N individuals must choose between two collective alternatives. Under Quadratic Voting (QV), individuals buy vote in favor of their preferred alternative from a clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased, and the sum of all votes purchased determines the outcome. Heuristic arguments and experimental results have suggested that this simple, detail-free mechanism is utilitarian efficient. In an independent private-values environment, we rigorously prove that for any value distribution all symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria of QV converge toward efficiency in large populations, with waste decaying generically as 1=N.

More on this topic

BFI Working Paper·Jun 23, 2026

Misleading Estimates from Nonlinear Models with a Binary Outcome

Brian Curran, Bruce Meyer, and Derek Wu
Topics: Uncategorized
BFI Working Paper·Jun 15, 2026

Don’t Give Up on Lab Experiments: Why the Field Still Needs the Lab

John List
Topics: Uncategorized
BFI Working Paper·May 5, 2026

Retrospective Versus Prospective Meritocracy

Steven Durlauf
Topics: Uncategorized