

The Speed of Sequential Asymptotic Learning

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- Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch 1992.
- **State of the nature** $\theta \in \{h, l\}$.
- Set of **Bayesian agents** $N = \{1, 2, \dots\}$.
- Agent i receives a **private signal** s_i which depends on θ .
- **Conditioned** on S , private signals are **i.i.d.**
 - **Example.** Gaussian private signals - either $N(-1, 1)$ or $N(1, 1)$, depending on θ .
 - **Example.** Bernoulli private signals - either $B(0.51)$ or $B(0.49)$, depending on θ .

- Actions set $A = \{h, l\}$.
- Each state associated with a preferable **action**.
- Each agent has to choose an action in turn.
- Agents observe the **actions** of their **predecessors**.
- **Time periods.** $t \in \{1, 2, \dots\}$.
- At time t , agent t
 - Observes a_1, \dots, a_{t-1} and s_t .
 - Takes action $a_t \in \{h, l\}$.
- The **utility** of agent t is 1 if $a_t = \theta$ and zero otherwise.
- $a_t \in \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in \{h, l\}} \mathbb{P}[\theta = a | a_1, \dots, a_{t-1}, s_t]$.

- Benchmark: agents observe **signals**.
- At time t , agent t
 - Observes s_1, \dots, s_t .
 - Takes action a_t .
- The error probability is $e_t = \mathbb{P}[a_t \neq \theta]$.
- **Asymptotic learning.** e_t tends to zero.
- In fact, exponentially quickly.
- The time to learn is

$$T_L = \min\{t : a_\tau = \theta \text{ for all } \tau \geq t\}.$$

- **Strong asymptotic learning.** $T_L < \infty$ almost surely.
- The public belief is $p_t = \mathbb{P}[\theta = h | a_1, \dots, a_t]$.
- **Public learning.** $\lim p_t \in \{0, 1\}$.
- Private signals suffice to estimate θ correctly.

- Back to observing actions.
- **Does the private signal information get disseminated?**
- Answers depend on whether signals are bounded.
- Define the private log-likelihood ratio

$$L_t = \log \frac{\mathbb{P}[s_t | \theta = h]}{\mathbb{P}[s_t | \theta = l]}.$$

- **Bounded.** The support of L_t is contained in some $[-M, M]$
- There's a limit to how convincing a private signals can be.
- **Unbounded.** There's no such limit (in both directions).

- What is the error probability $e_t = \mathbb{P}[a_t \neq \theta]$?
- What is the distribution of the public belief $p_t = \mathbb{P}[\theta = h | a_1, \dots, a_t]$?
- What about the time to learn T_L ?
- Banerjee 1992, BHW 1992, Smith and Sørensen 1992.
- **Bounded signals: information cascade.**
 - No asymptotic learning: $\lim e_t > 0$.
 - No strong asymptotic learning: $\mathbb{P}[T_L = \infty] > 0$
 - No public learning: almost surely $\lim p_t \in (0, 1)$.
- **Unbounded signals: no information cascade.**
 - Asymptotic learning: $\lim e_t = 0$.
 - Strong asymptotic learning: almost surely $T_L < \infty$.
 - Public learning: $\lim p_t \in \{0, 1\}$.

Questions: unbounded signals

- Assume henceforth **unbounded signals**.
- Recall

$$p_t = \mathbb{P}[\theta = h | a_1, \dots, a_t]$$

$$e_t = \mathbb{P}[a_t \neq \theta]$$

$$T_L = \min\{t : a_\tau = \theta \text{ for all } \tau \geq t\}.$$

- Condition on $\theta = h$.
- Asymptotic learning: $\lim e_t = 0$.
How quickly does this happen?
- Strong asymptotic learning: $T_L < \infty$.
What is the expectation of T_L ?
- $\lim p_t = 1$.
How quickly does this happen?

- **Vives** 1993. Observing beliefs + noise.
- **Sørensen** 1996.
 - “Proof to be finished”.
 - Conjecture: expected time to learn is **infinite**.
- **Chamley** 2004. Some estimate.
- **Lobel, Acemoglu, Dahleh and Ozdaglar** 2009. Social networks.
- Concurrent paper by **Rosenberg and Vieille**.

