva (2017):**

- What about human capital?

# **Discussion of Ideas for: Krueger, Ludwig (~~2018~~ 2020)**

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# Some Key Assumptions

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- In which direction to write the next paper?
- Paper already considers Epstein-Zin preferences
- For ideas, let's look at some data relative to:
  - ① Income Process
  - ② The Saving Rate
  - ③ Feasibility

# The Income Process

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In the paper:


- Income when young:  $i_y(t) = (1 - \kappa)w_t$
- Income when old:  $i_o(t) = \kappa\eta_{t+1}w_{t+1}$
- $\eta_t$ : i.i.d. and mean one;  $w_t$  common wage component
- Derive  $\kappa$  averaging in the cross-section or panel:

$$\frac{E^c[i_y(t+1)]}{E^c[i_o(t)]} = \frac{1 - \kappa}{\kappa}$$

$$E^p \left[ \frac{i_o(t)}{i_y(t)} \right] \cdot \frac{E^c[i_y(t)]}{E^c[i_y(t+1)]} = \frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa}$$



# The Income Process: Age Timing

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Source: SSA EPUF 2006

# The Income Process: Age Timing



- Constant over time, some issue with panel approach (heterogeneity? prices?)
- Caveat: **Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, Song (2016)**  
For ages 25-55, heterogeneity at top of income distribution


# The Income Process: Uncertainty

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- **Key:** when do households face most uncertainty?

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Source: SSA EPUF 2006

- Consistent with **Huggett, Ventura, Yaron (2011)**


# The Saving Rate

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- In the paper, young save. Key driver is precautionary saving
- Use *Survey of Consumer Finances* for 2016
- Split in two groups by age: Young  $\in [24, 54)$  and Old  $\in [54, 84)$
- With minor fudging:

$$s_{\text{young}} = 5.5\% \quad s_{\text{old}} = 0.0\%$$

# The Saving Rate: Smoothed Age Patterns



Source: SCF 2016

- **Retirement** = Quasi-liquid retirement accounts + Other managed assets + Other financial assets




# Feasibility

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☞  $k_{t+1}$  determined entirely by domestic savings. What do we observe:

# Feasibility

👉  $k_{t+1}$  determined entirely by domestic savings. What do we observe:



Source: WDI (NY.GNS.ICTR.ZS, NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS)

# Conclusion

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**S:** Clean and sharp characterization of policy and tradeoffs

**W:** Sharpness comes at a cost: appeal of the assumptions  
(lifetime timing saving & uncertainty; non-stationarity; commitment)

**O:** Ability to apply analysis to other margins: tech-change; aging population

**T:** A crowded landscape, need a loud voice

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