China’s land market features a substantial industrial discount: industrial-zoned land is an order of magnitude cheaper than residential land. In contrast to explanations centered on subsidies to industry or promoting industry growth, we emphasize the importance of future tax revenues from the land and find that local public finance incentives can largely rationalize this price gap. Under the “land finance” system, land sales are an important source of revenues for Chinese local governments. We show that local governments, who serve as monopolistic land sellers in China, face a trade-off between supplying residential or industrial land that is determined by the different time profiles of revenues from industrial and residential land sales, local governments’ financial constraints, and the extent of local governments’ tax revenue sharing with other levels of government.

More on this topic

BFI Working Paper·Oct 21, 2026

Venture Capital and Customer Capital

Martin Aragoneses, Young Soo Jang, and Amir Sufi
Topics: Financial Markets
BFI Working Paper·Oct 21, 2026

When Cash Wakes Up: Inertia in Institutional Money Market Funds and the Potential Effects of AI Disruption

Ali Hortaçsu and Younggeun Yoo
Topics: Financial Markets
BFI Working Paper·Aug 31, 2026

Democratizing Private Markets: Equilibrium Predictions

Lubos Pastor, Robert F. Stambaugh, and Lucian A. Taylor
Topics: Financial Markets