PART II: UNBOUNDED BELIEFS. In state H , $\ell_n \rightarrow 0$ and eventually everyone chooses action a_M , and so

$$\ell_{n+1} = \varphi(M, \ell_n) = \ell_n \frac{1 - F^L(\bar{p}_{M-1}(\ell_n))}{1 - F^H(\bar{p}_{M-1}(\ell_n))}$$

For now we shall assume that *extreme signals are not very rare at 0*: i.e. there exists $K > 0$ so that for all $p \in (0, 1)$, $F^L(p)/p < K$, and similarly, *extreme signals are very rare at 1* if there exist $K > 0$ so that for all $p \in (0, 1)$, $(1 - F^H(p))/(1 - p) < K$. By Lemma A-1.2, with unbounded beliefs and very rare extreme signals, there exist $\varepsilon > 0$ such that $(1 - F^L(p))/(1 - F^H(p)) > 1 - \varepsilon p$, once p is close enough to zero. Since $\bar{p}_{M-1}(\ell) = \ell/(u + \ell)$ for some $u > 0$, we can conclude that $\langle \ell_n \rangle$ eventually satisfies $\ell_{n+1} > \ell_n - \delta \ell_n^2$ for some $\delta > 0$. Fix n so large that $\ell_{n+1} > \ell_n - \delta \ell_n^2$ and $1 - 2\delta \ell_n > 0$, and take then N so large that $\ell_n \geq 1/((N + n) \log(N + n))$. Then we get $\ell_{n+1} \geq 1/((N + n + 1) \log(N + n + 1))$. Thus $\sum_n 1/(n \log(n)) = \infty$. (proof to be finished) \square

Benchmark model again

- Benchmark: observing signals.
- Let the **public log-likelihood ratio** be

$$l_t = \log \frac{p_t}{1 - p_t}.$$

- When observing signals

$$l_t = \sum_{\tau=1}^t L_{\tau},$$

where L_t is the private log-likelihood ratio.

- So conditioned on θ , l_t grows linearly, by LLN:

$$\lim_t \frac{l_t}{t} = \mathbb{E}[L_t | \theta].$$

- $l_t \rightarrow \infty$ when $\theta = h$.
- $l_t \rightarrow -\infty$ when $\theta = l$.

Theorem

When observing actions

$$\lim_t \frac{\ell_t}{t} = 0$$

almost surely.

Theorem

For every $r: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ with $\lim_t r(t)/t = 0$ there exist private signal distributions with

$$\lim_t \frac{|\ell_t|}{r_t} = 1$$

almost surely.

- Let G_θ be the distribution of L_t , conditioned on θ .
- When $a_t = h$,

$$l_{t+1} \approx l_t + G_l(l_t).$$

- Condition on $\theta = h$. Then $a_t = h$ from T_L on.
- When G_l has a thick tail, l_t will grow quickly. When the tail is thin, l_t will grow slowly.

Evolution of public beliefs

- $l_{t+1} \approx l_t + G_l(l_t)$.
- Mild technical assumptions (continuity, convexity etc) on G_θ .

Theorem

Let f be a solution of the differential equation

$$\frac{df}{dt}(t) = G_l(-f(t)).$$

Then, conditioned on $\theta = h$,

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{l_t}{f(t)} = 1$$

almost surely.

The time to learn

- The time to learn is

$$T_L = \min\{t : a_\tau = \theta \text{ for all } \tau \geq t\}.$$

Theorem (Sørensen 1996)

$\mathbb{E}[T_L] = \infty$ for **some** signal distributions.

- Intuition: when all predecessors have taken the same action, an agent is very likely to do the same.
- Enough to show that expected time until first correct action is infinite.

Conjecture (Sørensen 1996)

$\mathbb{E}[T_L] = \infty$ for **every** signal distributions.

Theorem

When G_l and G_h have **polynomial tails** then $\mathbb{E}[T_L] < \infty$.

- An **upset** is a time t such that $a_t \neq a_{t-1}$.
- A **run** is a sequence of times between upsets.
- In a run all agents take the same action.
- T_L is the time of the last upset (or 1).
- To show that T_L is small, we show that
 - The number of upsets is small.
 - The length of each run is small.

- What is the probability that there are many upsets?

Theorem

*The distribution of the number of upsets has an exponential tail for **every** signal distribution.*

- Intuition.
 - Whenever agents take the correct action they have a positive probability of never making a mistake again.
 - This probability can be bounded away from zero.

The length of each run is small

- Assume private signals have polynomial tails.
- The length of each run has finite expectation.
- But expectation is bigger when run starts after long opposite run.
- But not by too much.
- Easy to see when ℓ_t is uniformly bounded after every upset.
- This is not the case, but we can bound it sufficiently.

- The error probability is

$$e_t = \mathbb{P}[a_t \neq \theta].$$

- We have some upper and lower bounds.
- Large gap between bounds.

Question

How does the asymptotic behavior of e_t depend on the signal distributions?

Thanks!