Yuliy Sannikov is a theorist who has developed new methods for analyzing continuous time dynamic games using stochastic calculus methods. His work has broken new ground in methodology, and has had a significant influence on applied theory. He has employed such methods to study the design of securities, contract theory, macroeconomics with financial frictions, market microstructure, and collusion.
His dissertation, “Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time,” published in Econometrica in 2007 introducing tools for analyzing repeated games. He has applied his work on optimal dynamic contracts to the financial sector, studying incentives to determine the optimal design of securities and firm financing.
With Markus Brunnermeier, he has developed a macroeconomic model with financial sector frictions. The 2008-09 financial crisis highlighted the need for models that can better account for economic disruptions arising from stress in the financial markets. This model offers a way to analyze the expected frequency and severity of financial crises.
He began his academic career as an assistant professor of economics at the University of California Berkeley. He also was an assistant professor of finance at New York University before joining the Economics Department at Princeton University in 2008.
In 2016, Sannikov was honored the with John Bates Clark Medal, awarded by the American Economic Association to the economist under age 40 who has had the greatest impact on the field. He also won the Fischer Black Prize in 2015 and the Kiel Excellence Award in Global Economic Affairs in 2014.
Sannikov earned a bachelor’s degree in mathematics from Princeton University and a doctorate in business administration from Stanford.
Faculty Page: Yuliy Sannikov
Visited 10/3/16 – 10/7/16