About 45,000 Americans die from firearm injuries each year, including roughly 20,000 homicides, and handguns are involved in about 90% of homicides where the weapon type is known. Yet restrictions on gun sales face intense political opposition, and since District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), courts have limited how far governments can restrict access to commonly owned firearms. Part of the difficulty with gun rules is that they impose visible losses on an identifiable group of buyers, while the benefits are spread across people who may never know they were spared.

In this paper, the authors examine a different approach to reducing firearm deaths. What if, they ask, the government paid consumers who are about to buy their first handgun to choose a less lethal option instead, such as a rifle or shotgun (known as long guns), or to forgo the purchase altogether? Buyers would remain free to purchase any legal firearm, while taxpayers would pay for the resulting gain in public safety. The authors reason that wherever the lives saved are worth more than what buyers give up by forgoing a handgun, there are gains from trade: the net benefit created when a deal leaves both sides better off. Here, the lives saved are worth more to society than what buyers give up by switching, so paying buyers to switch leaves everyone ahead. : the government can fully compensate buyers, and society still comes out ahead.

To quantify what buyers give up by switching, the authors turn to their own prior research that estimated consumer demand for firearms. They use these results, which show how much consumers value handguns relative to long guns and how sensitive they are to price, to infer the minimum payment each prospective first-time handgun buyer would require to choose a long gun or no gun instead.

Next, the authors calculate how many deaths these paid switches could prevent. They draw on research showing that a 1% increase in the share of households owning a gun raises homicides by 0.1 to 0.3%, using the midpoint of 0.2% for their estimates.1 In addition, because most switchers would buy a long gun instead, the authors estimate the effects of those switches under two scenarios: an optimistic one in which long guns add no homicide risk, and a pessimistic one in which long guns raise homicide risk at the same proportional rate as handguns — which, because long guns are involved in far fewer homicides to begin with, still implies a smaller increase in deaths than the same rise in handgun ownership would.

Finally, the authors check whether compensating would-be first-time gun buyers to opt out of handguns yields gains from trade; in other words, they quantify whether the lives saved, valued at $13 million each,2 exceed the full cost3 of getting buyers to switch. They compare two approaches. In one, the government pays each buyer exactly their minimum price. In the other, it offers everyone the same flat payment.

Combining their estimates of what buyers would need to be paid with the resulting reductions in homicide, the authors find the following:

  • Many first-time handgun buyers would switch for modest sums. Absent any payment, roughly 64% of prospective buyers from gun-free households would choose a handgun. Half of those buyers would switch for $815 or less, and a quarter for under $300. A long tail of committed buyers pushes the average to $2,118. Most switchers (78%) would choose a long gun; the rest would forgo a gun or choose an alternative such as a Taser.
  • Paying each buyer their minimum price to switch passes a cost-benefit test. When payments are perfectly targeted to each buyer’s minimum required amount, the best policy would move 47.5% of handgun buyers and avert 220 homicides a year in the optimistic scenario, or move 27.3% and avert 60 in the pessimistic one. The net social cost is $5.5 million and $5.9 million per averted homicide, respectively, with government spending of $0.97 billion and $0.28 billion a year.
  • The cheapest switches save the most lives per dollar. Most of the deaths a targeted program could prevent come from buyers who would switch for small sums. Raising the maximum payment from the optimal $745 to $5,000, nearly seven times as much, would less than double the lives saved.
  • A flat subsidy costs much more and saves fewer lives. If the government cannot tell buyers apart, it must offer the same payment to every first-time buyer who ends up with a long gun instead of a handgun, or who doesn’t buy a gun at all. The best flat subsidy of $412 moves 32.4% of handgun buyers and averts 148 homicides, but it costs $2.43 billion, two and a half times as much as the targeted program. Only 36% of that spending reaches buyers who actually switch; the rest goes to people who would have chosen a long gun or no gun anyway. The policy still passes a cost-benefit test, at $6.8 million per averted homicide, but it spends $16.4 million in public money per life saved.

The authors stress that their analysis is a benchmark rather than a policy proposal: implementation would raise questions about verification, resale, and fraud, and the estimates rest on survey choices rather than actual purchases. Still, the results suggest that substantial gains from steering buyers away from handguns exist even after fully compensating them. Compensation-based approaches have proven politically viable in other areas, including agricultural subsidies, cash-for-clunkers programs, and tax credits for electric vehicles. And because most first-time buyers say they want a gun for personal safety, policies that meet that need with less lethal options may hold particular promise.

1 Chandler, Alfred D. 1977. The Visible Hand. Harvard University Press.
2 The federal government’s standard value of a statistical life, from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ 2024 guidance.
2 That cost has two parts. The first is what buyers give up, which equals the smallest payment that would persuade them to switch. The second is the cost of raising that money through taxes, which discourage some work and investment; following federal guidelines, the authors put that cost at 25 cents per dollar paid out.

 

Written by Abby Hiller • Designed by Maia Rabenold