The introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) allows the central bank to engage in large-scale intermediation by competing with private financial intermediaries for deposits. Yet, since a central bank is not an investment expert, it cannot invest in long-term projects itself, but relies on investment banks to do so. We derive an equivalence result that shows that absent a banking panic, the set of allocations achieved with private financial intermediation will also be achieved with a CBDC. During a panic, however, we show that the rigidity of the central bank’s contract with the investment banks has the capacity to deter runs. Thus, the central bank is more stable than the commercial banking sector. Depositors internalize this feature ex-ante, and the central bank arises as a deposit monopolist, attracting all deposits away from the commercial banking sector. This monopoly might endangered maturity transformation.

More on this topic

BFI Working Paper·Jul 8, 2026

How Does Monetary and Fiscal Policy Affect the Economy in the Face of Large Shocks?

Greg Kaplan and Ken Miyahara
Topics: Fiscal Studies, Monetary Policy
BFI Working Paper·Jul 8, 2026

Seemingly Anchored Inflation Expectations

Ulrike Malmendier and Stefan Nagel
Topics: Monetary Policy
BFI Working Paper·Jun 30, 2026

Leaning Against Inflation Experiences

Stefan Nagel
Topics: Monetary Policy